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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The

problem of this

thesis

is the discovery of

scientific knowledge and the importanee of discovery for
understanding the rationality of science.

I will argue that

an adequate account of the rationality of science must
include an analysis of discovery,

and that many of the

problems that have arisen for philosophers of science are the
result of their failure to examine discovery.
Clearly,

this position :runs counter to traditional

wisdom in philosophy of science which holds that philosophy
of science concerns

itself only with the

justification of

scientific knowledge and that discovery is the province of
the pyschology or, perhaps, the sociology of science.

DISCOVERY AS A DIRECTION FOR PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

I

will argue that discovery is more than merely

another problem that deserves its niche in philosophy of
science.

It represents, instead, a new direction for philos-

ophical research into scientific knowledge.

I

will argue

that pursuing discovery will provide a b:roader framework for
l
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understanding science than the Justification alternative.

In

fact, the framework for the rationality of science developed
through

the

discovery

approach

will

be

shown

to

be

sufficiently broad to encompass justification.
What

is

it about

discovery

that gives

it philo-

sophical significance when so many have assumed that it was
the realm of creativity and impenetrable to logic?

The

answer to this question lies in the movement of the discovery
process.

In dealing with a problem the scientist is seeking

an explanation of it such that it will no longer be seen as a
problem

but will

expected.

instead

become paC't

The explanation is

of'

a theoC',Y,

that
of

which

course,

is
and

discovery can thus be seen as' moving from observation to
theory.

However,

it can also be seen as moving from a

problematic observation to a non-problematic observation.

In

either case the discovery problem will involve the character
of observation and the relation between observation and
theory.

To deny that the character' of observation and the

relation between observation and theory are
empirical

characterization

of

science

relevant to an
would

seem

unreasonable.

THE JUSTIFICATION APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

How
writers

does this

relate to the problem encountered by

in philosophy of science 't

I w111 argue,

beginning

3
with Thomas Kuhn in Chapter II,
stem

from

inadequate

observation.

and

that many of those problems

self-defeating

Kuhn, as I will show,

concepts

of

accepts the claim that

observation is theory-laden, but he interprets that claim as
essentially destroying the objectivity of science, insofar as
it is based on observation.

Observation for Kuhn becomes a

matter of consensus of a community of scientists and this has
powerful

implications

for

his

philosophy

of

science.

One

such implication is his assessment of the limits of philosophy of science.

Science, he says,

is rational only during

periods of stability because these are the only times when
consensus on observation statements is achievable.

Philos-

ophy of science, then, is limited in its characterization of
the rationality of science to those stable periods when
testing or justification relation is functional.
argue that Kuhn's
narrow

and

I will

limits on philosophy of sciences are too

that

his

abandonment

of

objectivity

is

unnecessary.
In Chapter III I will examine a position taken by
Ernest Nagel which attempts to include the theory-ladenness
of observation without the limitations or loss of objectivity
that

Kuhn was

willing to

ladenness but argues
are

nonetheless

emb I:' ace.

He accepts

theory-

that observation terms and statements

relatively

stable

in

comparison

to

theory

terms and statements because, although theory-laden, they are
laden with "common sense."

He ful:'ther argues that while

4

theory-ladenness does create problems of circularity in the
testing relation,

those problems can be avoided simply by

choosing evidence that is not laden with the ·theory being
tested.

I

will argue that Nagel has

situation left by Kuhn.

not

improved the

Kuhn describes the theory component

of observation as an "arbitrary element" and Nagel describes
theory as a ''free creation" of the scientist.

Consequently,

they both treat observation as if it were at least partially
determined to be what it is by the theory component.
says,

for

instance

that

"significant observation

Nagel

involves

more than noting what is immediately present to the organs of
sense" ([1], p. 24).

Kuhn reaches the more radical conclu-

sion that with the development of a new theory we observe a
different world ([2], p. 111).
Both Kuhn and Nagel assume that in embracing the
theory-ladenness of observation they must admit that theory
determines what the evidence of observation is in a generative sort of way,

that is,

that theory in theory-laden

observation is responsible to some degree for fabricating the
evidence obtained through observation.

In this interpreta-

tion of theory-ladenness theory determines an observation in
the senses of making it possible and in dictating in part the
content of the knowledge gained through the observation.
The result of this interpretation of theory-ladenness
for Kuhn is that testing ·in science is circular since the
observations that are offered as support for any theory are
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dependent on that theory for their meaning.

In fact,

Kuhn

holds that many observations that were once possible on the
basis of particular theories that no one believes any longer
are no longer possible.

Further',

periods of major theory change,

he believes

that

during

the testing process breaks

down entirely and the scientist is reduced to conversion
tactics in order to persuade his colleagues.
Nagel attempts to avoid such a radically unempirical
conclusion about science by arguing that while the knowledge
gained through observation is determined to be what it is in
part by theory, observation terms are relatively more stable
than

theory

terms

and

that

observation

terms

essential

to

describing situations that are Pelevant to testing a theory
are often not

laden with theory.

I

applaud

the latter

defense of the empirical character of science, but it is
still a weak sense of
through observation

"empirical~

is

treated

since the knowledge gained
as

paPtially fabricated

by

theory.
I will further show that Nagel continues to believe
that circularity in the testing relation is a problem.
solution he offers is prudent choice of evidence.

The

I will

argue that a more reasonable and more empirical solution to
this problem is an analysis of the

relation between theory

and observation.
The

same

assumptions

observation motivate

others

about
to

the

argue

theory-ladenness
for

a

of

theory-neutral

6

In Chapter IV I

interpretation of observation.
that

this

will argue

interpretation leads to a characterization of

observation that is too indeterminate to yield knowledge of
the world.
While

Nagel

and

Kuhn

observation is theory-laden,

accepted

on the other hand,

observation

entirely

in

claim

that

they failed to analyze how

theory arises in relation to observation.
approach,

the

The theory-neutral

seeks to separate theory from

order

to

avoid

the

rationality

problems encountered by positions like that of Kuhn.

Having

separated theory from observation, there seems no way to get
them back together.

THE DISCOVERY ALTERNATIVE

The problem for philosophy of science, as I will
argue

in

Chapters

V and

VI,

is

not

to

keep

theory

and

observation separate or even to limit their relationship, but
rather

it is

to analyze that

relationship in order to see

what sort of characterization of scientiI'ic knowledge is
justified.
That analysis was begun by N. R. Hanson with his
logic of discovery.
observation,
which

Hanson found,

problematic

problematic.

The function of theory in theory-laden
was

phenomena

to provide a context within
make

sense

or

become

non-

What I will do is extend Hanson's analysis of

7
theory-ladenness

in order to draw out the

theory-ladenness for testing in science.

implications of

This analysis has

logical priority over the assumption that

theory-ladenness

implies that the theory determines what the world is like (in
the

strong

sense

of

fabricating

and

making

observation

possible) since it proposes to examine the relation between
theory and observation before reaching any conclusion about
theory-function in the observation process.
The

analysis of the relation between theory and

observation in the testing process will be supported by an
analysis of that relation in the observation process itself.
That analysis will be given in terms of the contributions
from the world in the form of energy and from the observer in
the form of theory.
by theory.

Energy, I will argue, is not alterable

The function of theory, however, is describable

in terms of its ability to select from the available energy
data and to connect that data in appropriate ways.
Among the conclusions that I will reach on the basis
of the discovery approach are:
1.

A

re-interpretation

of

the

justification-

discovery distinction as a continuum.

2.

A

new

basis

for

the

theory-observation

distinction other than empirical content.

3.

A dissolution of the problem of the meaning-

dependency of observation terms on theory.
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4.

A solution to the problem of the non-rejection of

theories in the face of counter-evidence.

5.

An interpretation of scientific truth with less

emphasis on conventionalism.

9
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CHAPTER II

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THEORY-LADENNESS
FOR THE HISTORY AND RATIONALITY OF SCIENCE

In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Thomas
Kuhn found himself in what appeared to be a

dilemma.

The

history of science provided ample testimony for the fact that
the growth of scientific knowledge was more complex than that
for which the model of simple accumulation of data and theory
could account.
than addition,

Scientific change,

no

involved more
He had no

it also involved subtraction.

difficulty marshalling theories
that

Kuhn saw,

and

"facts"

from

the

one would consider good science today.

side of

past

The other

the dilemma came from his belief that science was

empirical.

It seemed to Kuhn that science made genuine

contact with the world and that it had done so even in its
distant past using theories and data that are no longer
accepted.
Kuhn was
had

either

irrational

to
or

faced with unattractive alternatives.
treat
make

the

history

adjustments

rationality of science.

The

been

that

unattractive

except

in

of

science

the

as

concept

latter course might

10

the adjustments

He

partly
of

the

not have

amounted

to

11

reductions.
it,

is

The rational! ty of science,

limited to epochs.

as

Kuhn described

When major changes occur the

rationality of science breaks down.

He saw no way to develop

a trans-revolutionary criterion of rationality in science.
I will argue that Kuhn's philosophy of science is an
elaboration of the implications of two principles.
is

the traditional empiricist assumption that

objectivity in science lies
observation statements.
character

of

The first

the basis of

in consensus on the content of

And the second is the theory-laden

observation.

Kuhn

was

faithful

to

both

principles and I will show that the problems he encountered
arise from incompatibility between them.
Did

Kuhn

actually

accomplish

the

replacement

of

traditional philosophy of science with historical insight as
he promised?
light

on

I will argue that he succeeded in shedding

science

in

several

ways,

including

a

deeper

understanding of discovery and the conditions necessary for
change

in

science.

understanding of

the

But

I

will

also

theory-ladenness

of

argue

that

observation

his
leads

him to an anti-empirical position with regard to science
which has inadequate philosophical content for the void left
by confirmation and falsification.
providing

an

alternative

Science for two reasons.
remains with the

account

He does not succeed in
of

the

rationality

of

First, his concern for science

charact~r

of the testing relation;

the

normal science/revolutionary science distinction amounts to a
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definition of the limits of that relation.
misunderstanding of the meaning of the

And, second, his

theory-ladenness of

observation leaves him stranded with little else to do but
define the limits of a system of thought that he believes he
has rejected.
My argument will have three steps.
provide a

summary account

of Kuhn's

First, I will

analysis

of normal

science and revolutionary science in order to see what

it

actually accomplishes as a replacement of earlier approaches
to philosophy of science.

Second,

I

will

show how his

emphasis on the history of science shaped his understanding
of the theory-ladenness of observation.

And,

third, I will

argue that with this understanding of the theory-ladenness of
observation,

he was limited in what he could accomplish as

well as predisposed to the sorts of problems that arose with
his theory.

NORMAL SCIENCE

Normal science begins for the first time with the
victory of one of the pre-scientific schools
others.

over all

the

This usually happens with the solution to a problem

that was recognized at least in some form by most of the
pre-scientific investigators into this part of nature.
achievement usually has
It

is

two essential characteristics:

sufficiently unprecedented to attract a

That
1.

group of

13
researchers away from other modes of scientific activity, and
2.

It is sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of

problems for this group to work on ([l], p. 10).
A number of consequences follow from the evolution of
pre-science to science.

First, it is no longer necessary for

each researcher to elaborate and defend the fundamentals of
his work.
element

With the dominance of a particular arbitrary
there

is

consensus

within

the

community

on

fundamentals such as the types of entities that populate the
universe,

how

they

interact

appropriate methods for

with

each

other,

investigating them.

This

and

is what

Kuhn describes as the emergence of the "paradigm."
paradigm includes

the

The

the theoretical commitment which is the

same thing as the arbitrary element for Kuhn,

but it also

includes such things as research techniques, instrumentation,
"exemplars" (in the sense of finished pieces of research that
serve as instances of successful application of the paradigm,
often for the purpose of teaching the students of the
science), and much more.
Having achieved consensus on the arbitrary or theory
element, science progresses with far more efficiency than it
could have otherwise.

This is due in part to agreement on

fundamentals,

is

but

it

also

due

to

the

psychological

assurance that the past success of the science offers.

The

researcher is encouraged by more than the promise of further
success, however.

The paradigm that grows up around the

14
science

includes

methods

effective ([1], p.

and

38).

tools

which have

also

proven

Community adoption of a particular

interpretation of nature has the effect of getting research
off the ground and directing it toward problems of a sort
that have proven solvable in the past.
For Kuhn, science does not progress in spite of the
theory-ladenness of observation as it did for Nagel, but
It is only if we have a theory to augment

because of it.

observation and experience that we can assess the relevance
of the available facts and develop methods and instruments to
deal with them.

Having achieved this level, researchers have

a great deal to work with as well as a history of sucess to
encourage them.
Kuhn says that his new image of science will be one
in which fact
"except

and

perhaps

theory
within

scientific practice"
exception?

are
a

( [1],

not

categorically

single

tradition

p.

7).

separable,
of

normal-

Why does he allow this

It would seem that the dependence of fact on

theory would be as great in normal science as in situations
where that dependence becomes problematic in that it leads to
a revolution.

What he seems to be saying is that during

normal

theory

problem.

science

input

into

observation

is

not

a

Since consensus has been achieved on the theory to

employ, facts can be treated as if they were independent of
theory.
problem

This is similar to Nagel's attitude toward the
of

theory-ladenness.

As

long

as

there

is

a

15
foundation on which all normal observers can agree,

the

evidentiary status of observation is saved.
Kuhn understands normal science as those periods when
debate about fundamental assumptions
existent.

is minimal or non-

Research during these times proceeds in a fashion

which is amenable to the cumulative model.

Fact and theory

in these periods seem separable because the facts serve their
testing function in a non-problematic way.

Normal science

is, in this sense, philosophically non-problematic science.
However,

Kuhn's concept of normal science does more

than merely tag it as that part of science which satisfies
the conditions of testing in the "standard view" of science.
It also tells us ..!!:!.l_ science is cumulative, why there is
little debate over fundamentals, and why science in this
situation proceeds with such efficiency.

Having a theory to

guide research and having that theory held in common have a
powerful impact on science.
It is interesting that Kuhn does not concern himself
with the problem of circularity in the testing that occurs in
normal science.

Nagel will avoid this problem after admit-

ting the theory-ladenness of observation by placing the
commonly held theory outside of science, but this option is
clearly closed to Kuhn.
theory that
science.

results

It is the dominance of a particular

in the emergence of science from pre-

The reason for his lack of concern is most likely

that he remains committed at some level to science as an

16
empirical endeavor.

"Observation and experience," he says,

"can and must drastically restrict the range of admissible
scientific belief, else there would be no science" ([l], p.
4).

Observation and experience are not sufficient, as we

have

seen,

essential.

since

the

contribution

But

the

arbitrary

of

the

element

or

perceiver
the

is

theory

contributed by the perceiver is not the whole story.

The

world which is experienced allows only a range within which
such theory assisted observation can function.
to make itself felt,

even though the way it is felt is

determined in part by the perceiver.
circularity?

It continues

Is this a form of

Perhaps, but not in the logical sense that that

which needs to be proven is presupposed by the evidence.
Part of what needs to be

proven~presupposed,

but not all.

The evidence is shaped by the theory, Kuhn would allow, but
not generated in its entirety by the theory.

REVOLUTIONARY SCIENCE

The

arbitrariness

additional aspect to it.

of

the

theory

element

has

an

It facilitates progress in the

conservative sense discussed so far, but it also leads to the
major changes that Kuhn calls revolutions.

This seems odd in

light of the fact that the aim of research during normal
science is not innovation- of either fact or theory, but is
more of a "mopping up operation," an attempt to force nature

17
to fit the contours of the paradigm ( [ 1], p.

24).

How does

research with this sort of motivation lead to major innovations and the ultimate rejection of the paradigm that guided
it from the beginning?
arbitrariness
11

So

long as

The answer to this lies in the very

of the element

contributed by

those commitments

arbitrary," Kuhn says,

the perceiver.

retain an element of

"the very nature of normal

the

research

ensures that novelty shall not be repressed for very long"
( [ 1], p. 5).

In other words, an arbitrary characteriza,tion

of nature is necessarily limited.

It achieves dominance

because of a spectacular solution of a problem.

And it

proceeds to solve problems in part because of the diligence
of

researchers

who

"force nature

this cannot last indefinitely.

into its

contours."

Sooner or later,

But

a problem

will arise that cannot be forced into the "conceptual boxes"
provided in this approach.

When this occurs we have the

beginning of a revolution.
The failure of a paradigm is usually heralded by a
discovery.

To say "unexpected discovery" would be repeti-

tious for Kuhn since the aim of science,

under "normal"

conditions, is not to generate discoveries, but to make the
phenomena that are already known fit into the paradigm.

If

something unexpected arises, an "anomaly," the first response
is

to try to show that it is compatible with the paradigm.

If this attempt fails repeatedly then future attempts tend to
incorporate assumptions that diverge further and further from

18
the paradigm.
ingly

As this process goes on it becomes increas-

difficult

to

achieve

consensus

on

just

what

the

83).

paradigm really is ([1], p.

Kuhn offers this analysis as a replacement of older
philosophical

theories

anomalies

almost

are

al though in the
what they are.
face

because,
never

among

treated

as

other

reasons,

counter-instances

language of philosophy of science

that

is

If scientific theories were rejected in the

of anomalies all scientiic theories would have

rejected at any given time.

to be

To do this would be to reject

science itself, for bringing anomalies into the fold of the
paradigm is the major research activity of normal science.
He
"necessary."

argues

that

scientific

revolutions

are

What he means by this is that radical changes

of the sort which involve the rejection of part of what was
previously considered scientific knowledge are essential to
the evolution of science.
way, he admits.
require it.

Science might not have been this

The "logical structure" of science does not

Instead, new discoveries might involve only

previously unknown phenomena and new theories might represent
only higher level integrations of previously divergent fields
([1], p. 95).

This is just what the latter day logical positivists
would have us believe, Kuhn says.
accumulation as

the

ideal

for

They take development by

science and

treat

instances

Where this did not occur as the result of human idiosyncracy

19
( [ 1], p. 96).

They claim, for instance, that Newton's laws

of motion were not proven wrong by the theories developed by
Einstein.

Newton's laws provide good approximations when the

velocities of the objects studied are small in comparison to
that of light.

Any wider claims made by the Newtonians, the

positivists say, were not supported by the evidence and were,
therefore, "unscientific" ( [ 1], p. 99).

Kuhn counters that

if scientific assertions were limited in scope and precision
to phenomena clearly supported by the evidence, that most of
scientific

research

would

become

illicit,

"unscientific."

Scientists would be limited to talking about those discoveries which are only part of the history of their science.
The assumption that science grows through simple
accumulation
assumptions
The

also

ignores

which always

the

disparity

accompanies

in

fundamental

revo1u tionary

convertibility of matter to energy,

change.

part of modern

physics, was inadmissible in the Newtonian paradigm, for
instance ([l], p. 102).
In other words,

the positivist notion of growth by

accumulation fails on two fronts.

First, it refuses to admit

that the process of growth in science-pushing a paradigm
until it fails is scientific and, second, it cannot account
for fundamental disparity between competing systems.
The cumulative acquisition of unanticipated novelty
almost

never occurs

in science,

accumulation does occur,

he points out.

While

during periods of normal science,
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the discoveries are usually anticipated.

And when discov-

eries are not anticipated, as was the case with the discovery
of X-rays, they are often not cumulative ([l], p. 96).
This discussion helps to explain why it is often
difficult to determine just when a discovery is made and who
should

be

credited

with

the

discovery.

Discovery

is

accomplished in steps, the first of which is the gradual
realization that that which is being discovered does not fit
into the current paradigm.

The second step is the develop-

ment of an alternative paradigm that is capable of explaining
the

discovered phenomenon as well as much that the old

paradigm explained.

These steps take time and they are

frequently contributed to by many researchers.
retrospect and for

It is only in

the sake of simplicity that particular

discoverers and precise dates are designated.

KUHN'S HISTORICAL METHOD

Why did Kuhn characterize the contribution of the
perceiver as "arbitrary"?

The primary reason is that he was

impressed by the deep differences that have existed between
scientific descriptions of the world in various times in its
history.

He traces an interesting back and forth shift on

the admissibility of innate forces which demonstrates this
point:

Aristotelian dynamics, he says, were rejected largely

because it included the concept of innate forces.

Aristotle

21

explained the falling of a stone, saying that its innate
nature

drove

it

toward

the

earth.

The

commitment

to

mechanico-corpuscularism in the Seventeenth Century excluded
such qualities as "occult" and unscientific since they were
not

included

in that paradigm

([l],

p.

104).

Newton's

concept of gravity caused problems for the same reason.
While the standards of corpuscularism remained in effect the
search for mechanical explanation of gravity was one of the
most important problems among those accepting the Principia,
including Newton himself.

Failing to find such an explana-

tion, and unable to proceed without Newtonian theory, gravity
was gradually accepted as a force innate in particles of
matter

([l],

fields

such

p.
as

105).

This acceptance had impact in other

electrical

concept of attraction at a

theory

where

distance,

it

leg! t imized

the

leading eventually to

Franklin's interpretation of the Leyden jar experiments and
to a Newtonian paradigm for electricity ([l], p. 106).
finally,

And,

Einstein's theories represent a shift back to pre-

Newtonian

science

in

that

they

explain

gravity

without

reference to innate forces ([l], p. 108).
Another reason is his commitment to the belief that
science is empirical.
theories

did

a

It seemed to him that past scientic

creditable

job

of

making

Phenomena with which they were confronted.
merely manufacture those phenomena.

sense

of

the

They did not

Their theories were

concocted in response to the environment.

22

Kuhn was faced with making sense of two aspects of
science.

First, radical change was revealed in its history,

and second,
systems

that history also revealed that out-of-date

of belief were both empirical and often highly

successful ways of explaining the natural environment.

He

tried to explain both of these facets of science by treating
science (and perception itself) as an amalgam of (a) genuine
impact from the environment and (b) a creative contribution
by the scientist.

By retaining the impact of the environment

he could keep his conception of science in accord with a
basic commitment to empiricism.
perception

that

was

arbitrary

And by adding an element to
in

the

sense

of

being

contributed by the perceiver and not by the environment, he
had a way of explaining change in science that could reach
all the way to observation.

Further,

he could accommodate

such change without designating all previous bodies of belief
as unscientific, as myth, or as simply in error.

THE SUCCESS OF KUHN'S REPLACEMENT

It is clear that Kuhn's theory of science is successful

in

some respects.

He is able to explain the rapid

progress of science under "normal" conditions by demonstrating the guiding aspect of the paradigm.
explain major

change

in· science without

historical interpretation of science.

He ls also able to
adopting an anti-

He has shed new light
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on

discovery,

and

he

has

explained

why

scientists

are

tolerant of apparent anomalies.
But has he solved the problems which will cause Nagel
and Thrane to try so diligently to avoid the theory-ladenness
of observation as a part of their philosophies of science?
Has he developed a theory of science which can replace the
analysis

of

the

testing

relation as

the model

for

the

rationality of science?

I believe that the answer to these

questions must be "no."

As Frederick Suppe points out, most

of the criticisms of Kuhn have centered on the assertion that
his concept of revolutionary change in science is fundamentally

irrational,

and

science as unempirical

that
([2],

he
p.

ultimately
150).

characterizes

Kuhn contributes to

these criticisms with claims such as his "different worlds"
thesis, saying that after a revolution the scientist responds
to a different world

([l],

p.

111).

He seems to be saying

that theory is not only constitutive of science, but that it
is

also constitutive of nature.

this claim,
However,

calling it a

he feels

attitudes,

He

is uncomfortable with

"strange locution"

([l],

p.

118).

that we must somehow make sense of both

that even though the world has not changed with

paradigm change,

the scientist works in a

different world.

The reason is simple--what occurs in a r~volution is not
merely

the

re-interpretation

of

old

data,

involves the emergence of-new data ([l], 121).

but

it

also
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Kuhn attempted to accomplish both these ends with one
theory.

By retaining the impact from the environment he

hoped to keep his theory on firm empirical grounds.
introducing an arbitrary
thought

he

contribution by

the

And, by

perceiver he

could explain revolutionary change.

He did

explain many things about revolutionary change that previous
theories had failed to explain, but he did not provide a
rational structure for such change.

In fact he denies that

this sort of change is rational at all.

It is a matter of

conversion instead of proof, he says ([l], p. 148).
He

attributes

to

the

dominant

epistemological

paradigm of recent time the attitude that experience is fixed
and neutral while theory is the man-made interpretation of
the neutral data provided by experience.
longer

functions

effectively

but

in

This paradigm no

the

absence

of

an

alternative, he says, he cannot relinquish it entirely ([l],
p. 126).

The part of that paradigm that he did not relinquish
is

the

genesis

of

theory.

He

sees

theory

as

the

free

creation of the perceiver in the same way that Nagel and
Thrane will see it.
of science?

What does this mean for his philosophy

In combination with his belief that observation

is theory-laden,

it is a powerful assumption.

given this pair of assumptions,
theory-laden.

It

Observation,

is far more than merely

is at least partially

theory-fabricated.

This creates no problem as long as the theory is accepted by
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the entire
between

community

competing

of

scientists,

theories

but

necessarily

it

makes

choosing

non-rational.

The

evidence is fabricated in different ways from the perspective
of each theory.
But Kuhn's attitude toward theory genesis is not the
only reason why he comes to apparently non-rational conclusions.

His philosophy of science retains another component

of the dominant epistemological paradigm, its emphasis on the
testing relation.

His work can be read without distortion as

a definition of the limits of philosophy of science, or of
the limits of rationality in science.
Nagel's

"familiar

methodological

Testing proceeds as

principle"

would

have

it

during normal science, but it breaks down occasionally, and
these occasions are called revolutions.
His philosophy of science is constructed from incompatible components.

He retained the "free creation" model of

theories, but in the standard view of science this was but
one of two principles that served in the analysis of the
testing relation.

The other was the belief that observation

was theory-neutral or at least not laden with the theory
being tested.

His attempt to replace the positivist and

falsificationist
not succeed.

approaches

to

philosophy

science

could

He retained the free creation model of theory

and concern for the testing relation,
second principle that
relation.

of

se~ved

but he gave away the

in the analysis of the testing

Testing can make sense of science only if one of
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the principles remains stable.
principles

remained

stable

he

Since neither of Kuhn's
was

pre-disposed

to

non-

rational consequences.
In summary, Kuhn proposes to replace the standard
interpretation of the rationality of science with an analysis
of

its

history.

He

is

motivated

to

do

this

by

the

recognition that change in science has often involved more
than mere re-interpretation of old and stable data, but may
also involve change in the data as well.

Ultimately, he sees

this as the result of an arbitrary contribution on the part
of the perceiver.
The arbitrary element has much positive influence on
science.

It provides direction and tells the researcher the

relevance

of

available

facts.

Without

perception itself would be impossible.

it

science

and

Its arbitrariness, on

the other hand, guarantees that its usefulness will not last
forever.

Its usefulness ends with a discovery it cannot

accommodate and with the emergence of another such element
that can account for the discovery.
Kuhn

has been able to explain many elements

in

science which are ignored or denied by other philosophical
theories.

I have argued, however, that he has not been able

to achieve an alternative model for the rationality for
science, and that the primary reason for this failure is his
interpretation of theory as the "free creation" of the mind.
Consequently,

the

theory-ladenness

of

observation

is
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interpreted

as

at

least

partial

theory-fabrication

of

observation.
Is there a way to retain Kuhn's insights into science
and avoid his non-rational conclusions?

I believe that there

is, but a new model of theory and of the theory-ladenness of
observation must be developed if this

is

to be done.

theory-ladenness of observation must be taken as

The

a problem

for careful examination in philosophy of science in order to
see what it really means.

One should not assume, as Nagel,

Thrane and Kuhn have all done, that its meaning is clear and
that its place as an assumption for philosophy of science is
unproblematic.
The theory-ladenness of observation as a problem for
the philosophy of science will be my starting point in Part
II.

The general character of my approach to philosophy of

science will change as a result.

The examination of the

testing relation, for instance, will not be the first order
of business.

Until the meaning of the theory-ladenness of

observation is clarified, one of the relata of that relation
remains unspecified.
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CHAPTER III

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THEORY-LADENNESS FOR
THE STABILITY OF EVIDENCE IN SCIENCE

Many attempts have been made to solve the problems
that dominate Kuhn's work.

Few philosophers have been will-

ing to enbrace his conclusion that a significant part of
science, its periods of major change, are non-rational.

The

concomitant conclusion that there is no trans-revolutionary
cirterion of rationality has been found equally unpalatable
by most philosophers.
In "Theory and Observation" Ernest Nagel offers a
solution to the problems brought by the theory-ladenness of
observation.

He grants that theory-ladenness destroys any

inherent difference between theory and observation statements
and terms, but he argues that differences in "use" of these
statements and terms are sufficient to ground the distinction.

He further argues that differences in stability

between theory and observation statements and terms justifies
the continued assumption of a viable testing relation between
them.

In an additional argument he tries to show that, while

circularity can be a problem as a consequence of theoryladenness, the problem is manageable merely by choosing
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evidence that is not laden with the theory being tested.

In

other words, Nagel argues that pholosophy of science can
accommodate theory-ladenness with no major change in its
characterization of the rationality of science.
I will argue that the concept of the basis of rationali tY has not changed with Nagel, but continues to be based
on consensus on the content of observation reports.
show

that

this

continued

assumption

undercuts

I will
all

his

attempted solutions.
Nagel's article is important for the added reason
that it brings out a concept of theory that is as problematic
as his concept of observation.

The reason, I will argue, is

the separation of theory and observation that results from
the failure to examine discovery.
Nagel has three arguments which are intended to show
that the testing relation in science has not been compromised
by the admission of the theory-ladenness of observation.

One

involves his concern for the relative stability of observation terms. and statements mentioned above.

He argues for an

identifiable class of observation terms which are not subject
to the vicissitudes of theories in science.
class,

or sub-class,

since

He locates this

it does not include scientific

uses of observation terms, outside of science in what might
be called "common sense" or normal, everyday uses of observation terms.

He calls these uses of observation terms "core"

Uses as distinguished from "peripheral" uses of the. same
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terms in science.

I will argue that the placement of the

"core" of observation terms outside of science puts observation beyond the ken of philosophical analysis.
A second argument defends the continuing viability of
the theory/observation distinction, given that observation is
theory-laden.

In

this

argument

Nagel

first

concedes

that

most if not all of the "inherent differences" that had been
assumed

to

exist

between

theory

and

observation

terms

and

statements are dissolved by the admission of the theoryladenness of observation.

He goes on to argue that none of

these supposed differences are essential to maintaining the
distinction, and that their loss does not impair the function
of the theory/observation distinction in the analysis of the
testing relation in science.

All that is needed, he says, is

to identify different "uses" to which the two sets of terms
are put

in the actual conduct of scientif le inquiry.

The

uses he identifies are interesting, opening up the possibility of a broader investigation of scientific knowledge.
will

argue

that

instead

of

investigating

the

I

possiblities

implicit in the uses he identifies he actually abandons them
as

a

source of insight into science and falls

back on the

different levels of stability mentioned above as a criterion
of different uses.
His third argument is his defense of testing as noncircular.

He admits

observation term that

that circularity is a problem.
is

If an

laden with a particular theory

is
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used in an observation statement that purports to test that
theory then the test is circular and not valid.

But as he

indicated at the outset, he believes that observation terms,
though theory-laden, are not meaning-determined by the entire
set of theories and laws that make up a science at a particular time.

Such a term can be used to test any theory or law

other than the particular one that determines its meaning.
He adds a historical argument against the seriousness of the
circularity problem.

I

will argue that his historical argu-

ment is well taken and that circularity in scientific testing
is not a serious problem at all.

I

will show that the reason

why Nagel took the problem seriously was due to his inadequate concept of scientific theory, and that given that
concept of theory, circularity is indeed a serious problem.

THE RELATIVE STABILITY OF OBSERVATION TERMS

Nagel

grants

that

changes

in

theories

!nevi tably affect the way in which terms
theories and laws are used.
terms" like "red."

and

laws

laden with those

This is true even for "basic

The redness of a star, for instance, may

be regarded as the effect of its motion and not as its
genuine color after certain theoretical advances are made.
He cal ls this a "peripheral" use of the term
says that there remain

"c~re"

color of apples and traffic

'red' and he

uses of such terms such as the
lights which remain unchanged
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with theoretical changes of this sort.
by "relative stability."

This is what he means

The relative stability of the

"core" uses of observation terms is what, in part, makes the
theory/observation distinction both warranted and useful, he
says ([1], PP·

33-34).

It has been pointed out, he goes on,
might have been different,

that the world

that one can conceive of physi-

cally possible circumstances in which the core meanings of
observation terms would not apply.

The argument is not

relevant, he says, since relative stability is significant to
the understanding of scientific knowledge even if it cannot
be

demonstrated

that

it

is

"cosmically

necessary

and

unalterable ([2], p. 34).
In a later argument he makes a similar point, saying
that when theoretical statements that report observations are
threatened we must pull back to statements including predicates

of

"normal perceptual

experience"

( [ 2],

p.

37).

In

this way ordinary non-scientific language provides a sort of
foundation for science that is always available if theoretical expansions of knowledge fail to pan out.
It is interesting to note that both the "peripheral"
and

"core"

uses

of

red

are

dbservation

terms.

The

"~eripheral" uses are those found in science and "core" uses

are

"normal"

Relative

or

'common

stability

theoretical

terms

sense"

has - been
and

uses

of

observation

demonstrated

not

terms.
between
between

34
scientific and non-scientific uses of observation terms.
This is the consequence of the theory-ladenness of observation,

of

course.

Having

accepted

that

observation

is

theory-laden, Nagel cannot deny that the observation terms of
science

are

vicissitudes
observation

theory-laden

and

therefore

of scientific theory.
terms

are

subject

to

Non-scientific

theory-laden

in

some

sense

the

uses
as

of

well,

according to Nagel, for he has already granted that "significant

observation

involves

immediately present

to

more

the organs

than

noting

of sense"

what

( [ 2],

p.

is
24).

But the non-scientific uses of observation terms do not have
their meaning determined by science.

It is here that their

relative stability and their value lies.
This is not the problem of circularity because it is
not a particular testing relation that Nagel
about.

is worried

Rather it is the general character of the ground of
If testing is that which charac-

testing that concerns him.
terizes

science

isolated.

then

a

stable

ground

of

test

must

It is not, apparently, to be found within science

since changes in science would af feet its stability.
has

be

Nagel

chosen to place the ground of test outside of science

Where it is beyond the theory-ladenness of observation,

at

least

or

insofar

as

theories

are

generated

by

science

scientists.
Placing the ground of

testing in observation terms

outside of science also places it beyond philosophical, that
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is,

epistemological analysis.

In a sense, this is not a

surprising move since Nagel's predecessors in the empiricist
tradition did the same thing.

Prior to the airing of the

issues surrounding the theory-ladenness pf observation, R. B.
Braithwaite insisted that

the philosophy of perception was

irrelevant to the philosophy of science.

Regardless of the

answer one reached regarding the philosophical character of
observation, he said, it would serve the purpose of identifying

the facts

normal observers

of observation which are the same for all
([1], p. 4).

One might have expected this

attitude to change with the

introduction of the theory-

ladenness of observation into the discussion, but Nagel side
steps

this problem by locating the ground of testing in a

sub-set of observation terms

that,

if theory-laden,

are at

least laden with theory that is common to normal observers.
But what
with

Braithaite

concerning

the

is more surprising than Nagel' s
is

the

location

similarity
of

the

between

ground

position of Kuhn on the same issue.

of

agreement

his

position

test

and

For Kuhn the ultimate

ground of test or justification for any observation is
paradigm.

And

the

paradigm,

like

the

Nagel's

"core"

the
of

observation terms, is outside of science in the sense that it
is not open to any test.

Like Nagel, Kuhn takes the testing

relation to be primary in understanding science.

The main

Point of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was to
define the limit of the testing relation.

That limit is

36
defined by

the

concept of the

"revolution."

Testing,

for

Kuhn, can proceed in the "normal way" so long as the paradigm
is not questioned.

But as soon as the paradigm becomes the

issue the testing process breaks down.
ophy of science.

And so does philos-

Kuhn offers no philosophical insight into

the process of revolutionary change other than the fact that
it happens.

His discussion of it

is given in terms taken

from sociology and pyschology.
The point of bringing up Kuhn here is to emphasize
the limitation on philosophy of science caused by placing the
ground of test outside of science.

Nagel differs from Kuhn

in that he places his ground of test in common sense,

and

since common sense might never change, revolutions might
never occur.

But should a

change of such depth occur,

he

would have no more than Kuhn to say about it.
Other important questions are ruled out as well.
instance,

the

character of observation is more open to

philosophical analysis with the
ladenness.

For

Its

recognition of

character is not

its

theory-

investigated by Nagel.

Instead its character as evidence for testing is presupposed
and treated as exhaustive.
means

to

say

that

addressed either.

The determination of just what it

observation

is

theory-laden

is

not

By placing the observational core outside

of science Nagel hopes to neutralize the impact of theoryladenness on philosophy of science.
theory-ladenness

means

would

not

A closer look at what
be

important

on

these
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Neither

conditions.

is

the

more

general

issue

of

the

relation between observation and theory given priority since
observation is essentially an unanalyzable term in this
approach to philosophy of science.

THE "USE" CRITERION FOR THE THEORY/OBSERVATION DISTINCTION

Some

critics

of

the

theory /observation

distinction

have suggested that the admission of the theory-ladenness of
observation

dissolves

the

"inherent

differences"

theory and observation terms and statements.
fies

three

attacked.

types

of

Nagel identi-

inherent difference that have

been

First, some critics have argued, the proponents of

the distinction have
because

between

theory

sometimes

terms

are

held

that

inherently

it

was

justified

problematic

while

observation terms are understandable in their own right.
Nagel grants that either type of term may be clear in some of
its applications while it is problematic in others.
words,

he says,

all terms

have a

including observation terms,

In other

"penumbra of vagueness",

but this does not vitiate the

distinction itself ([2], p. 30).
Secondly, it has been charged that the assumption
that

theory

different

terms

and

"languages"

in

observation
science,

terms
a

represent

two

self-contained

and

autonomous language of observation which deals only with
directly observable matters and a theoretical language which
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deals with unobservable matters
survive

the

admission

theory-laden.

that

Nagel agrees.

locution has any meaning,

( [ 2],

the

pp.

27-28),

observation

does not

language

is

Insofar as the "two languages"

he says,

it

refers

to different

uses or functions to which certain groups of expressions are
put in the process of articulating inquiry in science ([2],
pp. 31-32).
The third inherent difference between theory and
observation terms is actually part of the second one above.
The assumption that the sets of terms differ because observation terms, but not theory terms, can be predicated of
things

on

the

strength of

direct

observation alone,

falls

before the admission of the theory-ladenness of observation
since the addition of theory to observation makes it indirect
as well

([2],

p.

32).

Again Nagel agrees.

And,

again, he

says that it does not matter.
Why does it not matter?

Because all that we need to

be able to do is distinguish different
of terms are put.

~

to which the sets

What are the different uses?

Nagel iden-

tifies five typical uses for observation terms and three
typical
used to,

uses

of

theoretical

terms:

Observation

terms

are

(a) "mark off in perceptual experience" objects and

Processes,

(b) to characterize an entity as of a certain

type, (c) to describe instrumentation, (d) to report measurements and other perceptual findings,
experimentally ascertained data"

([2],

and
p.

(e)

29).

to

"codify

Theoretical
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terms are used to (a) codify idealized or limiting notions
(such as point-mass and instantaneous velocity),

(b)

pre-

scribe how the things identified in perceptual experience are
to be analyzed and manipulated, and (c) provide inferential
links between experimental data and "conclusions of inquiry"
([2], p. 30).

Nagel entertains an additional argument regarding use
which appears to dissolve even that way of making the theory/
observation distinction.

Critics have pointed out, he says,

that predicates ordinarily classified as theoretical are
often used to describe situations which are "directly apprehended" ([2], p. 35).

Since he has already granted that

observation terms cannot be predicated of things on the basis
of direct observation he clearly must not mean that theoretical terms can be predicated of things in this way.

What he

must mean is that theoretical terms appear in some cases to
be predicated of things in as direct a way as are observation
terms.

Examples of such theoretical predication are the

description of a land format ion as a

11

glac lat ion 11 and the

description of a track in a cloud chamber as having been
produced by a positron-electron pair.

It is beyond doubt, he

says, that this sort of thing happens.

Some theoretical

predicates are used to describe observable matters while
others apparently never are.

We would not,

for instance,

describe what ls observed.in the electrolysis of water as the
rearrangement of electrons in hydrogen and oxygen atoms ([2],
pp. 35-36).
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Just why some theoretical terms are used to describe
observable situations and others are not is not clear, Nagel
says, but he endeavors to shed some light on those situations
where theoretical terms

~so

In many instances of

used.

this sort the theoretical term in question appears to serve
as

a

"shorthand

complex features

formula"

for

describing

of an experimental

observable

event.

The

but

shorthand

replaces a long and involved account if that account were to
be given in "terms of perceptual experience"

( [ 2],

"Accordingly,"

a

he

concludes,

"it

is

only

in

p.

37).

Pickwickian

sense that the theoretical predicates can be counted as
observation terms" ([2], p. 37).
It

is

theoretical
they

interesting

terms

must be

experience."

that

to

note,

report

he

adds,

observations

replaced by terms

from

that

are

when

threatened

"normal perceptual

This part of the argument was mentioned earlier

in connection with the discussion of the relative stability
of observation terms.

Why must we pull back to the "more

familiar observation predicates?"

His answer is

that they

are "better warranted by the actual evidence" ([2], p. 38).
But why are these more familiar terms better warranted?
Because, he says, the theoretical terms assert more than the
ordinary

observation

terms,

"on

pain

of

being

totally

"use"

basis

of

superfluous" ([2], p. 38).
It

is

interesting

that

the

theory/observation distinction has shifted here.

the

Theoretical
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terms

~

used

differently

from

observation

terms

in

that

they assert more than observation terms, or expand on those
terms.

Both assert more than is immediately present to the

senses, but theoretical terms go beyond observations that are
"normally"

recognized.

To

repeat,

the

new

"use"

of

theoretical terms is to expand knowledge beyond what is
"normal" and the "use" of observation terms is to provide a
stable retreat when that expansion is in doubt.
Why does Nagel shift his ground for the use basis of
the theory/observation distinction?

One reason may be that

he has not found anything in particular to do with the uses
he

identified earlier.

They are

interesting in that

provide some possibility for expanding his
science.

The use of theories,

inferential

links

inquiry suggests

between

for

treatment of

instance,

experience

and

they

in providing

conclusions

the possibility of examining the

of

relation

between observation and theory in a detailed way.
But Nagel has no intention of following up such a
suggestion.

His concept of science will not allow it.

In

particular, his concept of theory blocks his invesitgation of
science.

His treatment of theories is given in terms of

"free creations" of the scientist.
creations of the scientist it
they report observations.

If theories are free

is troublesome to allow that

Such a concession would appear to

make a mockery of the testing relation and empiricism in
general.

This is why he seeks to explain away the sense in

42
which theories are said to report observations.

But his

attempt to do this raises more questions about his approach
to science than it answers.

Why, for instance, does he say

that theories are "free creations" of the scientist and then
assign to them the role of shorthand for observation statements?

It would seem an unusual coincidence for a free

creation to dovetail so well with observation.

If it is not

a coincidence, then why is it not a coincidence?
understanding of science is at stake here.

An adequate

But if theories

serve this function in science, why suggest that they also
assert more than that for which they are shorthand?
being superfluous, of course.

To avoid

Nagel clearly recognizes that

theories must do more than serve as shorthand for observation
statements, but just how they accomplish more than this is
not an issue that Nagel is interested in addressing.

And

what of the theories that apparently never report observations?

Perhaps they codify limiting or idealized notions or

prescribe how things identified in experience are to be
analyzed, as he outlined earlier.

It appears that the uses

of theories need to be better clarified if "use" is the
criterion

of

the

theory/observation

distinction

which,

in

turn, is essential to understanding the rationale of science.
What concept of science must Nagel have in order to
employ arguments of the sort that we have seen so far?

It

would

of

appear

theories.

that

science

for

him

is

a

collection

Observation statements cannot be included since
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theY are placed outside of science.

And it appears to be a

finished product rather than a process.

Such a concept of

science, it seems, would not require a scientist.

THE PROBLEM OF CIRULARITY

Nagel entertains one last attack on the theory/observation distinction which he considers a "radical'' challenge.
Some critics of the distinction have claimed that every
theory determines the meaning of the observation predicates
that they used to test it.

In other words the theories

"manufacture" data in such a way that every test is "fatally
circular."

Only evidence which is generated by the theory,

according to this c ri t lclsm,
testing.

can serve as the bas is of

As a result, no theory could possily be refuted,

but neither could they be said

to have any factual content,

according to Nagel.
Further,

if the meanings of observation terms were

determined by the theory for which they serve as evidence,
the same observation report could not confirm one theory and
disconfirm another.

In other words, it would be impossible

in principle to ever decide between competing theories ([2],
p. 41).

Nagel has two arguments against this radical thesis.
First, he says, the hist-0ry of science provides evidence
against both its aspects.

Many theories have been refuted on

44
the basis of observational findings.

Therefore, it must not

be the case that observational evidence invariably is molded
bY the
also

theory it is supposed to test

the case,

he says,

( [ 2],

p.

that even theories

39).

It is

that have pro-

foundly different presuppositions often share "some hard core
pedicates and laws" ([2], p. 41).
dynamics,

for

instance,

share

Newtonian and Einsteinian

important predicates such as

"acceleration of bodies falling near the earth's surface," as
well as a number of laws in which such shared predicates are
found ([2]), p. 42).
His

second argument is that while an observation

predicate may be determined in part by a theory, it need not
be dependent on all the laws that make up the theory.
some of the laws that make up a

Since

theoretical system may be

logically independent of each other,

it is possible for an

observation term to serve in evidence statements for those
laws which do not determine its meaning ( [ 2], p.

41).

For

example, it is possible to count the laws concerned with
measuring instruments as well as

the

laws

geometry as parts of Newtonian dynamics.
however,

of Euclidean

This does not,

make observation terms relating to measurements or

geometrical assumptions circular as evidence supporting some
other part of Newtonian dynamics ([2], p. 40).
The theory-ladenness of observation appears to Nagel
to

present a

rationality

of

serious
science

problem for our understanding of
since

that

rationality

is

given

the
in
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terms

of

the

testing

He

relation.

seeks

to

avoid

the

supposed implication that evidence ls determined by the
theory it ls evidence for by distinguishing between the
impact of the theory-ladenness of observation on evidence in
general and its impact on evidence in particular situations.
This argument is

linked to his earlier argument for the

relative stability of

"core" observation terms.

Competing

theories, he says, often share such "hard core predicates."
If this is so then meaning-dependence must not be immediate
in

the sense of dependence on the particular theory

being

tested.
The

issue here

is

not

the meaning-dependence of

observation terms on theories as a result of the theoryladeness of observation, but rather the scope or immediacy of
the

dependence.

But

why

does

he

accept

dependence of observation terms at all?

the

meaning-

Is this what it

means to say that observation is theory-laden,

that the

meaning of observation terms is determined by theory?

And if

theories are the "free creations" of the scientist, does this
mean that observations are generated by theories?
that

this

is the implication for Nagel since,

It appears
at

least in

some cases, observation is no longer counted as genuine
evidence.

This is what circularity means.

Under

what

circularity arise?
discovery

of

viruses

conditions
Suppose

might

that a

hypothesized

the

problem

of

biologist prior to the

that

there

was

a

living
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organism smaller than any bacterium which was responsible for
certain diseases whose causes remained unexplained.

He then

executed the following steps in the hope of gaining evidence
for or aainst his hypothesis:
individuals

before,

during

particular set of symptoms.

1.
and

Cultures were taken from
after

the

onset

of

a

The cultures were viewed under

the electron microscope with the result that the culture
which was taken while symptoms were active showed "shapes"
that were not present in either of the other two cul tu res.
2.

Otherwise healthy individuals were infected with the

active cultures with the result that they developed the same

3.

set of symptoms.

Cultures taken from these people showed

similar "shapes," when viewed under the electron microscope.

4.

Other diseases that were unexplained as to cause but

which appeared to be transferred by contact were examined
using these techniques with the subsequent discovery of more
such "shapes."

He then presented his results as evidence for

his hypothesis, saying that the "shapes" were in fact living
organisms called "viruses."
Is

there

reasoning?

anything

circular

about

this

sort

of

All the observations are clearly theory-laden in

the sense that they involve a theory of disease, that disease
is the result of the parasitic infestation of one organism by
another.
i.n the
however,

Additionally, a great deal of theory was involved
development of the electron microscope.
are

not

the

theories

being

tested.

These,
One

can
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recognize

characteristic

shapes

under

the

microscope

observe symptoms without being committed to the

or

theory of

viruses.
But what about step four?

In this case we look in a

place not previously examined for evidence to support our
theory and we look because of our theory.

This is theory-

guided observation, in a sense, but it does not seem at all
circular.

The reasons are the same as above, the theory of

viruses is not essential to the observation of symptoms or of
"shapes" under the microscope.
What,

then,

would

constitute

circular

evidence?

Suppose our experimentor had stopped at step one of his
investigation and described the "shapes'' viewed as "viruses,"
the cause of the disease.

The question which sparked the

research was, "What is the cause of this disease?"

Is the

answer, guided as it was by the hypothesized theory of
viruses,

circular?

supported assumption.

No,

it

is

merely

an

insuf1c1ently

Suppose, then, that prior to step one,

without viewing before and after cul tu res,

our researcher

asserted that he had found "disease vectors" that he had
named "viruses" in the cultures of sick people.

But to offer

an explanation of a disease without evidence is similar to
attributing the sleep inducing quality of opium to its
"soporific" effects.
explained.
begging.

It presupposes that which needs to be

It represents_ a very primitive form of question
But again, is it circular in Nagel' s sense?

No,
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the recognition of shapes does not require the theory of
viruses.

It is, of course, quite unsupported.
What is the difference between question begging and

circularity?

In question begging the problem is whether the

explanandum is presupposed or entailed by the explanans.
circular! ty

the problem is whether the explanans

the meaning of the explanandum.

In

determine

With question begging we are

concerned about the quality of an argument or explanation.
Does

it explain that which it set out to explain is the

1ssue.

With

circularity

evidence is the issue.

the

quality

of

observational

Is it genuine or not?

In cases as simple as my example question begging is
highly unlikely,

but

it can become a

become more complex.

problem as

questions

Circularity, on the other hand,

highly unlikely in any case.

is

The unlikeliness is not a

function of complexity but of what it means to say that
observation is theory-laden.
theories

are

capable

circularity must

of

If theory-ladenness means that
generating

be guarded against.

observations,
But

then

theory-ladenness

should represent the substance of questions for philosophy of
science rather than the source of presuppositions.

It may be

that it is more accurate to say that observations generate
theories

than

that

theories

generate

observations.

There

seems no reasonable sense in which observations could be said
to be generated by theories.

And,

further,

there seems no

reasonable sense in which the theory-ladenness of observation
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raises any doubt about the geniuneness of observation as a
80 urce

of evidence.
The

difference

between

circularity

and

question

begging is the difference between two approaches to the
philosophy of science.

If one understands the philosophy of

science to be the analysis of the testing relation where
observation

is

placed

philosophy of science,

outside
and

of

theory

science

is

and

treated as

beyond

the

"free

creation" of the scientist, then the theory-ladenness of
observation will raise the problem of circular! ty.

But if

the problem of philosophy of science is the investigation of
the

relation

between

theory

and

observation,

then

the

theory-ladenness of observation represents grist for the
mill.
arise

Should the issue of question begging arise it would
in

that

context

as

part

of

the

problem of

what

constitutes an adequate explanation.
In summary,

Nagel has

presented three arguments he

believes demonstrate that the theory-ladenness of observation
has

no

significant

implications

methodological principle"

that

for

theories

the

"familiar

in science must

be

tested by confrontation with the findings of observation in
the form of observation statements.
First,
theory-laden,
statements

he argued that
and even

assert

more

though
than

is

even though oservation
this

means

immediately

that

~

observation

present

to

the

senses, there remains within observation terms a "core" which

50
15

relatively

stable

observation terms

in

comparison

to

theory

that are used within science.

terms

or

In doing

this he has placed his foundation of evidence outside of
science and beyond the realm of philosophical analysis, with
the result that he is in a position similar to that of Kuhn.
An

important

part

of

science

has

been

excluded

from

philosophy of science.
Second, Nagel argues that while no "inherent differences" between theory and observation terms survive the
recognition -0f the theory-ladenness of observation, such
differences

are

not

essential

theory/observation distinction.

to

maintaining

the

Differences in "use" can be

distinguished in actual scientific practice and this

is

enough to make the theory /observation distinction warranted
and useful.
"uses"

as

However, he declines to develop these different
instruments

knowledge.

for

shedding

light

on

scientific

Instead, when he entertains a challenge to this

sort of difference he appears to shift his ground of "use" to
reflect the difference in stability argued for earlier.

This

second sense of different "uses" reveals in more detail his
attitude toward theories.
parameters

that

observations.

would

He wants to keep theories within

allow

them

to

be

supportable

by

To this end he labels them as "shorthand'' when

they appear to report observations.

But he also wants them

to have a genuine function.in expanding scientific knowledge,
for,

as he points out, they would otherwise be superfluous.
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I applaud his attempt to expand the role of theories beyond
"shorthand," but this concept of theories is not adequate to
resolve

the

inherent

conflict

between

these

two

characterizations.
Third, Nagel argues that circularity is not a serious
problem since a theory-laden observation can test any theory
with which it is not laden.

The history of science bears out

this position, he says.

I agree with him that circularity is

not a serious problem.

I have argued that it is even less

serious than he takes it to be, that there is little reason
to suppose that the theory-ladenness of observation puts
observation in jeopardy as regards its status as evidence in
any case.

He sees circularity as a problem because of his

inadequate concept of theory and because of his subsequent
misinterpretation of what the theory-ladenness of observation
means.
The theory-ladenness of observation should be seen as
a potentially significant insight into scientific knowledge
and as the starting point for further investigation.

Nagel

sees it as a threat to the way science was understood prior
to the recognition of the theory-ladenness of observation.
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CHAPTER IV

THE THEORY-NEUTRAL APPROACH

The

rift between observation and theory that was

revealed in Nagel's work is in fact an implicit part of
justificationism as an empiricist philosophy of science.
This comes out most clearly in an article entitled "The
Proper Object of Vision" by Gary Thrane.

If the basis of

objectivity

in

the

content

of

observation

reports

theory

cannot

be

science

is

as

consensus

Thrane

on

sees,

accommodated but must be purged from observation.

If basic

observations were not theory-neutral, he says, there would be
no way to test theories.
I
that

the

have included this article here because it shows
problem

of

theory-ladenness

justificationist philosophy of science.

is

unsolvable

in

The concept of

objectivity implicit in justification is not compatible with
theory-ladenness,
f ree

but

the

return

to fundamental

or theory-

observation will fail to solve the problems of that

school.

Thrane elaborates the conditions that must be met

for theory-neutral observation as well as the conditions that
must be met for theory-neutral observation to serve as
epistemological foundation of science.
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the

As we will see,
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neither set of conditions can be satisfied.

Having separated

theory and observation at the start justification has created
a gap that cannot be bridged.
Thrane uses quotations from C. I. Lewis to make the
significance
clearer.

of

the

issue

of

theory-neutral

observation

The problem for Lewis was whether both the data of

experience and the interpretation put on them belonged to the
mind, whether there was anything in experience that the mind
could neither create nor alter.

He believed that there was

in experience a "given" which was characterized specifically
by the fact that it was "unalterable" ([2], pp. 6-7).
This seemingly plausible position has been attacked
by, among others, Hanson and Kuhn, Thrane says.

Both of

them, he holds, argue that different people may see different
things when apparently confronted with the same situation.
That is, both of them argue that, "What we see is altered by
what we think ([2], p. 7).
In response Thrane proposes to argue that what we
really see is "the pattern of light projected on the retina
([2], p. 9).
attend this

He is well aware of the many problems that
type of theory and much of his article

addressed to those problems.

is

His motivation is clear; he

hopes to establish a level of seeing that is sufficiently
fundamental to escape the influence or impact of theory or
knowledge.

The pattern of light on the retina would appear

to satisfy this condition as well as providing a reasonable
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sense in which all perceivers with "normal" eyes

could see

the same thing when confronted with the same situation.
Thrane's article is important to this thesis for
several reasons.

First, he does not merely presuppose that

theory-neutral observation is possible, but he tries to show

-

how it is possible.

His article helps to establish minimal

conditions for what it means to see, or more generally,

perceive.
inherent

It brings out certain problems that appear to be
in

clarifies

to

"fundamentalist"

approaches

the epistemological

theory of perception.

of

this

implications of

sort.

this

It

type of

And it helps to clarify that it means

to say that observation is theory-laden.
My discussion of Thrane's article will have four
major

sections

roughly

reflecting

importance mentioned above.
will be treated.

the

reasons

for

its

First, his "awareness argument"

Awareness is a problem for Thrane because

we as perceivers seem to be unaware of that which his theory
says that we really see.

I will present his argument for the

possibility of perception without being aware of what ls
perceived.

Further,

I will offer a distinction within the

concept of awareness to see whether his theory can be made to
Work on other grounds.

And, finally,

I will argue that

awareness of that which is perceived is a minimum condition
for perception.
Second,

the "fundamentalist" approach to perception

Will be examined.

I will show that this approach is the
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result of trying to avoid the input of knowledge in percepti on.

This approach,

I will argue, leads to "compound"

perception, or the seeing of one thing in order to see
another.

This will be shown to be an error that is inherent

in the fundamentalist approach.
The third section will deal with the epistemological
implications of such a theory of vision.

Thrane's assessment

of those implications is largely accurate as far as it goes.
But as I will show there are larger implications for his
project as it relates to philosophy of science.
The last section will deal with the meaning of the
theory-ladenness of observation.
understands what it means.

Like Nage 1,

Thrane mis -

Had he understood it differently,

as I will show, he might have been a better able to integrate
all his insights regarding perception into his theory.
Before taking up these four points let us see how
Thrane avoids certain obvious problems with a theory such as
this.

While he holds

that what we really see are the

patterns of light on the retina, he does not say that we see
them as on the retina.

The well-known criticism that seeing

retinal "pictures" would require another eye and so on,
Side-stepped in this way.

is

Similarly, seeing how the pattern

is situated on the retina would require another eye.

Thrane

draws three basic conclusions about the patterns of light on
the basis on this stipulation.

First , since we do not see

their setting, they are "free-floating."

Second, they have
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no

determinate

third

dimension.

And,

third,

they

are

entirely "metric-free" ([2], pp. 10-11).
The patterns of light are not pictures for Thrane
since the construction of a picture or seeing a pattern as a
picture requires a great deal of knowledge.
indeterminate in an extreme sort of way.

He leaves them

They cannot have a

three-dimensional shape since the retina is essentially two
dimensional and any representation in two dimensions can be
generated by an infinite number of actual three-dimensional
Being able to "disambiguate" a

scenes.
picture

into

knowledge

a

unique

( [ 2],

p.

scene

22).

determination of size.

requires
The

same

two-dimensional

a

great

is

true

deal
for

of
the

In fact, Thrane says, there is good

reason to believe that what we know about the world "informs
our determinations of how things

look"

([2],

p.

23).

But

this is not a matter of what we "really see" for what we
really see is indeterminate in the way that it must be if it
is prior to alteration by knowledge.

AWARENESS OF WHAT IS SEEN

Thrane grants that we might object to his theory of
seeing on

the

grounds

Patterns of light.

that

we

are

not

aware

of

seeing

The conclusion that this is what we see,

he says, is the result of a highly theoretical argument,
including among other things, projective geometry and optics
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([2],

p.

15).

If this theory is to work there must be some

sense of seeing in which we can say that the perceiver is not
aware of that which is seen.
His argument is as follows:

Suppose that Jones has

successfully climbed a flight of unfamiliar stairs.

We ask

him whether he saw the last step and he answers that he must
have, al though he was not aware of it.
that he must have seen it?

Why does he answer

Because he did not stumble ([2],

p. 16).

Similarly,

he says,

the reader of these pages must

have been seeing his thumb all the while he was reading but
he was not visually aware of it.

Another example of this

sort of thing is the apparent lateral motion of objects
around us as we move.

We are so unaware of this occurrence

that we may be surprised when it is pointed out.

Yet, we see

it, and we can become aware of it when it is brought to our
attention.
He will later argue, correctly I think,

that we are

sometimes inclined to employ the model of the conscious
noting of evidence and the conscious drawing of conclusions
to analyze seeing.
seeing,

But if this were an accurate analysis of

or perception in general,

it would make seeing

infinitely more complex than it actually is ([2], p. 36).

It

would also make it slower than it is, he might have added,
since conscious inferences- of this sort take time.
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If awareness of what is seen is not necessary to
seeing it,

what~

the necessary conditions?

says, the object seen must be there.
Jones' vantage point.

It must be visible from

He must be looking at it.

see the visible thing he looks at.
latter,

First, Thrane

we must know that he

eyesight is not defective.

is

And he must

In order to know the

conscious and

that his

In order to know that the first

three conditions obtain we need merely observe the object,
the light source and Jones' eye.

The judgment that he sees

the object is admittedly inferential.

If these conditions

were realized it follows that he saw the last step, even
though he was not aware of it.
I
the

find Thrane 's argument regarding Jones' ascent of

stairs not entirely satisfactory.

It would seem that

seeing

something and ·responding appropriately

always

involve some sense of awareness of that

to

it

thing.

would
Is

Jones' testimony that he was not aware of the last stair
adequate to establish his

lack of awareness as

factual?

Perhaps he was aware of it but, since the.re was no reason to
deli berate on the stair or his awareness of 1 t,
forgot about it.

he simply

What is the success of his ascent, that is,

not stumbling, evidence for?

It would appear to support the

conclusion that he was aware of the last stair as well as it
supports the conclusion that he saw it but was not aware of
it.
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Suppose we make a distinction within the concept of
awareness between a minimal sense in which we would be able
to

respond appropriately

to

objects

that

we

see and a

deliberative sense in which we could report that we have seen
them.

The behavioral sense of awareness would include much

of our daily experience.
report

that

we

drove

This distinction would allow us to
to

work

successfully

without

the

absurdity of adding that we were unaware of the traffic
around us or the traffic signs and lights

(when we do not

remember them).
Does
Learning

this

to

appropriately

distinction

see
in

could
response

help

in

be

merely

to

particular

Thrane's

learning

to

retinal

case?
behave

patterns.

Behavioral awareness might be sufficiently fundamental to be
the same for all "normal" observers.

But can he allow that

Jones was even behaviorily aware of the last stair without
negative impact on his theory?

The point of his theory is to

show that perception is possible with no input from theory or
knowledge.

And even responding appropriately seems to imply

some knowledge of that to which we respond.
the stairs,

for

instance,

suggests

that

Not stumbling on
we

know

something

about stairs, that they are solid for one thing.
Further,
response,

if

knowledge

is

implied

in

then awareness of that to which we

that much more certain.

appropriate

respond seems
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Instead of clarifying Thrane 's theory for him this
distinction brings up an additional problem for it.

In the

case of Jones' negotiation of the stairs we can say that he
was behaviorily aware of them,

and that if we call his

attention to them that he can becom deliberately aware of
them.

The same is true with regard to the examples Thrane

provides.

We may not be deliberately aware of our thumb

holding these pages or of the apparent lateral motion of
objects when we move, but we can become aware of these things
in the deliberative sense.

But this is apparently not true

of the patterns of light on the retina.
Could we, perhaps, train ourselves to be deliberately
aware of the patterns of light?

We

~

occasionally aware of

our visual apparatus as a result of dis comfort from bright
lights and from "after images",

for

images are not

in Thrane 's sense because

retinal patterns

they are not patterns of light at all.

instance.

But after

Discomfort and after

images seem more like artifacts of the perceptual process or
indications of its limitations than lessons in how to be
aware of retinal patterns.
Are there other things in our environment that we are
behaviorily aware of but of which we are never deliberately
aware?

There surely are things in our environment that we

are incapable of perceiving without special instruments.

But

this alone is not enough, since with. those instruments we are
able to be deliberately aware of such things.
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Perhaps instruments of this kind could reveal things
in

our

environment

deliberately

aware

which

we

of

the

in

correlated with behavior.
presence of

had

past,

Suppose,

radio waves was

not

been

able

but which

for instance,

found

to

be

could

be

that the

to correlate with an

increase in violent behavior in a segment of the population.
Would such a finding support Thrane's analysis of perception?
It would represent an instance of behavioral awareness where
no deliberate awareness was possible, at least prior to the
development of the appropriate instrumentation.

But in this

case we would have the problem of

identifying the sensory

source for the behavioral awareness.

In other words, instead

of

would have

Thrane 's

unaware

perception,

we

unperceived

awareness.
There are other things in our environment such as
background noises of which we are not usually aware in a
deliberative sense.

But even if such noises had always been

there we could still imagine circumstances whereby we could
become deliberately aware of them, by covering our ears, for
instance.
It would seem that if one can be behaviorily aware of
something

that

becoming

deliberately

require only a shift of attention.

aware

of

it

would

We are frequently aware

of our environment in only the behavioral sense,

but I can

see no reason to believe that there are some things that we
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can perceive only at this level or that there are some things
that we can perceive with no awareness at all.
A more

reasonable

conclusion

is

that

a

minimum

condition for perceiving something is that we are aware of it
at least on the behavioral level and that we can become aware
of it at the deliberative level.

THE THEORY-NEUTRAL APPROACH TO PERCEPTION

The fundamentalist approach to perception is an
attempt to identify an object of perception at a level which
is not influenced by theory or knowledge.

Sense data

theories aim at this goal as does Thrane's theory that what
we really see are "patterns of light" on the retina.
approach to perception has

This

the problem of explaining how

perception at this fundamental level facilitates perception
at other levels,

such as the perception of common objects

like tables and chairs.
To a theory like Thrane 1 s one might merely respond
that it is obviously false.

It is perfectly obvious that

what we see are objects and objects are outside of our
bodies, not inside on our retinas.
a

theory

But this is part of what

of vision should explain,

Thrane

feels.

He

considers it a "surprising fact" that we perceive an object
as there when we are here.

Every theory of vision should be

able to explain how we perceive a distant object as distant
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even though it is not touching our sensitive organs.

It is a

reasonable hypothesis, he says, that what we see is something
that is touching our visually sensitive surfaces, patterns of
light.

In other words,

seeing the surface of a distant

object just.!.! seeing a pattern of light ([2], p. 19).
The patterns of light "correspond" to the surfaces of
objects,
identity.
to

he says.

By "correspond" he means to suggest an

That is, seeing the pattern of light is identical

seeing the surface of an object.

He is not suggesting

that the pattern of light is identical to the surface of the
object for this would be contradictory on a number of levels,
one being the invariance of the object's surface and the
variability of the pattern of light, depending as it does on
perspective.

Instead,

the

identity

is

between seeing the

pattern of light and seeing the surface of the object.

What

that means is that seeing an object's surface just is seeing
a pattern of light ([2], pp. 20-21).
In other words, Thrane is offering a theory of "how
we see objects in space, not a theory that we do not" ([2],
p.

19).

He is not saying that we see patterns of light

instead of objects.

Seeing patterns of light is merely the

way we go about seeing objects.
He offers an analogy for this approach to perception,
saying that one might hold that science has proven that
objects

have

no

color.

When

an

object

looks
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red,

on this view,

what is

really happening is

that it is

reflecting light of a particular electromagnetic frequency.
When that frequency impinges on the retina it causes the
sensation of redness.

But this does not prove that an object

such as this has no color.

Instead, it is an account of what

it is for an object to have color ([2], p. 19).
Thrane obviously does not want to say that we do not
see ordinary objects in space, but only that we see them by
means of seeing something else, the patterns of light on the
retina.

But

troublesome.
another?

Is

especially in

this

"compound" approach to perception is

Do we really see one thing in order to see
this understanding of perception commonplace,
regard to perception in scientific

research?

It is surely true that scientists often observe one thing by
observing its effects on another.

Tracks in a cloud chamber

and Brownian motion are instances of this.

In the cloud

chamber a minute but visible quantity of condensation results
from

the

passage

particle.

of

an

otherwise

invisible

sub-atomic

In Brownian motion we witness molecular motion by

seeing how tiny but microscopically visible particles react
to it.
But

these examples do not illuminate the aspect of

Thrane's theory that the term "compound" was intended to
indicate.

In the examples the things seen are all outside

the perceiver.
that

are

Further, ·there are two objects in the world

involved.

In the cloud chamber we have condensa
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tion and sub-atomic paticles, and in Brownian motion we have
pollen or some other tiny particles and molecules in motion.
It

is

possible,

at least in principle,

these objects apart from others.

to observe each of

Sub-atomic particles can be

observed through other effects as can molecular motion.

But

Thrane's theory is compound in the sense that there is only
one object outside the perceiver, but two ''seeings" (Thrane's
term)

involved in our coming to know about it.

To explain

one "seeing" in terms of another seems questionable.

It is

similar to explaining cohesion in terms of atoms with tiny
interlocking hooks.
Would
helpful?

examples

other

organs

of

sense

be

Do we hear a symphony by hearing the vibrations of

our auditory apparatus?
the

using

inner ear

Do the hammer, anvil and stirrup of

reproduce

striking each other?

the

sound of

It might

be

the

orchestra by

possible

to

place a

microphone inside the ear to see whether they reproduce the
sounds

that

necessary?

cause

them

to

move.

But

is

this

really

If they did reproduce the sound, what organ would

hear that sound?

We would need another ear, even if we did

not hear the sound as in the ear, just as others have argued
that we would need another eye in order to see the retinal
picture.
What is the point of the compound or fundamentalist
approach?

It is to establish a level of perception that is

Prior to the intrusion of knowledge.

Would it be enough to
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say that there is at least one element of seeing, which is
necessary but not sufficient to explain seeing,
without the aid of knowledge?

No,

that occurs

for what is sought is a

source of the "data of experience" which is free of the
influence of knowledge, and the data of experience can come
only from actual,

completed perception.

Thus,

the element

that is identified must be treated as perception itself.
The inherent conflict in the fundamentalist approach
is

that we are not aware of the fundamental

perception.

The

approach

is

forced

into

"object" of
its

compound

position in order to explain how it is that we perceive the
things of which we are aware.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY-NEUTRAL APPROACH

Thrane began his article with a clear statement of
the meaning of the theory-ladenness of observation for the
philosophy of science.

If Hanson and Kuhn are right, he

said, then what we see is altered by what we think.

For this

reason he thought it important to develop a theory which
preserved vision as a source of data from experience which is
not altered by what we think.
Having

developed

a

theory

which

is

sufficiently

fundamental to be prior to the impact of what we think, he
proceeds to define criteria which will determine the meaning
that such a theory has for philosophy of science.

These
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criteria are stated as types of "priority" that a theory of
this sort might be expected to have.

These types of priority

are as follows:
1.

The conceptually prior is that which we believe

pre-theoretically that we see, tables and chairs and so on.
2.

The perceptually prior is "that by virtue of

seeing that we see anything at all."

3.

The epistemologically prior is that whose nature

we can know for certain merely by seeing it.
The

conceptually

identify when asked,

prior

to

that

which

we

would

"What in general do we see?"

ordinary objects around us
according

is

Thrane.

The

largely exhaust this
conceptually

theoretical" and therefore pre-sciene.

prior

The

c.ategory,
is

"pre-

It is the level Nagel

identifies as the "core" of observation terms.
The perceptually prior is obviously the pattern of
light on the retina, according to Thrane.

The point of these

distinctions is to determine whether the perceptually prior
is also conceptually or epistemologically prior.
perceptually prior also conceptually prior?
Thrane says.

Is the

It is not,

The reason is simple, the things that are

identified as conceptually prior are far richer than the
"impoverished array" of patterns of light could ever support.
His appreciation of the richness of the conceptually prior is
surprising.

It is a

fa~t,

he says, that "the agony is there

to be seen in Picasso's Guernica, the serenity there to be
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seen

in Claude Lorrain's The Herdsman"

patterns of light,

on the other hand,

([2],

36).

p.

The

are so indeterminate

that they defy description.
Why

have

so

many

writers

assumed

that

the

perceptually prior would also be conceptually prior, Thrane
asks.

The likely reason is that they assumed that we as

perceivers will be aware of the
which our knowledge is based.
would make our daily
really is.

life

"cues" and "evidence" upon

If this were true, he says, it

infinitely more

complex than it

The model that is being employed is the conscious

noting of evidence and the conscious drawing of conclusions.
Aside from the_complexity issue, he has already argued that
we are neither conscious nor aware of the patterns of light
which are the "cues" and "evidence" level of perception.
Since we cannot be aware of this level the model does not
help to make the identification between the perceptually and
the conceptually prior.

In another sense, it does not matter

that the model fails since the perceptually prior is far from
adequate as

the foundation,

even by inference,

for

the

conceptually prior.
But a more important issue is the possible identity
between
But

this

Because

perceptual

priority

and

epistemological

identity cannot be asserted either.
the

epistemologically

empirical knowledge,

prior as

"the

priority.
Why not?

foundation

of

must- be in those things the nature of

Which is apparent and certain."

And the patterns of light,
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he

allows,

are

indeterminacy"

"not

there

( [ 2], p.

37).

to

be

Now,

seen

in

their

naked

this is a bit odd since

the patterns of light were supposed to answer the question,
"What do we really see?"
1.

What he most likely means to say is

That we are never aware of seeing them, and 2.

their extreme

indeterminacy makes

such awareness

That

unlikely.

If we are not aware of them their nature cannot even be
apparent, not to mention certain.
An

additional

reason

for

the

failure

of

this

identity, Thrane says, is the fact that "much that we see is
'imposed' on" the patterns of light.
could be mistaken.

That which is imposed

The level at which this imposition occurs

must be the level of conceptual priority.

And unlike Nagel,

Thrane is unwilling to accept the "relative stability" that
might be found at this level as adequate for epistemological
priority.
Thrane's insistance that the epistemologically prior
must be apparent and certain forces him to concede that it is
probably not to be found anywhere.
found in vision,

he says,

It is certainly not to be

and vision is the source of our

most refined knowledge of the world ([2], p. 37).
What does this mean for philosophy of science and the
possibility of identifying a source of data from experience
that

is

prior

to

the

influence

of

the

mind?

If

the

perceptually prior is not the same as the epistemologically
prior, then no such source is forthcoming.
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Does this mean that Thrane's theory has failed?
depends on what you want from a
want

to

justify our claims

theory of vis ion.

to know with the

That
If you

justification

resting on a "sensorily self-evident base," then the theory
has failed.
says.

But the theory had far more modest goals, he now

Instead

of

aiming

to

justify

knowledge

on

a

self-evident base, its goal was to explain "what in part the
evidential base of our visual judgments is" ([2], p. 35).
Thrane refers to Quine in supporting this goal for a
It is sufficient, according to Quine, to

theory of vision.

seek only "the casual mechanism" of our knowledge of the
external world.
Thrane 's theory of vision has helped to clarify the
conditions that a fundamentalist approach must satisfy.

One

condition,

the

that

it

be

influence of knowledge,

grounded

at

now appears

a

level

beyond

to place

it beyond

anything that could be called the "data of experience."

THE MEANING OF THE THEORY-LADENNESS OF OBSERVATION

Why

is

it so important to Thrane to establish a

fundamental level of perception that is beyond the influence
of knowledge?

The answer lies in his understanding of what

the theory-ladenness of observation means to him.

What it

means can be seen first -in his response to Hanson and Kuhn.
Both of them hold, he says,

that what we see is altered by
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what we

He fears

think.

that

in accepting the

theory-

ladenness of observation one accepts the position that the
data of experience somehow ''belong to the mind," as Lewis put
it ([2]), pp. 6-7).
He believes, as we have seen,

that much of what we

see is imposed on the patterns of light.

He quotes Dewey,

with apparent approval, saying that qualities other than
those detectable by the eye are obviously controlling factors
in perception.
In other words,

the theory-ladenness of observation

means the theory-generation of observation just as it did for
Nagel.

Since

this

seems

incompatible with the

testing of

theories in science, a level prior to theory must be sought.
And, further, if that level fails to satisfy all the demands
of the testing relation, it at least identifies the "causal
factor" in perception which

~prior

enough,

takes

he

says,

and

he

to knowledge.

Hanson

to

task

realizing "the importance of the retinal pattern"
31).

This ls
for
([2],

not
p.

If theory-laden observation means theory-generated

observation then there seems little point to an investigation
like that Hanson pursues.

When Hanson tries to distinguish

two senses of seeing, a sense in which Tycho and Kepler see
the same thing in the east at dawn and a sense in which they
do not,

Thrane accuses him of equivocation ([2], p. 30).

If

the sense in which they do not see the same thing is due to
theory-ladenness, then it is not significant for a theory of
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vision,

in Thrane's

analysis

It

terms.

might

of how the fundamental

contribute

to

an

data of experience are

altered or added to by knowledge, but a theory of vision must
explain how we come to know

what~

and what is surely

cannot be altered by the caprice of the knower.

His theory

may not have accomplished all he had hoped, but at least it
identifies something in perception which is not added by the
mind.

He and Hanson differ on the import of the retinal

pattern because he sees it as the end point of an analysis of
vision and Hanson does not.
But Thrane is not entirely oblivious to problems
relating to perception that are of the sort that Hanson takes
seriously.

As indicated earlier, he grants that, "The agony

is there to be seen in Picasso's Guernica, the serenity there
to be seen in Claude Lorrain's The Herdsman".

How is it that

"agony" or "serenity" are there to be seen in the painting?
"Although it is clearly something about the painted surface
that makes The Herdsman serene, it is not easy to say what."
About this issue he says,

36).
theory

"I have nothing to say"

( [ 2], p.

It is not to the point in any case, he says, since a
of

vision

need

only

establish

that

which

is

is wrong about what

the

perceptually prior for vision.
But

like

Nagel,

Thrane

theory-ladenness of observation means.
observation

was

theory-generated

If it did mean that
or

theory-generated then it would follow,

even

partially

as he says,

that
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ordinary objects would have a rich range of "visible but not
necessarily optical qualities" ([2], p. 37).
a conflict in Thrane's position.

This represents

To suggest that we can see

something that has no optical aspect would appear to be the
assertion of extra-sensory perception.

But this is not what

the theory-ladenness of observation means.
is

Theory-ladenness

entirely compatible with the belief that all of what we

see is there in the object to be seen.
A theory of vision, or perception in general, must be
able to explain how we can see such things as serenity.

It

must give a detailed account of what the theory-ladenness of
observation

means.

theory-ladenness

does

As
not

I

will
mean

argue
that

in

Part

II

observation

is

theory-generated, even in part.

Instead of treating the

theory-ladenness

as

of

observation

an

obstacle

to

be

overcome, it should be treated as the beginning point in
understanding the logic of observation.
In summary, I have argued that Thrane's theory of
vision

is

flawed in that he is forced to argue for the

possibility of seeing without being aware of what
His argument fails to support that position.

is seen.

The mere fact

that we do not deliberate on a particular perception does not
mean that we are not aware of the object perceived.

In fact,

I have argued, awareness of the object is a minimum condition
for perceiving it.
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Further,
approach carries

I

have

the

argued

that

inherent flaw of

his

fundamentalist

requiring

"compound"

perception or two "seeings" for every visual perception.
This flaw is the result of the position on awareness, which
in

turn

is

due

to

his

misunderstanding

of

the

that

the

theory-ladenness of observation.
I

have

argued,

with

Thrane's

help,

implications of this position point to serious limitations.
It is too impoversihed to account for what we ordinarily
think that we see, and it is too indeterminate to provide the
foundation for science that empiricism has traditionally
assumed was essential.
Finally, I have argued that Thrane's understanding of
the theory-ladenness of observation is mistaken.
it

as the theory-generation of observation.

why he feels
vision.

He treats

This explains

compelled to avoid theory in his treatment of

It also explains the paucity of his theory.

Much of

what needs to be explained about observation must be left out
if theory-ladenness is interpreted in this way.
The challenge offered by the theory-ladenness of
observation is not
perceptions

and

to find a way to accept the claim that
that

which

fabricated by what we think.

is

perceived

are

somehow

Instead, it should be taken as

an insight into the problem of how we come to know the world.
It will also help us to· better understand theory and the
relation between theory and observation.
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CHAPTER V

THE LOGIC OF DISCOVERY - HANSON

Hanson has often been grouped with philosophers such
as Feyerabend, Kuhn and Toulmin as a proponent of a position
which leads to epistemological relativism and an irrational
characterization of

science.

Relativism and

irrationality

are thought to follow from the claim that observation ls
theory-laden, a claim which appears to destroy the empirical
base of science, to make the comparison of -0ompeting theories
impossible and to make the rational acceptance or rejection
of a given theory impossible.

Even among those such as Peter

Machamer ([5]) who doubt that such consequences necessarily
follow

from

the

theory-ladenness

of

observation,

the

placement of Hanson in this group fails to raise an issue.
But Hanson should be viewed differently.

What he

offered in Patterns of Discovery is the outline of a new
concept of the rationality of science based on the discovery
of

scientific knowledge rather than its

justification.

In

his introduction he insists that micro-physics be used as the
model for philosophy of science for
continues to be a research science.

the

reason

that

it

To use finished systems

such as planetary mechanics or optics is a mistake he says.
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The point of research is not the rearrangement of known facts
into

more

elegant

formal

patterns

but

is

discovery of new patterns of explanation.

instead

the

The program for

philosophy of science that he proposes shifts the emphasis
from theory-using to theory-finding, from the testing of
hypotheses

to

their discovery.

Instead of looking at how

observation, facts and data are built up into systems of
explanation,

he proposes to examine the influence of those

systems on observation, facts and data ([2], pp. 1-3).
I
an

will argue that Patterns of Discovery constitutes

outline for

the

rationality of science

based on the

espistemological relations into which observation enters.

I

will also show how this analysis represents a philosophy or
logic of discovery.
I will divide Hanson's work into three parts.
I

will examine his analysis of observation.

First,

The point of

this analysis is to develop a sufficiently complex model of
observation to be able to account for the things that we
ordinarily report that we observe, e.g., that the animal
before us is a mammal.
of facts.
between

Second, I will examine his treatment

His primary concern here is the relationship
facts

and

the

fact-stating

language.

This

relationship has

important implications for the objectivity

of science.

will show that Hanson's account of this

relationship

I

disputes

standing of objectivity,

the

traditional

empiricist

under-

but that it does not preclude the
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understanding of science as a rational process.
I

will

And, third,

deal with Hanson's treatment of theory.

points will

be made here,

first

Two major

that the understanding of

theory is inseparable from the understanding of observation.
Secondly, the sense will emerge in which the examination of
the epistemological relations between observation and theory
constitutes a logic of discovery.

OBSERVATION

I

have described Hanson's purpose with regard to

observation as an attempt to develop a sufficiently complex
model of observation to be able to account for the things we
ordinarily report that we see.
model

arises

from

The need for a more complex

paradoxical

situations

conf renting Tycho and Kepler in Hanson 1 s

like

example.

the

one

Do they

see the same thing in the east at dawn or do they not?
would answer that they do,

Many

that any difference is due to

alternative interpretations they put on the visual data.
What

they

however.
person

report

that

One might
account

they

respond that

what

is

observing of an event by
differently.

see would not

the

same,

regardless of their first

actually

going on

two men who

In other words,

be

then

is

first

interpret

the
it

they report their interpreta-

t 1 on and not merely what they see.

But this is at least

paradoxical since both men, if asked, would likely say that
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what they have reported is exactly what they

even though

their reports were different.
Do they see the same thing or not?

This is not a de

facto question, Hanson says, but it is rather the beginning
of an examination of the concept of observation.

To take

this as a de facto question should be viewed as the refusal
to participate in that examination.

The reason for the

refusal is most likely the feeling that one must insist that
Tycho and Kepler see the same

thing or else scientific

knowledge based on observational evidence will lose any claim
to objectivity.
There are other reasons why a more complex model of
observation is
first

person

needed besides

reports such as

the paradoxical

character of

those from Tycho and

Kepler.

One of them is the apparent failure to the "interpretation"
explanation for the different reports.

Hanson uses the

gestalt example of the perspex cube to bring out the problem
with this explanation.

Most observers of this drawing are

able to see it as a box viewed from above or as a box viewed
from below.

The shift, when it occurs, Hanson says, does not

seem at all like a change in interpretation.

For one thing

interpretation is something with which we are all familiar.
It is an intellectual process, e.g., we interpret a literary
work, and it takes time.
point that we are half
Particular work,

We might, for instance, say at one
th~ough

with our interpretation of a

but we could say no such thing of our
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interpretation" of the box from above or of the sun as a

satellite

of

the

earth.

One

might

respond

that

interpretation in this case is instantaneous> but there is no
ordinary or philosophical sense of the word "interpret" that
fits this usage ([2], p. 10).
At this point Hanson offers his alternative model of
observation.

The "interpretation," he says,

seeing its elf.

He

calls

this

sense of interpretation the

"organizational element" of seeing.
ways

we

see

the

perspex

is part of the

cube

The differences in the

and

the

dawn

are

due

to

differences in organization.
Just what is this organizational element?
another

line

landscape.

in

the

drawing

or

another

It is not

detail

in

the

It is similar to the tune of a piece of music or

the plot of a story.

It is that which makes

the details,

notes or lines "hang together" in the way they do.
Is the organizational element something that is added
by the perceiver or is it there to be seen as Thrane conceded
that the agony is there to be seen in Picasso's Guernica
([8]>

p. 36).

An essential issue about the character of

empirical science is at stake here.

If the organizational

element is seen, it is not seen in the same way that the
lines of a drawing are seen or the notes in a piece of music
are heard.

It seems to belong to the perceived object, and

yet the perceiver seems to contribute something too.
~

interpretation

formula

does

not

appear

The ad

adequate

to
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this

explain

complexity

in

perception

since

such

interpretation would surely be the exclusive property of the
perceiver.
Hanson goes on with another example, the x-ray tube:
Does

the

layman or the child see the same thing as

physicist when they look at the x-ray tube?

the

He has already

conceded that there is something common about what they see,
but the physicist sees more than either the child or the
layman.
an

Is this because he has learned more and can provide

interpretation based on his knowledge?

No,

he does no

more than they when he looks at the x-ray tube.
is what

is happening for all threee,

Observation

Hanson says

([2],

p.

16).
Is

the knowledge of the physicist relevant to this

problem?

Yes,

it provides the context appropriate to such

pieces of apparatus; it gives the physicist a pattern of
concepts which reiate x-rays to other forms
magnetic

radiation

as

problems and techniques.

well

as

numerous

of electro-

other

theories,

The layman and the child see the

same lines, colors and shapes but they do not organize them
in the same way because they lack the appropriate conceptual
background.
Knowledge is also relevant to the sense in which the
layman and the physicist do see the same thing.

They both

know enough about glass to know that if the x-ray tube were
dropped it would probably break.

Tycho and Kepler share even
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more knowledge about the sun and consequently organize what
they see at dawn in much the same way.

The sense in which

they see the same thing is not at odds with the sense in
which they do not see the same thing.

What is seen is in

part the "organizational element" and while that element is
there

to be seen in the object or situation,

the perceiver

must have particular knowledge in order to see it.

When

individuals see the same thing it is because they share
knowledge that allows them to organize the situation in the
same way.

When they do not see the same thing it is because

they do not share the same knowledge.
Hanson
organizational
that."
which

He

further
element

describes

connects

clarifies
through

his

"seeing-that"

observation

with

the

character

discussion
as

a

of

the

of

"seeing-

"logical

element"

knowledge

and

language.

Seeing involves, at least, the having of knowledge of certain
types.

It is to see that if certain things were done to the

objects we see, other things would result.
he says,

Every perception,

involves an aetiology and a prognosis.

To see an

object x is to see that it will behave in ways characteristic
of x 's.

If it does not behave in that way, we tend not to

see it as a genuine x any longer ([2], pp. 20-22).
Observation could not have been any other way, Hanson
argues.

The formula presented earlier which makes

the

knowledge contribution an ·ad hoc feature which explains any
differences in what we say about what we see.

Knowledge on
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this

view

is

not

part

manipulate observations.
believes.

of

observation,

but

is

used

This model is too simple,

It would have us

Hanson

treat visual observing as

simple absorption of retinal pictures.

to

the

But pictures are not

adequate to account for the fact that we make significant and
relevant observations.

Why is this so?

way pictures accomplish their end.

It is because of the

Hanson explains this by

contrasting it with language.
How do pictures and language differ?
says,

First, Hanson

they represent originals by copying certain of their

aspects.

The lines, shapes and colors of pictures stand in

much the same relations to each other as the lines, shapes
and colors of the originals.
does

not

Language, on the other hand,

represent or copy originals at all.

Instead,

language characterizes the original as of a particular type,
and it states the relations that obtain.
Further, statements can be true or false but pictures
can be neither.
Statements are also more versatile than pictures.

It

is said that a picture is worth a thousand words, but this is
true only if what the words attempt to describe is picturable.
growl,

A picture of a bear will tell us nothing about its
but language can tell us that and more about its

texture, smell and habits ([2], p. 27).
Hanson describes the differences between language and
pictures as "logical" in type.

He wants to emphasize the gap
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between the simple model of seeing (as the absorption of
retinal

pictures)

and

significant

or

relevant

observation.

Seeing according to the simple model would be like a view
through a kaleidoscope, for pictures like objects and events
have no intrinsic significance ([2], p. 26).
The point of

"seeing-that"

and language together, or rather,
separate.

is

to bring observation

to show that they are not

If we can see the significance of an object or

event it is because our linguistic knowledge is part of our
seeing.
Does it matter that the knowledge contribution to
observation is not ad hoc
formula would have it?

in the way the interpretation

From Thrane's perspective it matters

a great deal since allowing theories to intrude in the realm
of observation means that the data from the world is diluted
by what we think and no longer genuinely empirical.

But

Hanson's model intends to do more than shift the temporality
of the knowledge contribution to perception.

Just as a

student can learn nothing if he does not help, the perceiver
can

see nothing if he does not contribute to the process.

The knowledge element is his contribution but it is not
contributed

in

absentia

from

the

observational

situation.

The knowledge contribution is more like gaining a better
perspective from which to see the world than it is.like
laminating something onto· observations

of

the

world.

The

knowledge contribution of the perceiver is essential but it
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does not constitute dilution of the data any more than the
effort of the student alters the lesson.
Microphysics, Hanson says,

is the search for new

organizational elements for observable data.
conceptual organization are found,
entities will follow.

If new modes of

the discovery of new

Gold, he says, is rarely found by

those who have not got the lay of the land.
only

Microphysics is

secondarily the search for new objects and facts,

although he adds, these two endeavors are "as hand in glove"

([2], pp. 18-19).
This

is an interesting point in part because it is

similar to Kuhn's suggestion that theoretical discoveries are
often

"open-ended" ,in the sense

that

they

lead to further

discoveries and new appltcations of those discoveries in
previously unexpected areas.

Why should this be true?

Kuhn it is largely a psychological matter.

For

Past success

provides the scientist with the assurance he needs to devote
time and energy to further

"articulation" of. the paradigm.

What this really means for Kuhn,

as he says frequently,

is

that the scientist is willing to devote sufficient energy to
"forcing nature to fit the contours of the paradigm."
Hanson's point is very different.

His way of stating

the connection suggests some kirid of guarantee--that if a new
conceptual organization is found then the discovery of new
entities will automatically follow.

But the more accurate

statement of the case is suggested by the phrase "hand in
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glove."

New conceptual organization always works intimately

with the actual experimental or perceptual context.
do nothing else.

It could

The discovery of new aspects of nature is

part of what it means for new organizational elements to be
considered successful.
world that was

If they reveal nothing about the

not already known,

they would be simply

dropped.
The discovery of new aspects of nature is not guaranteed in any mysterious way by new conceptual organization.
Instead discovery is part of what "new conceptual organization" means.

To label one of these aspects of research as

"primary" and the other as

"secondary"

is misleading.

It

leads to the suggestion of a guarantee where none is needed.
Kuhn thinks that a guarantee is needed because he does not
see theory as essentially related to observation.

Theory is

not part of observation for Kuhn but is an addition to it.
It

~part

of

observation

for

Hanson.

So why

does

he

separate the search for intelligibility from the search for
entities?

It is because he wants to emphasize the former.

It is the pattern that the scientist is looking for, not new
things.

He is not a scout in the sense of one who is sent

randomly looking for problems.

Instead, he is more like a

detective searching for relationships between his problem and
other elements of the observable situation.
Recognizing that there is an organizational element
in observation is the same as recognizing an aspect of the
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epistemological significance of observation to science.

The

more complex model of observation is the cornerstone of his
philosophy of science.

It is on the basis of this concept of

observtion that his concept of the rationality of science is
explicated.

What he has accomplished here is a concept of

observation that allows for the contribution of the perceiver
without subs ti tu ting that contribution for
perception of the world itself.

the

input

into

It is for this reason that

his philosophy of science does not preclude the understanding
of science as an objective process.

FACTS

Hanson assumes all along that science is objective.
His philosophy of science is not aimed at defending that
point but rather it is concerned with understanding the
rationality of science as a process.

In order to appreciate

the character of that process it appeared important to Hanson
to determine what, if any, parts of the process were static.
Particularly the concept of "fact" has been treated as if it
were as irreducible and unequivocal as the world itself.
This attitude is misleading, Hanson said, since facts are not
observable, not even picturable entities.

White was later to

agree, pointing out that we can state the facts but that we
cannot see them ([9], p. 83).
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The

status

of

understanding science.

facts

appeared

significant

for

How do they relate to observation,

given that they are not observable?

They are clearly related

since what we observe determines

the facts

willing to state about a given situation.
for
this

dealing with facts
concept

is

is

to show that,

complex.

that we are

Hanson's reason
like observation,

Understanding it properly is

important to a similarly complex account of the rationality
of science.
The limitations or peculiarities of our language may
tell us something about facts.
for

instance,

tends

properties of objects.
have fur."

are

not

give

a

passive

account

of

the

"Grass is green," we say and "Bears

But some languages express these properties in a

verbal idiom:
activity.

to

The English adjectival idiom,

"Grass greens, 11 and "Bears fur,

11

suggesting

The facts that are expressed in the latter idiom
exactly

the

same

as

in

the

former.

Certain

conclusions will follow from one statement of the situation
that

will not follow from the other.

To say,

"The sun

rounds," instead of, "The sun is round," is to suggest that
the sun is constantly arranging itself in a sphere,
argues ([2], p. 34).

Hanson

This is very much what fluid mechanics

suggest that liquids do in even gravitational fields.

To say

that the sun is round misses this active aspect of its shape.
There may be,

Hanson goes on,

many

things about

ordinary situations that elude our current language.

If our

90
language had been different we might have come to think about
the world differently, to see different aspects of it and to
know different facts about it ([2], p. 35).
This is not to say that the world might have been
different,

he says.

"Given the same world,

been construed differently"

( [ 2], p.

36).

it might have

Theory,

language

and knowledge have importance in the way we see our world,
but this admission is fully compatible with an empirical
characterization of science.

Empiricism does not require a

simple model of observation.

THEORY

The

more

complex

account

of

the

rationality

science offered by Hanson stems from two sources.
begins

with a more

First, it

complex account of observation,

second, it analyzes a process instead of a product.
two points are

related since the process

terms of the dynamism within observation.

is

of

and

These

explicated in

This comes out in

Hanson's discussion of theory.
The notion of "dynamism within observation" makes
sense because of the complexity of observation, that is,
because it involves an "organizational element" as well as a
cont ri but ion from the world.

The ways in which those work

together and evolve together represent the evolution and
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growth

of

science,

i.e.,

the

development

of

scientific

knowledge.
The failure to appreciate the complexity and dynamism
of observation has resulted in misconstrual of the nature of
scientific theory, Hanson argues.

The isolation of causes by

science represents such a case of misconstrual.

Science

sometimes explains a problematic phenomenon by showing that
it

is

caused by a

better understood phenomenon.

among others Hanson says,

assumed as a

result

Russell,

that

causes

represent something very like chains of sense experience that
can be

traced from any point backward to the beginning of

time ([2], p. 50).
Again, the issue is complexity.
to give an explanation.

To name a cause is

And the giving and understanding of

an explanation may presuppose a great deal of knowledge.
This

is not to say that causes are not observable.

Since

observation always involves an "organizational element" the
requisite

knowledge

for

understanding a

also makes it possible to see the cause.

causal

explanation

We do commonly see

the causes of events in our environment, but there are also
events whose cause escapes us.
The point is that the determination of a cause is or
may be as complicated as the development of any explanation
in science.

In fact, there may be many causes for any event,

as many as there are reasonable explanations of it.

When we

attempt to determine the cause of even the most ordinary
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events, the knocking over of a chair, for instance, we often
find

ourselves

in

the

process

which contributed to it.
usual place,

the

of

listing numerous

factors

The chair had been moved out of its

lights were dim and the package

I

was

carrying could all be offered as "causes" of the accident.
Further, Hanson says, cause words are as theoryloaded as words like "finesse" and "offside."
knowledge of bridge and football

Without some

these terms mean nothing.

Neither can we observe the events they refer to without
knowledge ([2], p.

57).

That one billiard ball is the cause

of the motion of another is obvious, but only because all of
us know enough about the elastic properties of such bodies to
know that, e.g., they will not stick together or merge like
water droplets on contact.
The

chain

analogy

misses

the

causality in science in another way.

significance

of

The chain relation

suggests a sort of equality between cause and effect which
fails

to

illuminate

the

explanatory power

of

causality

in

science.

To say, for instance, that I knocked the chair over

because

it was out of its usual place is to provide an

explanation in only a very modest sense.

This may be all

that is required to explain a causal accident, but it would
not be adequate for science.
from

which

I

can

predict

It does not afford a pattern
future

events

or

link

this

phenomenon with other phenomena not previously known to be
connected (except in the same modest sense that other chairs
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or other objects inappropriately placed
connection in science is
says.

.) .

•

Causal

diagnostic and prognostic,

Hanson

The description of the cause must be at a different

logical level from the description of the effect to perform
these functions

([2], p. 60).

Otherwise the explanandum

could not be deduced from the explanans

in a scientific

explanation.
This

insight

explanatory

relation

concerning
between

logical

cause

and

levels
effect

and

the

helps

to

clarify another concept relevant to scientific knowledge, the
notion of "necessary connection."
connected to effects, Hanson says,

Causes are certainly
"but this is because our

theories connect them, not because the world is held together
by

cosmic

glue.

The

world

~

be

glued

together

by

imponderables but this is irrelevant for understanding causal
explanation" ([2], p.
This

comment

64).
is

interesting

for

three

reasons.

First, it tells us the source of the necessity in scientific
explanation.

It is the necessity of the syllogism.

certain premises the conclusion must follow.
view

of scientific theory which is

history of change in science.

Given

This allows a

compatible with the

When one theory

replaces

another it is not because the older theory has been exposed
as having falsely isolated necessary connections in nature.
Necessity does not reside in nature at all, Hanson is saying.
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Second,

it tells us something about what we should

expect of causal explanations in science, what is missing in
the ''modest" causal explanation above.

Causal laws are not

built up by merely noticing that A's are followed by B's
repeatedly and then summarizing this observation under the
umbrella formula, "All A's are followed by B's."

Exceptions

to such laws would raise no conceptual issue.

There are

exceptions to causal laws in science, Hanson admits, but they
also raise conceptual issues.

They cause the pattern of our

concepts to "warp and crumble" ( [ 2], pp. 64-65).

There are

ways to save favored patterns from warpage, as Hanson surely
knows, but these too raise conceptual issues.
And, third, Hanson seems in a certain way to have
overstated this point.

The connection identified by a theory

or law between two events is not there merely because our
theory or law connects the statements that describe them.

If

theories are to be cast as empirical, they must tell us about
the world.

It is important to identify the source of any

supposed necessity in causal laws, but it is also impotant to
understand the sense in which laws and theories tell us about
the world as it is.

Much of Hanson's discussion of theories

is aimed at making just this point.
Whether causal connection is left solely in the realm
of statements is important.

An essential feature of Hanson's

Philosophy of science is his attempt to bridge the gap
between statements and experience.

That is why he hegan his
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philosophy

of

science

culminating in his
language and seeing.

with

an

discussion

analysis

of

the

of

observation,

relationship

between

If the two are ever separated,

indeed difficult to get them back together.
"bridging" the gap was in fact

it is

His method of

the demonstration that they

were never separate.
The

chain analogy is deficient in the additional

sense that it fails to appreciate the genius that is required
of a Galileo or Newton in accomplishing their explanations of
nature.

When

experiments

appear

chain-like

they were designed to appear that way.

it

is

because

It is the chain-like

character of logic and not of objects or events in the world.
Experiments are designed to direct attention to a
particular sequence of events, Hanson says, and philosophers
who dwell on those events miss what is involved in directing
attention in this way.

Nature, he says, must have been

tampered with to achieve this end.

One way in which nature

is tampered with is by holding all but one variable constant
([2], pp. 66-68).
Philosophers who focus on the spectacular event,
usually

the

impressive conclusion to a

lengthy experiment,

fail to appreciate what the scientist had to do in order to
expose its

spectacular character.

generated the event for this
tbat

scientists engage in.

It

is not

that

they

is not the sort of tampering
But the scientist did have to
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aesign its

exposure using a

theoretical background against

which its spectacular character'could be seen.
Focusing on the spectacular is equally likely to lead
to the conclusion that the event was merely there to be seen
by any passer-by.
This

discussion of

causality sets

the stage for

understanding the process whereby theoretical explanation is
achieved.

Again,

Hanson's point is to characterize the

rationality of science through the examination of discovery.
He proposed to do that by looking at theory-finding, at the
influence

of

theory

on

observation,

facts

and

data.

Everything that he has done to this point is in the service
of explicating discovery.

In order to understand discovery,

the complex character of observation must be appreciated for
discovery will involve new observations in old and familiar
landscapes.

We must appreciate the relation between facts

and the fact-stating language,
result

because discovery will also

in the statement of new facts,

or, at least,

statement of facts that had not been stated.
essential

to

understand

that

we

are

the

It is also

looking

for

an

explanation when we look for a cause, and to appreciate the
applicable sense of "necessity" if "necessary connection'' is
used to describe scientific theory.
It is against this background that Hanson gives the
details of the dynamics of theories and the rational! ty of
discovery.

Philosophy

of

science,

he

says,

has

typically
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provided

two

enumeration
(H-D).

accounts

account

and

of

theories,

the

the

hypothetico-deductive

They are different but compatible.

induction

by

account

The H-D account

tells us what laws and theories do--serving as higher order
propositions

The inductive account

in a deductive system.

tells us how they are arrived at--by enumerating particulars.
There is something wrong with each account, according
to Hanson, and something right as well.

Scientists do not

come up with theories by enumerating and summarizing data.
And as a description of research H-D fails as well since
scientists do not start with hypotheses,
from data ([2], p 70).
starting point,

but instead start

The inductive view is correct in its

but it misses the critical point that a

theory must explain why something occurs, instead of being a
summary account of what occurs.

The H-D account included the

explanatory character of theories,

but it

left

out any

reference to the connection between data and those theories.
The

reasoning H-D takes

as

fundamental,

from higher

order

propositions to lower order propositions, will englighten our
reasons for accepting an hypothesis after it is got,
tells

us

nothing

about

the

reasons

for

but it

proposing

the

hypothesis in the first place ([2]), p. 71).
While

such

proposals

may

require

genius,

their

genesis is of more than psychological interest.
This

is Hanson's· introduction to

theories in science.

the problem of
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If

theories

are

freely

created

with

their

only

empirical connection provided after the fact in the form of
deducing observational propositions, then their creation will
be

difficult

responses

to

to

understand or

an

observable

trace.

environment

But

if

with

they

are

empirical

connection at every step, then their creation may be subject
to logical analysis.
The logical form of this process is retroduction or
abduction,

according to Hanson.

He employs

Peirce and

Aristotle in support of this "form of inference."

It differs

from both induction and deduction,
originate any new idea whatever.

neither of which can

While induction tells us

what is the case and deduction shows what must be the case,
abduction tells us what may be the case ([2], p. 85).

What

may be the case is given in the form of hypotheses which
provide a new pattern or background against which the data
could make sense.
That an hypothesis of this sort is not achieved by
induction is suggested in the way statements are falsified.
If a bird-antelope drawing has four lines added to it we
might say that it is a drawing of a bird with four feathers.
About the number of feathers we could be wrong;

the way of

deciding whether we are wrong would involve a simple count.
But about whether the drawing is of a bird, we could not
decide in the same way.

Pattern statements such as, "It is a

bird," are different from detail statements such as, "It has
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four feathers,"

in ways

that inductive summaries such as,

"All birds have four feathers," are not different from detail
statements such as, "This bird has four feathers."

The

inductive summary and the detail statement could be falsified
in the same way--a simple count would suffice.
Both pattern and detail statements are empirical,
Hanson says, but not in the same way.

What he has offered is

an interpretation of what it means to say that a statement in
science is empirical.

His interpretation is richer than that

common to empiricists such as Nagel and Thrane.

The theory-

ladenness of observation, as I understand it, represents
evidence for the claim that theories in science are empirical.

It is not evidence against the claim that observation

statements in science are empirical.
conclusion?

How do I

reach this

Let us examine the assumptions that are involved

in each approach.

Why does theory-ladenness appear to

threaten the empirical character of observation statements:
The answer lies in the sense in which theories are assumed to
be created.

For Nagel, Thrane and Kuhn theories are "freely''

created by the scientist.

How they are related to experience

or reports about experience is never specified.

Hanson, on

the other hand, assumes no such freedom in the creation of
theories.

For him theory creation is always intimately in

contact with observation.

As a result his account of theory

creation represents no threat to the rational! ty of science
because it is not a non-rational process.
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How

are

theories

created,

according

First, they are generated in context.

to

Hanson?

This is hardly a new

1nsight since people unfamiliar with scientific contexts
rarely make scientific discoveries.

In order to see how

theories are generated we must appreciate the ways in which
they are related to that context.
Theories

are

intended

to

provide

a

pattern

or

conceptual framework within which observable phenomena make
sense, Hanson says.

They also make possible the observation

of phenomena as of a

certain type and as related to other

phenomena in understandable ways ([2], p. 88).

Any pattern

which appears to have the potential of making a problematic
phenomenon explicable as a matter of course is a potential
theory.
"modest"

Inductive accounts of theory generation,
causal

explanation

presented

like the

earlier,

cannot

illuminate the capacity of scientific theories to explain why
something occurs.

The process of theory generation will be

developed in greater detail in connection with Hanson's
discussion of classical and modern physics.
The significance of Hanson's approach to theories can
be seen in at least three ways.

First, it develops an aspect

of science that has been ignored.
activity

of

science,

but

previous

Research is the major
characterizations

of

science by philosophy of science have failed to provide any
acceptable account of how discovery comes about.
omission was

justified by the

claim that

This

discovery was

of
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psychological interest only.

Hanson has tried to show that

discovery is a rational process, proceeding in a step-wise or
walking fashion.

The scientist always has one foot firmly

grounded in observation before the second foot attempts,
through hypothesis to make further contact with the world.
He need never "jump" from data to theory.
This

account of theories

is

significant for

the

second reason that it makes theories empirical both in their
genesis and in their function.
in

a

way

that

is

at

They tell us about the world

least

the

equal

of

observation

statements.
And,
"gap"

third, Hanson's treatment of theories leaves no

between

theories

and

experience.

"Correspondence

rules" and "bridge laws" are not needed in his approach,
giving his
that

philosophy

of science an economy

and

relevance

is missing in the other accounts of science that have

been examined here.
But Hanson's point in discussing theories in relation
to the H-D and inductivist accounts is not merely to criticize them but also to identify where they were correct.
Induction was correct in trying to give a rational account of
theory

generation and

~-D

was

correct

in assuming that

theories and observation statements were deductively related.
The

recognition

of

the

deductive

relation

is

important

because it establishes the logical sense in which theories
Provide a context within which problematic phenomena become
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the expected.

This is the point of Hanson's attempt to

formalize abduction ([2], p. 86).

But as Harold Brown points

out, any such attempt is destined to be paltry since formal
logic

is

concerned only with formal

concern for content ([l], p. 134).

relations,

with no

A dialectical logic,

which Brown wants to pursue, is concerned precisely with the
context of science in its historical setting.
philosophy

of

epistemology

science

(logical

should

analyis

He argues that

abandon

based

on

"absolutist"
an

irreducible

empirical foundation) in favor of historicism and relativism
([l], p. 152).
that

The consequence of this shift, he admits, is

philosophy

of

correspondence

in

science
its

must

theory

give

of

up

truth

any

sense

of

and

re-define

objectivity to mean "non-arbitrary" ([l], pp. 153-154).

CLASSICAL PARTICLE PHYSICS

Part
attempt

of

the

to define a

absolutist
structure
discussion

and
of
of

value

of

sense of

Hanson's

rationality

relativist/historicist

that

rationality

classical

work

particle

is

lies

in his

between these

extremes.

given
physics

flesh
and

The
in

his

elementary

particle physics.
There is more to be said about the relation between
theory and observation than is contained in the reference to
deduction or in the historical context approach of Brown.

It
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has long been recognized, for instance, that some of the laws
of classical physics are used in such a way that disconfirming evidence is conceivable and some are not.

This presents

a problem for some philosophers who argue that physics must
keep in touch with experience in the sense of always being
falsifiable.

Hanson

responds

that

"the

orderings

of

experience are limitless; we force upon the subject matter of
physics

the ordering we choose"

([2],

98).

p.

What he

appears to mean is that, having chosen a particular ordering
of experience, we see the world according to the pattern it
provides.

The fact that we may not be able to conceive of

another pattern at a particular time does not count against
the

empirical

empirical

it

character
must

of

provide

a
the

observational details make sense.

theory.

In

background

order
against

to

be

which

On the contrary, the fact

that some laws of physics appear to be functionally a priori
represents testimony for the power of the patterning function
of theory.

They do their job so well that, having accepted

them, we find it difficult to conceive of any other way of
making sense of this aspect of nature.
But no scientific theory has ever been a priori in
the

sense of having been generated prior to or apart from

experience.
Falsification and falsifiability are concepts which
have the potential for shedding light on the rationality of
science but

they are not

touchstones

of empiricism in the
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naive sense suggested in the concern over the functional a
priori-ness
count

of

some

against

theories.

Non-falsifiability may

the empirical

character of a

theory,

not
but

contrary evidence may not result in a theory being rejected
either.

The entire system of science is empirical,

believes,

and as a

result contrary evidence counts against

the system as a whole.
such evidence

count

science,

to

but

Hanson

Naive falsificationists would have

against

reject

the

them

fundamental
when

tenets

confronted

of

with

the
such

evidence would amount to refusing to think about this part of
nature at all ([2], p. 103).

A more reasonable attitude is

to take the contrary evidence as counting against the system
as a whole--it did not apply where it might have.

The "hard

line" of the naive falsificationist may be due in part to a
misunderstanding of the location of "necessary connection" in
science.

If

a

theory

has

failed

to

isolate

necessary

connection in nature then it is untrustworthy and should be
rejected.

But, as we have seen,

the function of theory is

not to isolate necessary connection in nature.
Further,

as

Hanson

has

alreay

pointed

out,

the

falsification of theory is not accomplished in the same way
that it would be for an observation statement.

Theories

provide patterns for observable data and they may succeed in
doing that even when particular bits of observable data that
were expected to fit into·that pattern fail to do so.
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The point is that the patterning relation between
theory and observation explains how one goes about seeking a
It is understandable on the basis

theoretical explanation.

of the complex character of observation and facts discussed
thus

far,

and

it

provides

the

basis

for

assessing

the

relevance of falsification to the rationality of science.
Whether one subscribes to this as the best or only
way of understanding the rationality of science is not the
point.

Rather,

the point

is

that Hanson has presented an

integrated system whose purpose is to present in outline form
the rational structure of science as research.
Hanson 1 s

discussion

of

elementary

particle

physics

helps to further articulate the character of the patterning
relation between theory and observation.

ELEMENTAL PARTICLE PHYSICS

Elementary particle physics has been thought by some
philosophers
science.

to present special problems for philosophy of
For

characterized
unvisualizable
according

to

instance,
in
or

such

a

ultimate
way

that

unpicturable.

Hanson,

which

explanation in science.
problem for philosophy of

lays

matter
it

is

This

is

bare

the

seems
in
an

to

be

principle
insight,

essence

of

Instead of presenting a special
~cience,

the character of science in general.

it helps us to understand
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What is it about unpicturability that is essential to
scientific explanation?

It is that an explanation must not

rely on that which requires explanation.
explanation

have

been

rejected

Various attempts at

for

this

reason.

The

suggestion that crystals might be explained by a reference to
a brick-like structure, for instance, was
the

bricks

would

then

have

to

be

rejected because

invested

properties of crystals that require explanation.
explaining cohesion with "hooked atoms" fails
Hanson says.

with

those

Similarly,
to explain,

This is part of the promised account of how it

is that theories are generated.

Scientists, in order to be

successful, must understand this and more about the structure
of explanation.
Atomic

theory

picturable properties.

attempts

to

explain

visible

or

It must do that by reference to

something which does not possess those properties ( [2]), p.
12 0) •

E.g.,

if atomic theory is to explain the color and

odor of chlorine it must do so without endowing atoms with
either color or odor.
The classical concept of the atom with its postulated
properties

such

as

impenetrability,

homogeneity

and

sphericity is no longer adequate to pattern the data of
physics with its array of sub-atomic particles, Hanson says.
The properties of these particles are "discovered and (in a
way) determined by the physicist."

He ascribes properties to

sub-atomic particles which he hopes will support inference to
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the phenomena he has observed.

An intelligible conceptual

pattern is the goal ([2], p. 123).
In

what

way

does

the

physicist

properties of sub--atomic particles?

determine

By choosing only those

that are explanatory, must be Hanson's point.
story of micro-physics,

he says,

the

is that

The whole

the sub-atomic

particles show themselves to have just those properties which
they must have

in order to explain the phenomena which

require explanation ([2], p. 124).
Only when the quest for picturability was dropped was
the essence of explanation in science laid bare.
recognizes, however,

As Hanson

this is not the only essential feature

of scientific explanation.

Explanation in science must unite

phenomena that might otherwise have been anomalous or wholly
unnoticed

([2],

p.

121).

A theory must be concerned with

more than a particular phenomenon or a particular property of
a particle in order to constitute a pattern.

It must connect

with other phenomena in order to avoid being merely ad hoc in
the way that epicycles were in Ptolemy's astronomical theory.
Unpicturabili ty does

not present a

real existence of such particles.

problem for

Intelligibility,

the

Hanson

says, demands that they exist ([2], p. 123).

In other wods,

unpicturability

the

does

not

count

against

character of micro-particle theories.

empirical

These particles have

just those properties they must have in order to explain
problematic phenomena.

Such properties are not postulated at
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random but

are

responses

to

actual

laboratory

They are attempts to explain problems that,

situations.

as a type,

are

picturable and have therefore to be, as a type, unpicturable.
The same is true for other supposed special problems
in modern physics such as the absolute identity of atoms _and
sub-atomic particles as well as

the uncertainty

principle.

Observations forced physicists to construe the world with the
help of these principles in order to make sense of the data
([2], p. 131).

Had the world been different such ideas might

never have been formulated.

They are justified in every

experiment in quantum physics since those experiments would
not make sense without them.

They are parts of "interlocked

and systematic accounts" of the behavior of complex bodies,
Hanson tell us ([2], pp. 134-136).
Why

is picturabi 11 ty such a pivotal issue?

Hanson

emphasizes one reason, that it reveals the essential feature
of

scientific

explanation that

such explanations

rely on that which requires explanation.

must

not

It also brings out

the other essential feature that scientific explanation must
put

the

problematic phenomenon in the context of other

phenomena.

This helps to distinguish scientific explanation

from the "modest" sort of explanation of why the chair was
upset.

The

latter was modest

because it

connect this phenomenon with any others.

did

little

to

The latter was

modest because it did little to connect this phenomenon with
any others.

The law of gravity, on the other hand, connects

109

the falling of the chair with planetary orbits and other
phenomena

whose

relation

to

the

chair

would

have

been

unthinkable without it.
Similarly,

inductivist

concerned with particular
less

likely

approaches

types

are

by

of phenomena and

to make the sort of

connections

nature

are

even

that Hanson's

notion of "pattern" aims to illuminate.
The picturability issue has the added significance of
shedding

light

Nagel.

I

on

the

problem of

contended

in

circularity

discussing

that

this

plagued

problem

circularity was not a serious problem in science.

that

It appears

to be a problem if theories are seen as "free creations" of
the mind and the theory-ladenness of observation, in turn, is
interpreted

as

(at

least)

partial

theory

generation

of

But if theories are not free creations,

observation.

I

argued, but are responses to the environment of the scientist
such circularity is
explanation

must

problematic
phenomena.
clarify

constitute

phenomenon

a

makes

Now we can see why.
pattern
sense

within
along

which
with

An
the

other

The two essential features of explanation help to

the

requirement
requires

unlikely.

problem
that

the

explanation,

of

circularity.

explanation not
makes

Nagel's

The

depend
concern

first,

on

that

the
which

unnecessary.

That an observation is theory-laden does not mean that

the

theory constitutes its meaning.

Atomic theory can explain

the

does

color

of

chlorine

but

it

so

by

reference

to
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principles that do not include color.

In this case the color

of chlorine would count as genuine evidence for the theory
that intends to explain it.

Such evidence would not be

adequate to win acceptance of the theory, but it would not be
circular either.
The only genuine sense of circularity arises because
of the other essential feature.

The explanation must put the

problem in a context along with other phenomena.

Ptolemy's

epicycles were circular in this explanatory sense because
they explained only the apparent retrograde motion of some
planets.

In other words,

if circularity occurs it occurs

because the explanatory relation is too narrow.
For Nagel circular! ty is a problem of the empirical
character of observation.

Instead, it should be seen as a

problem of the empirical character of theories.

A theory

like Ptolemy's which can explain only the problem at hand has
questionable empirical status.
actually do in science.

It does poorly what theories

Theories provide the conceptual

backgound against which observable phenomena make sense.
background

to

be

background

it

must

be

wider

than

For
a

particular problem.
Does the theory-ladenness of observation mean that
the meaning of observation terms and statements is determined
by theory?

Yes, but only in the sense that the meaning of a

term or statement is determined by its context and the other
terms and statements to which it is related.

Does this

111

create

a

problem

of

circularity?

No,

the

problem

of

circularity arises when theories fail to provide such a
context, as was the case with the theory of epicycles.

HANSON'S CRITICS

Finally, it should be pointed out that criticism of
Hanson has often missed the point.

Carl Kordig, for one,

misinterprets the point of Hanson's work, treating it as if
it were framed by traditional concerns and assumptions about
objectivity.

Kordig believes that he has accompished a

reductio ad absurdum when he argues

that

if seeing x

requires knowing certain of x's properties, then one could
not change one's knowledge state with regard to those
properties and still be said to see the same x ([3]), pp.

457-459).

This argument has force only if one's concept of

objectivity is based on the content of observation reports,
as Kordig's is, but it has no impact if an alternative basis
of objectivity is presupposed.
It is surely true, as Kordig says, that we can see a
lamp without knowing that it is our maiden aunt's favorite
possession, but it is also true that we cannot see the lamp
without the aid of theory or knowledge.

This does not

create a problem for our concept of observation if we take
it as an insight suggesting a direction for research as
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Hanson did.

If we assume that the answer to that research

has already been given it creates serious problems.
Another award-winning paper taking Hanson to task
was written by Paul Tibbetts.

He argues that Hanson fails

to give adequate emphasis to the distinction between reports
of

seeing

as

interpreting.

discrimination

and

reports

of

seeing

as

Seeing as discriminating, he says, is nothing

more than "describing or discriminating a figure x relative
to a background y, rather than describing some property or
feature of x per se •

" ([7], p. 151).

Such reports,

having to do only with such things as change in direction
and size, are theory-neutral.

The problem with Hanson, on

his account, is that he failed to give sufficient empahsis
to

this

level

of

observation

reports

and

consequently

reached the inaccurate conclusion that there are no theoryneutral observation statements.
Tibbetts is wrong on two counts.

First, the level

of seeing as discriminating involves knowledge even if it is
at a level that is unlikely to be contested.

But, second,

he fails to see that Hanson is offering an alternative basis
for understanding the rationality of science.

The problem

of theory-neutrality is important to Hanson only because it
suggests the need for a better understanding of observation
in relation to science.
What Hanson has done is substitute an analysis of
observation for certain assumptions about observation.

He
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does not assume that observation is objective because of the
possibility of consensus on the content of observation
reports,

and therefore he need not seek a

that content is theory-free.

level at which

Both Kordig and Tibbetts

continue to assume that the objectivity of observation is
based

on

observation

reports

and

they

structure

their

arguments to show the error of failing to incorporate this
assumption into one's philosophy of science.
What is needed at this point is to make explicit the
concept of the objectivity of observation that an analysis
of

observation such as

that given by Hanson can support.

That concept will be based on the character of observation
rather than on the content of observation reports.
the task of Chapter VI.

That is
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CHAPTER VI

THE DISCOVERY APPROACH

I share with the philosophers I criticize the belief
that

science is empirical.

work is

What I

an adequate account

science to be empirical.
Thrane represent a dilemma.

find lacking in their

of how it

is

possible for

The works of Kuhn, Nagel, and
If observation is taken as a

theory-laden endeavor, the empirical character of scientific
knowledge becomes a problem; both Kuhn and Nagel attempt to
accommodate theory-ladenness to philosophy of science,

but

they fail to show how observation that is impregnated with
theory

can offer evidence for or against theory.

On the

other side of the dilemma is Thrane who defends a theoryneu t ra l account of observation only to find that on his
account observation is irrelevant to epistemology.
The alternative I offer is the discovery approach.
This

approach

assumes

that

the

scientist

observation of a problematic phenomenon,

begins

with

the

an anomaly or

malady of some kind, and seeks an explanation whereby this
phenomenon becomes non-problematic.
The alternative discovery approach will be developed
and defended in five steps.

First,
115

I will argue that the
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goal of discovery is explanation or theory.
that entities are discovered in science,

I do not deny

but I will argue

that one can make better sense of science by pursuing discovery as the discovery of explanation.

I will show,

instance

can

for,
case,

that

the

given this
and also

discovery

assumption,
that

of

entities

while the

the sense

be

reverse

for

accounted

is

not

the

in which "accidental" dis-

coveries are genuinely accidental can be explained with this
assumption.

I

do not assume that all explanations are

scientific theories, but I will assume that all scientific
theories

are

explanations.

As

Karl

Popper

"Theories are nets cast to catch what we call

puts

it,

'the world':

to rationalize, to explain, and to master it" ([6], p. 59).
Second, I will argue that observation is theoryladen.

As will become clear in my arguments, I do not mean

by "theory"-laden that all observation is informed, directed
or somehow loaded with scientific theory.
might

be

a

better

term

for

I

would

"Knowledge"-laden
count

fundamental

knowledge such as colors and shapes to be sufficient to
result in theory-laden observation.

I

am aware that some

consider this sense of theory-laden observation "trifling"

([3], p. 176), but my argument will show that, with regard
to the empirical nature of science, it is not.
Third,

I

will give a detailed analysis of what it

means to say that observation is theory-laden.

The purpose

of this analysis will be to define precisely the contribu-
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tion that is made to observation by the environment as well
as

that made by the observer.

This is critical to under-

standing the sense in which science is empirical.

The

theory-ladenness of observation created a problem in philosophy of science because it appeared to erode the evidence
character of observation.
of

independent

Does observation remain a source

information about

the world or must

it be

understood as "mind dependent" in light of theory-ladenness?
Observation is clearly mind dependent in the sense that it
could not occur without a mind, but a more serious sense of
mind

dependence

such as

"contamination,"

"dilution,"

"alteration" is the more usual concern when this
raised.

or

issue is

concern in this section will be to show that

My

observation can be treated as theory-laden without precluding

the

objective.

possibility

that

observational

evidence

is

That is, I will show that mind dependence in the

second sense is not a consequence of the theory-ladenness of
observation.
In section four,
tion

of

the

I will argue that this interpreta-

theory-ladenness

of

observation has

implications for philosophy of science.
provide

the

basis

for

a

theory/observation distinction.

clear

powerful

First, it will

description

of

the

The distinction will not be

collapsed but neither will it be treated as representing a
difference in levels of empirical or theoretical content.
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This

re-interpretation

of

the

theory/observation

distinction will provide the basis for treating the problem
of "unobservable entities" in science, for the meaningdependence

of

observation

terms

on

theory

and

for

the

problem of circularity in the evidence-theory relation.
The positive characterization of theory developed in
section three and the beginning of this section will be used
to support a re-interpretation of the justification/discovery

distinction

as

the

discovery-justification

continuum.

It will also be shown to aid in solving the problem of the
non-rejection of theories

in the face

of counter-evidence

from falsification theory.
In section five,
scientific

truth must

I

will argue

include

elements

that a
of

theory of

correspondence,

coherence and pragmatics.
Finally, in section six, I will take one more look
at

the posit ions taken by Kuhn,

Nage 1 and Thrane.

argue that the error common to all of them,

I wi 11

as well as to

Popper and Scheffler, is the failure to analyze observation.

DISCOVERY AS THE DISCOVERY OF THEORIES

That

discovery

in

science

is

theories is by no means a unique view.

the

discovery

of

Popper describes

discovery in science as "the act of conceiving or inventing a
theory" ([6], p. 31).

Hanson, of course, has the same view,
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suggesting

that

science

is

"primarily

a

search

for

intelligibility," or the seeking of "new modes of conceptual
organization," which, when it is successful, will be followed
by the discovery of entities ([4], pp. 18-19).

It would be

better to say that the discovery of entities often signals
success in the search for intelligibility, but the point here
is to distinguish the options.

The scientist either sets out

to discover new entities or he sets out to discover theories.
I will argue that the latter makes better sense.
The

starting

point

of

the

discovery

important in deciding this question.

process

is

The scientist always

begins with the recognition of a problem, that is, with a
problematic observation.

The sense in which an observation

is problematic may vary.

An observed measurement may not

conform to prediction (e.g., the total energy released from a
sub-nuclear

reaction

may

be

less

than

predicted);

an

unfortunate event may be observed, the cause of which is
unknown

(e.g.,

a recurring set of disease symptoms); or a

phenomenon may accompany an experiment which the operative
theory does not explain (e.g., Roentgen's glowing screen for
which

then

current

electro-magnetic

theory

could

not

account).
Having begun with an observed problematic phenomenon,
the scientist seeks a context within which the phenomenon no
longer appears problematic.

This does not necessarily mean

that we will look for or find a new entity.

In the case of a
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physical illness, he may find that its cause is an already
known agent.

He has solved his problem by locating it within

the aegis of the theory of a particular disease agent.

New

sets of relations are discovered in such a case instead of a
new entity.
In an instance such as unexplained energy loss an
entity may well

be sought,

but even then

research can best be understood in terms
theory.

the

of

course of

the operative

It is that theory that will tell the researcher the

sort of entity that is likely to be responsible for this
quantity of energy under these conditions.

Without such

guidance he would know neither where nor how to look for the
entity.
The alternative,

to assume that the goal of reseach

is entities, would seem to leave research without a context.
It would make of science a sort of "prospecting" where the
most successful scientist would be the one with the best
luck,

who happened to look into the corner of the universe

that was richest in unknown entities.
accurately
explain
achieves.

characterized

the

development

scientific
of

Even if such behavior
research,

intelligibility

it

would not

that

science

Each new entity would have to be placed, ad hoc,

into the explanatory structure of science.

We might expect

that process to be rather far behind the work of the "entity
Prospectors," with a constant backlog of things waiting for a
Place in the system of science.

But this does not coincide
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with

the order of events

in science where

entities and

explanations seem to come along hand in hand,

but with the

explanation commonly leading the way, if only in the form of
an hypothesis that is on its way to becoming an accepted
explanation.

"Acceptance"

often

corresponds

with

the

discovery of the entity predicted by the hypothesis.
This

is

not to say that new phenomena are never

encountered for which an explanation is lacking.

Roentgen's

discovery of x-rays is perhaps the best known case of such an
event.

But from an epistemological perspective the discovery

of x-rays is not different from the discovery of a virus.
problematic

phenomenon

symptom)

observed and an explanation for

is

(a

glowing

When the explanation is found,

screen

A

or

a

disease

it

is

sought.

(in each of these cases the

explanation involved the existence of a new entity) an entity
is discovered.
The discovery of x-rays was no more accidental than
any other in science.

The visual sighting of a glowing

screen in the presence of the cathode-ray tube could not be
called the discovery of x-rays since at

least one other

researcher had seen the screen without making anything of it.
X-rays were not discovered until they were placed within the
context of electromagnetic theory.
The
covers

term

"problematic

phenomenon,"

as

indicated,

both the unexpected or new phenomenon as well as a

well-known problem such as a particular illness.

To describe
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the discovery that follows from the first

(e.g., x-rays) as

"accidental" and the discovery that follows from the second
(e.g., a virus) as "non-accidental" is to disguise what they
have in common.

In each case the discovery involves the

theoretical context that makes them intelligible.

ARGUMENTS FOR THE THEORY-LADENNESS OF OBSERVATION

The problem of this thesis is not so much whether
observation is theory-laden as it is the best philosophical
approach to science.

I

believe that the best approach is

from the perspective of discovery, and one of the reasons is
that this approach involves the analysis of observation.
Since the movement of discovery is from the observation of a
problematic
requires
relate.

phenomenon

that

we

to

a

understand

theoretical
how

explanation,

observation

and

it

theory

In the process of investigating that relation Hanson

saw that theory was part of the observation process itself
and

he

labeled

that

discovery

"the

theory-ladenness

of

observation."
The importance of analysis of observation lies in the
fact that it provides the opportunity to specify the sense in
Which theory contributes to the observation process, thereby
making clearer
evidence for

the

sense

or against

in which observation
theory.

I.e.,

can provide

the analysis

of
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observation represents, as one might expect that it would,
the determination of the sense in which science is empirical.
What led Hanson to the conclusion that observation
was theory-laden?
guished

in

his

At least two arguments can be distinchapter

on

observation

in

Patterns

of

Discovery:
A.

"Gestalt" shifts
The issue as Hanson sees it is whether interpretation

is part of the perceptual process its elf or whether it is
something that occurs after perception is completed.

He

offers the "Gestalt" drawings such as the perspex cube and
the bird-antelope as evidence for the former option ([4], pp.

9 ff.).

The argument is simple.

The shift from seeing the

cube as from above to seeing it as from below or from seeing
the bird to seeing the antelope occurs in an instant.
takes

neither

time

nor

conscious

It

deliberation.

Interpretation as an intellectual process requires both.
The ability to see the drawing as a cube or as either
a bird or antelope will require training which is clearly of
an intellectual nature, but once the training is mastered it
becomes

part

of

the

observation

process

and

no

longer

represents intellectual functioning in the same sense.
Clearly
drawing itself.
intellectual

the

change

cannot

be

attributed

to

the

If it cannot be attributed to a change in

interpretation

either,

then

there

must

be
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something else about observation that can change, and Hanson
calls that the "organizational element" or the theory aspect.

a.

Argument from the Complexity of Perception
Hanson also argues that perception is too complex to

be accounted for solely by the contribution from the world,
or, in the case of vision, by the retinal "picture."
the

He uses

contrast between language and pictures to clarify this

sense

of

complexity.

typically

shapes,

Pictures

spatial

copy

relations

aspects
and

of

originals,

colors.

Pictures

represent the original in ways that language does not.

The

limitation of picturing brings this contrast into focus.
Pictures can represent only those things that are picturable,
e.g., physical elements such as shape, spatial relations and
color.

Language is not so limited.

instead of representing them,

It refers to originals

it characterizes the original

instead of arranging its parts according to that found in the
original.

But

language

can

refer

to and

characterize any

aspect of the original whether it is visual, auditory or
tactile.
The

most

important

aspect

of

the

complexity

perception lies in what Hanson calls "seeing-that."
see,

for

universe

instance,

that birds have hollow bones,

is heliocentric,

inopportune spot '( [ 4],

p.

of

We can
that

the

or that the car is parked in an
25).

In each case what

is seen

involves relations that are not obvious without relevant
knowledge.

A picture of the situation or a description of

'·
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each part would not necessarily convey the information that
18 observable to a suitable aware observer.
This argument can be used with simpler instances of
observation as well.

To observe a red pen involves knowledge

of shape, color and use.
philosophers

who

are

Israel Scheffler,

The point is admitted by many

in general

for one,

disagreement

concedes

from concept is impossible ([8], p.
same concession to C. I. Lewis.

that

36).

with Hanson.

observation apart
He attributes the

Nagel, as we have seen,
( [5],

agrees that every observation is determined by theory
p. 18).

It

is clear that even if the theory-ladenness of

observation is

indubitably established its

implications are

I will nonetheless add two arguments for

far from certain.

the theory-ladenness of observation which will be developed
in more detail in the next section.
C.

Argument from the Complexity of the World
Hanson's second argument above suggests

that

the

product of perception is too complex to be accounted for
solely in terms of the contribution from the world.

One

might also argue that the world itself is too complex to be
perceived without the help of theory.
the

terms of J.

Gibson,

J.

energy" ([2], p. 5).
information from

in a

We are immersed,

in

"flowing array of ambient

Perception is the process of extracting

that

flowing

array.

If we

are

to

be

successful we must have some method of selection or attention
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since there is simply too much energy to attend to all at the
same time.

We would be overwhelmed by the sea of energy if

we were without theory, that is, if perception were nothing
but the process of conveying energy through sensory channels.
D.

Argument from Non-Seeing
We often do not perceive things that are available in
There are at least

the sense of being directly before us.
two types of situations where this occurs.

In the first, our

failure to see what is before us may be due to lack of
knowledge.

I do not, for instance, see what the radiologist

sees when looking at an x-ray film.

This will not sway those

who are not convinced of the theory-ladenness of observation,
since they will, in opposition to other arguments presented
here,

hold

that

what

is

seen

is

the

same

but

the

interpretation put on it is different as the result of
different states of knowledge.
On the other hand, we often fail to see things that
are directly before us when our state of knowledge with
regard to them is adequate to "interpret" what we have seen
appropriately.

It might be answered that in such cases,

although we have the necessary knowledge, we fail to apply it
to this experience.

But it is not unheard of to actively

seek a particular item and still not see it when it is
directly before us.
that

This is explainable on the assumption

observation is theory-laden,

because on this account

Whatever is seen (and in cases like this there are always

127

other things to be seen in the environment) requires the
employment of some bit of knowledge.
explained

by

the

fact

that

Not-seeing can be

perception

as

an

activity

involving theory is involved with some other object when that
which is sought

is available.

The theory-neutral view of

observation that is followed by interpretation is less open
to an explanation of this sort.

With the separation of

processes the likelihood of such common perceptual mistakes
or malfunctions is apparently eliminated.
on this view,

All the data is,

presented with equal value, and we need only

sort for that which fits the item sought.
If observation is theory-laden it is also a skill and
is thus open to both error and excellence.

If observation is

theory-neutral it is not a skill but is the mere absorption
of energy which is then processed by the intellect.

Our

common experience of both error and excellence in observation
is evidence for the theory-ladenness of observation.
Finally,
in

Chapter

III.

I will only mention the argument developed
There

Thrane's

attempt

to

theory-neutral acount of seeing resulted in the
that observation is irrelevant to epistemology.
largely

to

the

totally

perception without theory

undifferentiated

develop

a

conclusion
This is due

character

of

(the insight that was responsible

for both Nagel and Scheffler accepting the theory-ladenness
of observation).

The assumption of theory-neutrality is

therefore self-defeating.
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THE ANALYSIS OF OBSERVATION
AND THE EMPIRICAL CHARACTER OF SCIENCE

The assumption that observation is theory-laden has
been seen as casting doubt on the evidence-theory relation.
I believe that the solution to this problem must lie in an
analysis of observation, the purpose of which is to specify
the contribution made by theory to the oservation process as
well as the contribution from the world.

I will begin that

analysis with a discussion of the "data" of perception.
A.

The "Data" of Perception

J.

J.

Gibson

argues

that

as

perceivers

we

are

immersed in a sea of environmental energy, all of which is
potential information about that environment.

The energy of

the environment is in that sense the "data" of perception.
But this sense of "data" should be carefully distinguished
from any "accomplishment" sense of data.
energy

is not

Without

That is, ambient

information but only potential information.

a perceiver it

is not

information,

and in the

presence of a perceiver it may or may not be information; it
will depend on the nature of the perceiver

(including the

constitution of his sense-organs), as well as his interests
or needs.
Therefore,

ambient energy represents the data of

perception but not in the sense that, say, a measurement
would

be a

datum

in a

blueprint.

The measurement

is
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information apart from the blueprint but energy

is not

information apart from an actual perceptual process.
explains why I

This

may not hear the traffic outside my office

even though sound waves from it are striking my eardrums at
an audible intensity virtually all the time.

The sound waves

are not the data of perception unless I perceive the traffic
and I

cannot do that unless I attend to it in the sense of

employing some theory or other.
B.

Analysis of Theory-Function
1.

Selection
As I

indicated in my third argument for the theory-

ladenness of observation, the energy of our environment is a
constant and

complex source

of potential

information.

comes in the form of electromagnetic radiation, heat,

It
sound

waves, pressure and chemical action.
The massiveness of the
its

first function.

source provides

theory with

In order for perception to occur the

perceiver must limit his attention to particular sources of
energy.

He must select from the vast array of energy just

those types and sources which are most likely to yield the
basis for information at a particular time.
driving,

for instance,

When walking or

we select for visual data in the

region directly ahead of us most of the time.
to

a

lecture

we

select

for

characteristic of the speaker.

audible

data

When listening
of

the

sort
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To argue for theory-ladenness is not the point here.
That argument has already been pursued to the degree that it
will be.

Instead, selection should here be seen in terms of

the specification or description of theory-function in the
observation process.

I

perception

the

involves

environment.
it also

begin with the assumption that all
absorption

of

energy

from

the

This provides needed breadth to perception, but

requires a tool for limiting the data source to

manageable

proportions.

Theory

in

a

selective

role

accomplishes this end adequately.
It

should be noted that since the energy of the

environment is potential data and only becomes data when it
is

selected,

the issue of the factual separateness between

theory in its selective role and energy cannot arise.
are

logical

distinctions

in

the

sense

that

These

theory

and

energy-data are separable in thought but not in fact, but in
the case of its selective role this problem cannot arise
since the energy does not become data until it is selected.
2.

Connection
The

with

other

data selected by theory must also be connected
data

environment.

in

order

to

make

sense

of

a

complex

In our ordinary situations we regularly connect

such things as a whistling sound with visible steam in order
to gain the information that the water in the kettle is
boiling.

In

science

one

may

make

connections

between

pendular and planetary motion in order to explain one or the
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other.

Or the scientist may employ mathematics to manipulate

data into a recognizable phenomenon.
The connective function of theory is the process of
establishing
has

the

relationships

additional

function

process, of course.
for

a

purpose.

among selected energy-data.
of

directing

the

It

selection

Selection is never random, but is always

The perceiver may be unskilled in finding

relevant data, resulting in the appearance of randomness, but
the

perceiver who remained unskilled would not succeed and

might not survive.

He would surely not succeed in science.

Suppose, for instance, that a researcher into a rare form
of early senility recognizes what appear to be symptoms similar to those he has read about accompanying a particular form
of paracitosis.

He reads the available reports on the para-

cite and,

perhaps,

contacts the people involved in that

research.

He knows that his patients are not suffering from

the same paracite since it is not found in his environment,
but through his library research he finds that this particular organism

injures

its

host

by

selectively absorbing an

important nutrient from its. host's diet.

The result is a

form of malnutrition with symptoms like senility.

He then

tests his patients for the presence of the crucial nutrient,
and finds that while their diets are adequate, their digestive

tracts

properly.

are

incapable

of

processing

the

nutrient

He then administers the chemical in the form of an
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injection and observes his patients for changes in their
symptoms.
In

this

example

the

researcher

is

guided

by

the

recognition of a similarity between very different dieseases.
His hypothesis was that early senility was the result of a
nutritional
disease.

deficiency

of

the

sort

found

in

the

paraci tic

He then knew what sort of experiment to perform.

The hypothesis was nothing but a suggested connection between
his problem and other data, but the possible data to which it
might have been connected were virtually endless.

It is the

guide-capacity of theory that makes research non-random.

c.

Theory as Non-generative
The point of this analysis of observation is to leave

open the possibility of an empirical characterization of
science.

For science to be empirical it must be possible for

observation and observation-reports to give information about
the world that corresponds
sense.

to the world in some meaningful

It is important to emphasize that possibility is all

that is sought.

I will not try to show that any particular

report or set of reports has accomplished this end or that it
ever will.

The point is to base the empirical characteriza-

tion of science on the analysis of observation and not on the
content of any set of observation reports.
There are two critical points about this analysis of
observation.

First,

every

observation

contribution from the environment.

involves

an

energy

Any process of gaining
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information about the world without such energy contribution
would not be called observation.
tion

by

the

generative

perceiver

in

And second, the contribu-

the

contribution.

form

That

of

is,

the

amplified or altered by theory function.
into

the

determination of

the

theory

is

energy

a

non-

is

not

Great effort may go

appropriate

relations

among

data that constitutes theory, but that effort is the process
of

theory discovery and not the product.

In any case,

it

does not represent the same sense of energy as that in the
environment

and

could

environmental energy.

not,

therefore,

Theories,

amplify

after all,

are

or

alter

conceptual

and concepts are too different from environmental energy to
dilute, amplify or alter it.
1.

Theory as empirical in function
The non-generative

function

of

theory

is

important

but there is more to the analysis of the empirical basis of
science than merely pointing out that the perciever 's contribution to observation is too different from the contribution from the world to replace it.
account

We must give a positive

of the function of theory if we are to understand

what it means to say that observation is theory-laden.
Hanson

argues

that

theories

represent

"pattern"

statements which provide the context within which detail
statements make sense.
claim.

First,

Two points need to be made about this

the pattern statement is

responsible for

revealing the world since it constitutes information in
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exactly the same way that the detail statement
world,

by

making

difference

is

appropriate

the

reveals the

connections.

The

level of generality and

the

only

level

of

complexity of the theory.
In other words,

the selective function of theory in

science is the same as in observation itself.

There is a

good reason for this similarity and it is that theory in
science always serves observation.
theory

in science that does

That is, there is no

not function as

component of some theory-laden observation.

the

theory

A theory that

did not would have no place in empirical science.
2.

Theory as empirical in production
Theories

who

are

immersed in the context of the problematic phenomenon.

It

grows out of

are

discovered

careful observation;

only

it

by

is

those

not an

activity in the sense of idle speculation.

"armchair"

According to

justificationist approaches to philosophy of science, theory
is

simply there with nothing said about how it came to be.

The support that is given for this omission is that the
creative act is the realm of psychology.
has

a

psychological

discovery

on

the

component,

observable

but

problem

Discovery doubtless
the

dependence

situation,

and

of
its

emergence from experience is not a matter of psychology.
Neither is the relationship between the theory and the energy
components of perception.
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The assumption that theories simply "leap" into existence
from the mind of the scientist ignores obvious facts about
the

relation between the scientist and his subject matter.

But it also ignores significant information about the character of theories.

Theories are as much the product

of the

world as they are the product of the mind of the scientist.
It is only because the scientist is in such intimate contact
with the world that he is able to solve a problem with regard
to it.
This again raises the issue of the beginning and end
points of discovery.

The scientist begins with the observa-

tion of a problematic phenomenon and his research ends, or is
successful,

when he

is able

to explain that phenomenon in

such a way that it is no longer problematic.

This descrip-

tion of the end point of research is another way of saying
that research ends when the scientist has achieved a new
observation, when he has developed a new way of seeing the
original phenomenon.

This understanding of the movement of

the discovery process is part of the support for the claim
made above that the development of theory is always in the
service of observation.

This

is

because the stimulus

for

every research project is an observed problem and the solution always involves a new, non-problematic observation.
credit for this change can go only to theory.

The

Whatever else

a theory does, it must facilitate this observational advance.
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Otherwise the problem which stimulated its development would
persist.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

A.

The Theory/Observation Distinction
The most

important

implication of this

analysis of

observation is the meaning it has for the theory/observation
distinction.

In

the

discovery

approach

"theory"

and

"observation" are logical distinctions within the process of
meaning-determination

in science.

The

distinction

between

them is not based on empirical content or theory content.

In

order to make the remaining basis of the distinction entirely
clear, it should be separated into two applications--its
meaning

within

observation

its elf

and

as

a

way

of

distinguishing statements in science:
1.

The theory/observation distinction and observation

itself
As a distinction that is relevant to observation,
"theory"

and

"observation"

observation process itself.
"observation" is misleading,

indicate

aspects

of

the

The redundancy of the term
and it comes from the tendency

of past empiricists to associate observation exclusively with
the contribution to the observation process of the world.

In

terms used here the T/O distinction is .E.£!_ applicable to the
observation process at all since the appropriate logical
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distinctions

for

analyzing

observation

are

"theory"

and

"energy-data."
The tendency to assume that observation is exhausted
by the energy contribution from the world is also

respon~ible

for the sense in which the term "theory-laden observation" is
misleading.

In fact observation is not laden with theory or

anything else.
theory.

Part of what is meant by "observation" is

Theory is logically distinguishable or separable in

thought from observation but not separable in fact.

Without

theory there is no observation.
2.

The T/0 distinctton in science
Within science T/O distinguishes statements or sets

of statements from each other.

From the perspective of

discovery statements are not here distinguished on the basis
of empirical or theoretical content.
"observation"

·indicate

explanans

differ in terms of generality.

and

Instead "theory" and
explanandum.

They

Each is empirical, i.e., each

describes or is intended to describe the world.

Hanson

suggests that the way they do that, the way in which they are
empirical, is different but I believe that he overstates this
difference.

If any scientific explanatory structure is to

have many levels, then there would have to be many senses of
"empirical" in an heirarchic relationship.

To distinguish

many senses is more of a task than I believe is necessary.
It is enough if the one sense sought here, the sense in which
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theory can be accommodated without precluding the possibility
of undiluted contact with the world, can be made clear.
This sense of "empirical" allows any statement in
empirical

science

observational,

to

be

labeled

either

depending on the context.

theoretical

or

A statement from

the explanandum of one scientific argument may be found in
the explanans of another.
a.

Unobservable entities
This interpretation of the T/0 distinction avoids the

"two-tier" characterization of scientific statements adopted
by

empiricists like Scheffler where the top or theoretical

tier is thought to refer to observable entities ([8], pp. 46
ff.).

Given the theory-ladenness of observation there is no

reason to describe any of the entities referred to in science
as unobservable.

To do that is to make a mockery of the

empirical characterization of science.
seem to be,

(a)

the fact

that

The reasons for it

these entities

cannot be

observed with the unaided senses, and (b) that the production
of

the

necessary

instrumentation

will

require

theory.

Neither of these reasons represents a philosophical problem
for the analysis of observation developed here.

If the

intervention of an instrument were sufficient, then anything
observed with the aid of eyeglasses or the light microscope
would have to be labeled "unobservable."

The fact

that

optical theory is necessary for the production of eyeglasses
or the light microscope does not change the situation either.
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We need not know optical theory in order to use either
instrument, but even if that knowledge were necessary it
would not have a pejorative impact on observation since it is
admittedly theory-laden.
There remains at least one additional reason for the
"unobservable"

label,

that

some

entities

that

require

instruments for their observation are in principle beyond our
sense organs.

Eyeglasses and light microscopes work with

light of wavelengths in what is called the "visible" range,
but the electron microscope uses a stream of electrons to
which the eye is not sensitive.

Similarly,

x-rays,

radio

waves and sub-atomic particle motion represent forms of
energy which none of our sense organs can detect at any level
of intensity without the appropriate instrument.

But the

fact that a theory is necessary in order to connect the
"energy-data" of observation to the entity in the world does
not

complicate our theory of observation.

A theory is

necessary in the case of the light microscope also.

In

neither case need we necessarily know the theory in order to
use the instrument.

There may be cases where knowing the

theory is important in assessing the relevance of particular
observations, but this could be true whether we have sense
organs tuned to this type of energy or not.
This problem needs a great deal more work but I will
make only one more remark about it:

The fact

that my

analysis of observation does not depend on any necessary
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connection between the actual structure of our organs of
sense and the entities found in the world is an advantage.
It

requires

only

that

the

theory

component

of

observation

function in such a way that it does not alter or replace the
energy-date

contribution

from

the

world,

function be empirical in character.

and

that

its

The intervention of

instrumentation has no effect on that analysis.
b.

Meaning-dependence of observation terms on theory
I

will

offer

two

arguments

against

meaning-dependence of observation terms on theory.
is

a

negative

argument

that

the

contradictory presuppositions.

problem

the

The first
itself

has

The second is a positive

argument based on the analysis of observation given above.
It is odd that the problem of the meaning-dependence
of observation terms on theory should be encountered in an
empiricist tradition since the most fundamental assumption of
empiricism
arises

B.

that

knowledge

(and,

therefore,

from experience or observation.

occurred,
R.

is

I

belie-ye,

Braithwaite 's

The

meaning,)

reason why

it

is the failure to examine observation.
introduction

to

Scientific

Explanation

gives an argument which expresses the prejudice against
observation as a philosophical problem in the treatment of
science.

The problem of philosophy of science, he says, is

scientific law and theory and how they relate to the facts of
observation.

It is not the problem of how we come to know

those facts through perception.

The reason why this second
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problem need not be examined is that the disputants in the
philosophy of perception debate

(the phenomenalists and the

realists) can agree about what the facts of observation are
even though they will disagree about whether there is a more
fundamental sense of experience,

to be analyzed in terms of

sense-data ([l], pp. 4ff.).
It is important to note that this work by Braithwaite
predated

the

observation.

debate

about

if

accepted.

theory-ladenness

of

The assumption that all observers will be able

to agree about the facts
casually

the

the

of observation cannot be made so

claim that

observation

is

theory-laden

is

At least some who accept that claim will argue

that the facts of observation vary with the theory employed
in observation.
It

is

also

important

to note that Braithwaite's

attitude toward the philosophy of perception places the
question of how observation terms and statements achieve
meaning outside the parameters of the philosophy of science.
If universal agreement is achievable on the meanings of these
terms and statements,

he is saying,

we can pursue other

questions without worrying about how observation terms and
statements attained their meaning.

This is not to say that

Braithwaite is not an empiricist.

It is

to say that that

part of his position which represents empiricism has the
character of an assumption· rather than a problem or argument.
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Further,

there

is an obvious

contradiction in this

claim, although a different one from that which is involved
in inferring the meaning-dependence of observation terms from
the

theory-ladenness

contradiction

lies

in

observation

reports

observation

is

of

observation.

the

fact

depends

that

on

theory-neutral.

philosophy of perception,

one

the

the

construal of philosophy of science.

uniformity

assumption

This
that

Braithwaite's

assumption

in
that

is

a

is essential to his
It is contradictpry to

define the parameters of philosophy of science (as excluding
the philosophy of perception) on the basis of a philosophy of
perception.
But

the

response

to

the

observation is my real concern here.

theory-ladenness

of

For the meaning of

observation terms to be treated as dependent on the theory
for their meaning,

one must first make an assumption which

leaves the question of how the meaning of observation terms
is

achieved unanswered.

The meaning of

observation terms

must be a sort of philosophical void in order for theoryladenness to imply that theory supplies the meaning of those
terms.

Otherwise the most we

could infer from theory-

ladenness would be that the meaning of observation terms
would have to be re-assessed in light of theory-ladenness.
In other words, if the problem of the meaning of observation
terms has already been examined, then the theory-ladenness of
observation would force a re-examination.

It is only under
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the

condition that it has not been examined at all,

that

philosophy

of

perception

is

irrelevant

(i.e.,
because

observation is theory-neutral) that from the theory-ladenness
of

observation

we

can

infer

the

meaning-dependence

of

observation terms on theory.
Braithwaite's
perception is

assumption

irrelevant

the needed assumption:

that

philosophy

of

to philosophy of science provided
we need not examine perception.

Theory-ladenness then appears

to imply that the meaning of

observation terms comes from theory.

Since the irrelevance

of philosophy of perception to philosophy of science is based
on the theory-neutrality of observation, we must first assume
theory-neutrality

in

order

to

infer

meaning-dependence

of

observation terms from the theory-ladenness of observation.
The positive acount of theory gives it the roles of
selection and connection in observation and in science it has
the correlative function of providing the context within
which observation reports are related to each other.
is

There

no factual separation between theory and observation

statements of the sort
relationship.
supported
perception.

by

that would support a

dependency

The assumption of a factual separation is
the

prejudice

against

the

philosophy

of

In this atmosphere theory invention or discovery

appears to be speculative in an "armchair" sense.

When

observation is given only an evidence or testing role it can
have no effect on theory production.

The result is the
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isolation of theory from observation and the assumption of
dependency.
c.

The Problem of Circularity in the Evidence-Theory
Relation
I will argue here that there is no conflict between

observation

being

theory-laden

and

the

belief

that

observation is the source of evidence for or against theory.
This

argument will be based on a clarification of what it

means to say that observation is theory-laden.
In

the

above

argument

I

hold

that

the

theory-

ladenness of observation does not mean that observation terms
are meaning dependent on theory.

In that argument the point

was to emphasize the ways in which theory and observation are
related in order to distinguish their relationship from that
which would be appropriate for
this

argument

observation

I

dependency of meaning.

will show that

indicates

or

the

refers

In

theory-ladenness of

to

the

connective

or

patterning function of theory, and that as a consequence of
this interpretation the theory being tested is never required
for the observations that constitute the test.

In other

words,

and,

I

have

argued against

meaning-dependency,

and

here I will argue against existence-dependency of observation
terms and reports as a consequence of theory-ladenness.
Let me begin with an example.

Suppose that a medical

researcher hypothesizes that disease symptoms A, B and C are
caused by the degeneration of a particular part of the brain.
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If that part of the brain were in fact degenerated it would
be revealed by test X.
with A,

Band C.

He then performs test X on patients

If test Xis positive for a significant

number of patients with this syndrome,

the hypothesis is

supported.
All

the

symptoms in such a

case would have been

observable and observed prior to the new theory of their
cause.

Test X might well have been available too.

None of

these observations depend on the theory, except in the sense
that they would not have been associated or connected with
each other without the theory.

This is the function of

theory that Hanson describes as "organizational," as the
"pattern" for observational details.
This is not to say that the experiment, which in this
case involved the performance of test X on patients with
symptoms

A,

B and C is

theory-neutral.

The ability to

recognize particular physical conditions as a symptom of
disease requires theory.

It might be argued, then, that even

though the experiment used to test the new disease theory is
not

determined

by

that

new

disease

theory,

it

remains

dependent on other theories, particularly theories which
describe

physical

indices

of

conditions

health.

This

such

might

as

blood

appear

to

pressure
lead

to

as
the

conclusion that theory retains the definitive role in testing
for empirical adequacy.
unwarranted.

I will show that this conclusion is
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The

fact

observations

that
which

question does not

other
are

theories

are

essential

to

involved
the

in

experiment

the
in

represent a problem for the empirical

character of science if it can be shown that in these cases
theory has the same guide-function that was described in
connection with the new disease theory.

That is,

if theory

does not determine those observations in the sense of making
them possible,
appropriate
this

level

but only guides

observations,
is

then

the

researcher

the

influence

also not anti-empirical with

to make the
of

theory

respect

to

at
the

experiment designed to test the new disease theory.
The

observation

of

elevated

grouped with other symptoms into
disease theory.

blood

~.single

pressure

was

syndrome by the new

Theory or knowledge is required for the

recognition that elevated blood pressure is an index of
heal th.

That theory is not required however,

observe and measure blood pressure.
pressure as a

in order to

The theory of blood

disease symptom guides

the

researcher to

measure blood pressure, but it does not make that measurement
possible.

The ability to observe and measure blood pressure

(apart from any understanding of 1 ts

relationship to human

health) is theory-laden too, but by still different knowledge
or theory.

In order to observe and measure pressure one must

know at least that it involves a mathematical relationship
between force and area.
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We can continue to trace this example downward toward
simpler instances.
order to

While theory or knowledge is required in

relate force and area in the mathematical way

required in order to express pressure, this knowledge is not
required in order to observe either area or force.
At this simpler level, the recognition of area as a
measurable entity requires the application of mathematics to
the energy contribution from the world,
fabricate that energy contribution.

but it does not

Neither is mathematics

necessary for that energy contribution to play a role in
perception.

Non-mathematical adults

and

children are

not

prevented from observing the surfaces of tables or other
objects around them.

Some theory or knowledge is required,

of course, but it need not be mathematics.
As science evolves, higher and higher theoretical
levels are reached, but
same at each level.

th~

guide-function of theory is the

Theory guides research toward ever more

complex integrations, but never does it supply the data that
are

to

be

integrated.

integrated by

a

The

theory have

fact

that

separately

the

been

data

being

integrated by

lower-level theories does not change the empirical character
of the experiment that is designed to test that theory.
This same point can be used to show how a single
experiment

can

decide

between

the

conflicting

theories.

Suppose that our current theory of light characterizes it as
composed entirely of energy in wave form having no mass.
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Suppose also that an alternative theory is offered which
allows that light travels in a wave pattern but suggests that
it has a small but detectable mass.
latter

theory

might

offer

a

"crucial

A proponent of the
experiment"--at

a

particular time during a near total eclipse of the sun the
light from a distant star will pass close to the sun before
reaching earth.

Since a large part of the earth's surface is

darkened it is possible to detect the light from the star
over a wide area.

If the light passing near the sun traveled

in a straight line its detection point on the earth would be
predictable relative to its detection point along other paths
passing farther from the sun.
In order to make the observations necessary for this
experiment one need not have any knowledge of the make-up of
light.

The scientist who suggested the experiment might ask

an astronomer to perform it for him, saying nothing of the
theory it was intended to support.
,Proponents of the older view might be expected to
support such research, expecting that it would corroborate
their theory of light.
Neither theory of light is necessary in order to
conduct this experiment.

Therefore, if it shows that in fact

light does bend when passing massive objects one might expect
that all parties would agree that the experiment offered
support for the new theory.

This may not happen.

Proponents

of the old view, as Kuhn argues, will doubtless question the
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experimental

design

or

suggest

intervening

have not been taken into account.

variables

that

These arguments will

prompt an examination of technique and possibly a search for
specific,

possible

unreasonable.
and

the

variables.

Such

responses

are

not

Fraud and error are not unheard of in science

search

for

unaccounted

for

results in significant discoveries.
or variable is found,

variables

sometimes

But if no fraud, error

the experiment can legitimately be

treated, if only in retrospect, as "crucial."
It
for

is

making

certainly possible that
the

observations

might

the

theory necessary

itself

be

replaced.

Euclidean geometry, for instance, is not the only way to
conceptualize
offered.

spacial

These

relevance

relations;

alternatives,

unless

they

alternatives
however,

demonstrated

the

have

been

would

have

no

falsity

of

the

Euclidean principles that were used in making the critical
observations.
here

would

Even then the philosophical point being made
be

untouched.

If

the

relevant

Euclidean

principles were proven false then both theories of light
would have to reassess the value of an experiment that had
appeared

relevant.

The geometric principles

that

replaced

Euclid's might support a similar experiment and they might
not.

But

experiment
could agree

there

is

could not
was

no

reason

have

been

decisive

intervening variables).

(given

to

suppose

designed
flawless

that

that

another

both parties

technique

and

no
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The point is that this interpretation of theory-ladenness
gives

theory

a

connective

or

guide-function.

When

an

hypothesis is first suggested, it directs the researcher to
the appropriate observation.
made

any

This observation may have been

number of times by others or it may have been

possible with available instruments.

But its relevance would

not have been known prior to the hypothesis which suggested
the previously unknown connection between this and other
observations.

An observation is T 1 LO because we are guided

to it by T 1 , not because T 1 is necessary in order to see
whatever is there.
Observations that act as evidence for a theory need
not have been made nor need they be possible with existing
instruments in order for this
ladenness to be viable.

interpretation of theory-

Dudley Shapere, in "The Concept of

Observation in Science and Philosophy," gives a detailed
description of the development of a neutrino detector which
was

expected

to

confirm or
It

sub-atomic particle.

disconfirm theories

required

about

the building of a

this
large

tank far below the surface of the earth in order to shield it
from

other

particles

that

might

have

similar

effects.

Chemicals that would react to a particle of this sort were
used in the chamber.

Specifically an isotope of chlorine was

used because it could be expected to decay on contact with
such a high energy particle yielding radioactive argon.

The

latter could be removed by bubbling helium through the tank
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which could then be separated from the helium with a charcoal
filter and conducted to a detection chamber ([9], p. 487).
The

theory of the behavior of the chlorine isotope

and its reaction to helium and charcoal filters as well as
the

theory

relevant to radioactivity detection were all

available prior to the construction of the elaborate neutrino
detector.

The theory of the neutrino was not involved in any

of these individual components of the device.

The theory of

the neutrino was involved in the choice of those components.
Only

chemicals

that

could

be

expected

to

react

in

a

predictable way would be useful and neutrino theory told the
researchers which chemicals would most likely do so.

Other

considerations such as cost had to be taken into account
since the character of the particle indicated that vast
amounts

of

the

([9], p. 501).

primary

detection material would

be

needed

Neutrino theory "guided" researchers

to

inexpensive material in the same way that it "guided" them to
an

isotope

of

chlorine.

To

suppose

that

we

can

only

understand this experiment from the perspective of neutrino
theory makes no more sense than supposing that neutrino
theory is necessary for understanding the cost of the primary
detection material.
The

theory being tested has enormous

impact on the

choice of evidence, but the impact is not of the sort that
could cast doubt on the espistemological warrant of the
evidence so chosen.
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At least one further problem should be considered
that

might

warrant.
were

have

relevance

to

the

issue

epistemological

Shapere tells us that results other than those that

expected

prompted

the

researchers

theories of the reactions within the tank.
that

of

the

low counts

to

reassess

the

It was suggested

initially achieved might

be

caused by

argon remaining an ion and being captured by another molecule
in the mixture.

In other words, the theory of the instrument

was adjusted because it failed to yield results predicted by
neutrino theory.

But as indicated with reference to the

light bending experiment, criticism of experimental technique
is a reasonable part of any research.
than those expected there may
design of the apparatus.
conclude

that

prediction.

this

If results are other

be something wrong with the

However, no scientist would simply

was

so

because

of

the

failure

of

He would test the implicated aspect of his

experiment against

the background from which

it

came.

In

this case ionization theory could be consulted to see whether
such

aberrant

conditions.

behavior

might

be

expected

under

these

Other experiments might be set up to determine

whether alterations were called for.
No epistemological problem is created by this sort of
interplay between prediction and experimental
critical point remains.

design.

The

Theory-ladenness does not imply that

the experiment used to test the theory is determined by that
theory.

Instead,

theory-ladenness tells us that the theory
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being tested guides us to relevant data;

it tells us what

sort of experiment to perform.
This

is

a

theory-ladenness

general
of

theory

of

observation.

the
I

meaning of

have

argued

the
that

theory-ladenness does not imply that the experiment used to
test a theory is determined by that theory, but the intent of
the

analysis

is

to make the general point

that

theory-

ladenness does not imply that science is non-empirical.
In order to make the case for the general argument
more

clearly,

objection.

I

will

entertain

one

further

possible

It might be argued that the notion of scientific

theory should be taken more broadly as including all the
theories that are involved in the experiment.

In the light

experiment this would include Euclidean geometry and in the
medical research experiment it would include the theory of
blood pressure as a disease symptom.
senses
that

There are at least two

in which this objection can be taken and I

both

can

be

satisfactorily

accommodated

believe

within

my

analysis of the theory-ladenness of observation.
First,

it must

be determined under what

conditions

the expansion of the notion of theory will be helpful in
solving the problem of the meaning of the theory-ladenness of
observation for philosophy of science.

Insofar as the issue

concerns the less general point about whether the theory
being tested determines the observations involved in its own
test, it is not helpful to expand the notion of theory.

The
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theory being tested in the light example is a theory about
the nature of light, not Euclidean geometry.
because

Euclidean principles are not

It is only

in doubt

that

the

experiment could be designed in the way that it was.
This is not to say that Euclidean geometry could not
be tested,

but if an experiment were designed with that in

mind, it would surely not be based on the assumption that the
connections proposed by those principles were valid.

To do

so would be to beg the question in an obvious way.
No experiment should be expected to test all the
knowledge that is presupposed by its design and relevant
observations.

The

point

or

controlling

variables

in

scientific experimentation is to limit to one the number of
things being tested.

If all relevant knowledge were included

in

theory,

the

notion

of

then

every

experiment

would

presuppose most of what it was supposed to test.
However,

a

second

interpretation

of

this

suggests a less obvious sense of circular! ty.
granted

that

"theory-ladenness

experiment used to test a

does

theory

not

is

objection

It might be

imply

that

determined by

the
that

theory," while insisting that the experiment is determined by
some theory (e.g., Euclidean geometry), and that this is
enough to give theory a definitive role in testing.

This is

a

vicious

weaker objection since it does

not

imply

the

circularity that would characterize testing when the tested
theory determined the condition of its own test, thereby
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guaranteeing its own success.

But it suggests circularity

nonetheless even though the circularity has been spread out
over a range of scientific theories.

The point of describing

my argument as "general" is to indicate that this sense of
circularity can be countered as well.

This was the point of

the analysis of the blood pressure datum used in the earlier
medical experiment example.

There I showed that the theory

involved in recognizing the datum functions in the same
guide-capacity described in connection with the theory being
tested.

Consequently its function in the experiment in

question is not to determine a datum if by determine we mean
to make it possible.
as

a

Instead, the theory of blood pressure

symptom of disease or Euclidean geometry will be

responsible for directing the researcher to make a particular
observation (which could have been made without it, but which
might not have been made), and, naturally,

for ignoring

others, in fact everything else seen or felt.
To generalize the argument that theory-ladenness does
not imply that the experiment used to test a theory is
determined by that theory is to show that it applies at every
level.

The argument itself showed that theory-ladenness

implies

a

guide-function

in

the

sense

of

guiding

the

researcher to make appropriate observations, but that it does
not mean that theory makes the observation possible.

If that

is true of all the observations that led up to the experiment
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in question, then there is no level of theory-ladenness which
threatens the empirical character of science.
When we say that an observation is T 1 -laden we are saying
that we are directed to make that observation by T 1 , not that
T

1

B.

is necessary in order to see whatever is there.
The Positive Account of Theory
The

discovery

approach

provides

the

context

within

which theory can be given a positive characterization.
positive characterization has four different aspects.
non-negative in two ways.

First,

That
It is

theories need never be

interpreted as referring to unobservable entities.

The use

of instrumentation does not make the entity unobservable and
it need not raise any doubt regarding its existence status.
Second, theory function in science does not have the negative
impact of making the testing process circular.
The
comes

third

positive aspect

directly from Hanson.

of

this

Theories,

account

of

he said,

theor>ies
provide a

"pattern" within which observation details make sense.
account is
able.

This

impressive in that it is simple and understand-

Other accounts of

theory function,

offered by Nagel, are less clear.

such as

that

Theories, Nagel says,

"codify highly idealized (or 'limiting') notions

• • • , " and

"serve as links in the inferential chains that connect the
instantial experimental data with the generalized as well as
the

instantial

conclusions

of

inquiry"

([5],

pp.

29-30).

This descr>iption conflicts with his later admission that
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theories

also,

occasionally,

report

observations

([5],

p.

36).
Scheffler is similarly vague and negative in his
characterization of theories; they represent the upper tier
of the two-tier structure of scientific language.
are

Theories

described by contrasting them with observation state-

ments.

The latter, he says, formulate observable facts that

are directly testable and that can be expressed independently
of

theory.

Theories,

by

contrast,

neither

formulate

observable facts nor directly testable generalizations ([8],
p.

4 7).

The meaning of theory-terms is determined by the

theoretical context in which they are found.

The function of

theories on Scheffler's account is more vague than that
offered by Nagel.

It appears that they are important in his

system because they provide an area in which scientists
disagree without casting doubt on the empirical foundation of
science.
The fourth positive aspect of theories developed here
involves their actual discovery.
the

function

of

theory

as

Given a positive account of
providing

the

pattern

or

organizational structure within which observational details
fit, it is easier to see how theories evolve.
distinction

is

divorced

from

the

Until the T/O

assumption

that

it

represents a difference of empirical or theoretical content,
theories merely "appear."

But function and discovery cannot

be separated without confusion.

Once we see how theories
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serve as part of the empirical structure of science, the role
their

discovery plays

in understanding the rationality of

science becomes more apparent.

Among the points clarified by

discovery are certain aspects of falsification theory and the
importance

of

the

justification/discovery

distinction

for

philosophy of science.
1.

The justification/discovery distinction
The traditional use of this distinction has been to

distinguish

philosophical

sociological issues.

issues

Discovery,

from

psychological

or

it was thought, was of no

interest to philosophy of science.

The distinction was

mistaken

I

in

examination

two

ways.

of

the

First,
discovery

epistemological consequences.

as

have

process

has

argued,

the

important

And, second, justification can

be better accommodated as part of the discovery process than
in isolation.
Traditional empiricism has equated justification with
the

testing process.

According to this school,

theory

statements and statements describing antecedent experimental
conditions are combined as premises.

From these premises

singular statements are deduced which are then compared with
statements describing the relevant observable situation to
see whether they match.

If they do the theory is justified

and if not it is not.
There are many problems with this account, but I find
two particularly troubling.

First, since no account of
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theory discovery is given,

it seems from a philosophical

point of view pure chance when a theory succeeds in supporting the deduction of observation statements.
The second problem is that as an account of science,
the

just ifica ti on approach is particularly pal try.

gives us is the "bottom line" of science.

All it

Philosophers, of

course, have found a great deal to do within this framework,
but much of it has the flavor of patching a leaky boat.
The

alternative

justification

that

continuum.

I

As

offer
soon

is

and

the
as

discovery-

often

as

an

hypothesis is developed which has promise it is tested.

The

testing process

its

need not

be

particularly

formal

since

essence is to determine whether the old problem can be seen
in a new way.

In the example given earlier of hypothesizing

brain tissue decay to explain a particular syndrome, the
researcher might, as a first step, call a colleague and ask
if he knew of patients with symtoms A, B, C and X.
point the process of justification has begun.

At this

The answer, of

course,

may be equivocal and the initial hypothesis may

require

refinement

or replacement.

But the point

is

that

justification or testing is

important because it serves

discovery

it

and

not

assertions are true.

because

proves

that

scientific

In my view the use of the term "true"

as well as the specification of its meaning should be given
following the analysis

of discovery.

Otherwise

it may

represent a source of problematic presuppositions.

The
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concept of "truth" should serve epistemology and not the
other way around.
Similarly the concept of "empirical" should refer to
science as a whole and not merely to the evidence used in
science.

Treating discovery-justification as a continuum is

part of the process of expanding "empirical" to cover all of
science.
2.

The non-rejection of theories in the face.of
counter-evidence
Why are theories in science not rejected when the

scientists employing them are fully aware of the existence of
counter-instances or anomalies?

Kuhn answers that to do

science is to work under the aegis of a guiding theory or
paradigm.

To reject a theory without another to turn to for

guidance would be to reject science itself.
a

satisfying answer;

But this is not

science might still be irrational for

maintaining a position which is in conflict with the evidence
of observation.
Others,

notably Popper and Lakatos,

have offered

programs which aim to outline the conditions under which it
would be rational to consider a theory falsified.

This is

not a straightforward project, according to Kakatos, for two
basic sorts of reasons.

First, almost any theory can be

saved by ad hoc additions to it which make exceptions for
recognized anomalies.

And second,

the evidence of observa-

tion cannot prove anything in the realm of statements since
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"proof" is a concept applicable to the logical relations
among sentences
statements

of

97-98).

([10], pp.

science are

fallible

As a result all the
including

"observational" or singular statements of fact.

those

called

They are all

adopted as a matter of agreement or convention ([10], p.
106).

It is on the basis of these fallible statements that

theories are rejected.

The choice, according to Lakatos, is

between this "risky conventionalist policy" or irrationalsim.
Lakatos
falsified

a

explains
theory

the failure

on

the

to

basis

reject or consider
of

counter-evidence by adding what he

calls a

proviso

criteria

to

the

falsificationist

behavior in science.
be

anomalies

or

"sophisticated"
for

rational

This proviso stipulates that no theory

rejected unless a new and better theory is available to

take its place.

By "better" he simply means that the new

theory must have "corroborated excess empirical content over
its predecessor" ([10], p. 116).

History suggests, he says,

that scientific tests are not the two-cornered fights between
theory and experiment of naive falsificationism, but instead
are

three-cornered

fights

between

rival

theories

and

experiment ([10], p. 115).
Taking historical factors

into account may give an

historicist ring to a philosophical account of science and it
may not.

In this case I believe that it does.

Lakatos gives

no

reason for the added sophistication other than history.

In

that

sense,

his

account

is

no

better

than

Kuhn's.
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Scientists, Kuhn has said, do not reject a theory until they
have a

better one because they could not continue to do

science in the absence of a theory.

Lakatos has altered

falsificationism to take that historical fact into account.
He would doubtless point out that falsification could not be
"progressive" otherwise, but this is also Kuhn's point.
dogmatically

reject the only available

To

theory would surely

halt progress.
The point remains that the rationality of science is
not

Part of the

adequately clarified by falsificationism.

reason for this is the conventional character of falsifying
observational statements.
Kuhn,

What is not made clear either by

Lakatos or Popper is the sense in which the observa-

tional

report

or

statement

is

conventional.

observation statements are fallible

tells us

That

little except

that they are not as good evidence as we had thought.
reason why they are fallible,

the

according to Lakatos,

The
is

because the truth-value of statements cannot be decided by
the facts.

His admiration for Popper is due to the latter's

willingness

to

proceed

on

the

basis

of

fallible,

conventionally chosen evidence statements, fully aware of the
risks, in an attempt to salvage some sense of rationality in
science.
In
problem

my

lies

view such willingness
in

the

observation reports.

supposed

is

imprudent.

conventional

character

The
of

Any structure built on admittedly
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conventional statements is of dubious value for explicating
the rationality of empirical science.

It is for this reason

that the problem of discovery is important.

Discovery begins

wih observation and it examines the ways in which observation
and

theory interrelate.

It shows us a sense in which the

perceiver contributes to observation statements and a sense
in which he does not.

It does not preclude the view that

observation provides information about the world that is
objective.
But more than that,

the process of testing is inte-

grated into the process of discovery.

Testing is perhaps a

less formal procedure than either Lakatos or Popper recognize
but this is part of the problem.

For Popper, the analysis of

discovery is impossible ([6], p.

31), and for Lakatos it is

the same as the "rational appraisal of scientific theories"
([10], p. 115).
a

The point is that such rational appraisal is

constant feature of scientific research.

A theory or

hypothesis is successful only if it facilitates observation,
and as often as it promises success it is tested.

The test-

ing usually takes the form of an experiment, which may or may
not be highly complex and time consuming.

But by integrating

testing into the philosophy of discovery it is possible to
see more clearly how theory actually functions within science.

Testing, in this sense, is a tool used in the discov-

ery of theories.

Viewed in this way we are less likely to

treat theories as imaginative leaps or sheer speculation.
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The problem lies in finding something to which to
link

the

scientists

actual
with

historically
regard

to

supported

tendencies

falsification.

To

say

of
that

falsification proceeds as it does because we could not have
progress otherwise is lame and historicist.
What does discovery do for falsification theory, and
specifically for the problem of the non-rejection of theories
in

the

face

of

First,

anomalies?

the

sense

in

which

observation statements are conventional and the sense in
which they are not becomes clearer.

Also important, however,

is the fact that falsification is given a rational context as
part of the discovery process.
that

observation statements

that

the history

of

That same context tells us

are

science,

conventional

including

its

in

the

sense

language,

will

dictate the direction of reearch.

But those statements are

not

the

entirely

conventional

since

theory-ladenness

of

observation does not preclude the possibility of observation
reports giving an empirical account of the world which,
although guided by theory, is not fabricated by theory.
And second, by focusing exclusively on falsification
one

misses a

surviving sense

that no theory is ever proven

of

justification.

(since a

The claim

falsifying instance

can always turn up) misses the point of why theories are
sought in the first place.

They are valued because they

facilitate observation and an hypothesis is called successful
(and raised to the status of theory) when it is found to do
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that.
tells

This is a genuine sense of justification.
us

why

theories

are

not

rejected

in

the

It also
face

of

apparent counter-instances:

They succeed in helping us to

observe in important ways.

That a theory could do more is

stimulus for further research but it does not detract from
what the theory is able to accompish.

Neither does it bring

into question the rationality of science.

The positive

account of theory offered above makes it unnecessary to
apologize for non-rejection.
The
necessary

numerous
because

he

retreats
has

that

Lakatos

chosen

to

defines

are

characterize

the

rationality of science using only a narrow band of the
spectrum of
cation.

scientific activity,

justification or falsifi-

Without the broader context provided by discovery he

is forced to busy himself with adjustments to a system that
had been crippled by the framework within which the problem
of scientific knowledge is placed.
principle

that

defines

scientific

non-rejection becomes a problem.
in

the

context

of

If falsification is the

discovery,

rationality,

then

But if falsification is put
non-rejection

is

reasonable,

i.e., it does not complicate a rational account of science.

A THEORY OF SCIENTIFIC TRUTH

My theory of truth-has an undeniable realistic flavor
to it.

I believe that the terms of science refer to real
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entities

in the world.

No other assumption

is

compatible

with an empiricist interpretation of science, and I believe
that the evidence for an empirical interpretation of science
is overwhelming.
Defining the exact sense in which I am a realist may
be aided by reference to an article by Richard Rorty,
World Well Lost" ([7]).
the

coherence

and

source

of

correspondence

responsible

the

for

distinction

between

theories
p.

665).

truth

presuppositions

which are

positions

and

as

receptivity

Kant's
and

distinction between necessary and contingent truth ([7],

649).

I

implicit

will

are

identifies

fruitless

spontaneity

of
He

([7],

philosophical
such

The

Rorty concludes in this article that

"non-competing trivialities"
the

11

concentrate here

on

the

errors

he

his
p.

finds

in realism in order to show how my theory avoids

such a fate.
The dispute between the realist and anti-realist
(correspondence

and

coherence)

has

been waged

in

terms

of

whether it is reasonable to assert the possibility of an
alternative conceptual framework

replacing entirely the one

we currently have, according to Rorty.

Without getting into

the details of his argument, Rorty rejects the notion of
different

conceptual

differently.
of

frameworks

carving

up

the

world

An equivocation is involved here on the meaning

"the world," which is· particularly relevant to realism.

The realist, Rorty says, wants the world to be independent of
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our knowledge in such a way that it might turn out that the
world contains none of the things we attribute to it.

The

world, in other words, must not be conditioned in any way by
the receptive faculty of our concepts, whether those concepts
are innate or optional.
The equivocation appears when we

realize

that what

the realist means when he refers to "the world" is what the
vast

majority of our beliefs

that are not

currently

question are thought to be about ([7], p. 662).

in

For realism

to be interesting, it must at once treat the world as having
those entities we refer to and also treat it as unspecified
and unspecifiable.

It does not help, he says, to talk of the

world in terms of "sense-data" or "stimuli" of a certain sort
which effect our sense organs, for this is to involve oneself
in a theory specifying how the world is ([7], p. 663).
My theory escapes this equivocation by virtue of the
fact that it contains no distinction between receptivity and
spontaneity.

If the

realist

is

to include a

receptive

faculty, he needs an independent test from the world in order
to balance the order imposed by that faculty.

He must take

some position, however general, on the nature of the world in
order to show that it can count as the source of independent
test.
ontology.

In

other words,

he

has

not

fully

The equivocation that Rorty points

equally well described as

escaped

from

to could be

the result of doing ontology and

epistemology without distinguishing which is which.

In the
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process of analyzing the

relationship between concepts and

knowledge,

the realist is pursuing epistemology,

positing a

receptive

ontology.

faculty,

he has

retained an

but in
implicit

Whether the character of that faculty is innate or

optional makes no difference.
I believe that observation is spontaneous, that there
is no reception apart from activity on the part of a knower.
What I have done here is analyze that activity in order to
see whether there are reasons to believe that science is
empirical in the sense of referring to real entities in the
world.

The reasons that I have offered have nothing to do

with the privileged claims about the way the world really is.
The problem of how the world really is I

leave to science,

art and common sense.
My reference to "energy," for instance, has nothing
to do with privileged information on my part.

The concept of

"energy" is itself theory-laden, but this is an advantage and
not a defect.

My point, after all, is to provide a theory of

the empirical character of scientific knowledge.
theory

provides

empirical,

good

reaons

it succeeds.

for

believing

that

If the

science

is

It cannot succeed if it re lies on

privileged claims.
Rorty's realist wants the world to be independent of
our knowledge in order to have it serve as a source of
independent

test.

I

too

independent of the knower.

believe

that

the

world

is

I also believe that it is a
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source of test for science.

I further believe that our

knowledge and observations are of real entities in the world.
But in order to maintain these beliefs I need not take any
position

on what

knowledge

of

the world

it.

The

is

question

like
is

independent
nonsense

for

of
it

our
is

knowledge that tells us what the world is like.
I have good empirical evidence for the first belief,
that the world is independent of the knower, for as Scheffler
says,

it frequently surprises me and resists my attempts to

deal with it.

By analyzing observation I have attempted to

give a philosophical interpretation to that sense of the
independence

of

the

world.

That

interpretation

has

implications for our understanding of science and I have
investigated some of those implications.
hold

But nowhere do I

that the knowledge that we gain of the world through

oservation "represents"

the world

in the sense of being a

sort of carbon copy or impression on a wax block, for that is
the

receptivity

Consequently,

assumption

criticized

by

Rorty.

when knowledge changes my theory does not

fracture, for on my view knowledge does not correspond to the
world by virtue of copying or picturing.

This is not what it

means to have empirical knowledge of the world.
The belief that the world is the source of test in
science

is

philosophical

supported
arguments.

by

both

empirical

Physical

science

empirical evidence that the contribution to

evidence

and

supplies

the

the perceptual
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process by the world is energy.
supports the argument that

Physical science also

thought or theory

could not

possibly alter or generate energy of the sort supplied by the
world.

The

philosophical argument

provided

in

connection

with the analysis of observation and the medical and light
research examples gives a reasonable analysis of theoryfunction in theory-laden observation without supposing that
theory alters or fabricates the energy contribution from the
world.
of

The combination of these arguments gives us a concept

observational evidence in science which is

based on

theory-laden observation, and yet which has no non-empirical
aspect.
It is my position that this is an adequate argument
to support a
believe

that

correspondence

I also

realist interpretation of science.
this

argument supports

component

in a

theory

the
of

inclusion of a

scientific

truth.

The claim that scientific knowledge corresponds to the world
is based in part on the fact that we have good empirical
reasons

for

believisng that

human observers.

there

are

entities

It might be objected,

apart

however,

that

from
the

issue in supporting correspondence is not that there are
entities apart
like.

from us but

rather what those entities are

In a sense I agree with this objection; correspondence

cannot be established between determinate knowledge and an
indeterminate
Rorty 1 s

world

discussion).

("unspecified
But

the

and
issue

unspecifiable"
is

complex

in
and
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distinctions are needed in order to clarify it.

First, it is

clear

between

that

knowledge

the
and

correspondence

the

world.

The

relation

is

problem is

how we

our

could

possibly know whether correspondence is possible.
There are two possible solutions to the problem of
how to know whether correspondence is possible.

The first is

a philosophical analysis of the processes of coming to know
the world which may or may not support the belief in correspondence between knowledge and the world.

The second is a

comparison between scientific knowledge and some other source
of knowledge of the world such as ontology or metaphysics.
The latter is unlikely to succeed since it shifts the problem
from

correspondence

between

knowledge

and

correspondence between two types of knowledge.

the

world

to

The problem

of how we know whether correspondence between the more basic
type of knowledge and the world is possible would remain.
If

appeal

to

special

(non-scientific)

knowledge

of

the world does not succeed, the philosophical analysis of the
processes of coming to know the world seems to be the most
reasonable route.

But how are we to respond to the charge

that the issue is not that there are entities but what those
entities are like?

We cannot know what the entities are like

apart from our knowledge (in this case, scientific knowledge)
of them.
special

Even if we held open the possibility of appeal to
or

ontological

privileged
sort,

it

knowledge
would

not

of

a

answer

metaphysical
the

question

or
of
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correspondence.
show that

At least this much is clear:

correspondence is possible we must

if we are to
do more

than

argue that there are entities apart from human observers.
must

show that

the

impact of those entities

We

is neither

altered nor fabricated by the observer.
Does
correspondence

this
can

leave
hold

indeterminate entities

open

between

the

problem

determinate

in the world?

of

how

knowledge

The fact

that

and

those

entities are unknown apart from our knowledge of them should
not be confused with the assumption that they are indeterminate apart from our knowledge of them.

There is no reason

to suppose that the entities of the world are indeterminate
or unspecifiable apart from our knowledge of them.
Further,

a qualified sense of correspondence is

supportable based on the theory-ladenness of observation if
it

can

be

shown

that

theory-ladenness

means

only

that

observation is guided by theory and not determined by theory.
If this is so,

then observational evidence is objective in

the same qualified sense.
Coherence has a role as well since the scientist is
most likely to seek answers in directions or areas mapped out
by his predecessors.

But coherence should not be interpreted

in the strong sense that
decided by whether is is
the other propositons

the

truth of a proposition is

"logically deducible from some of

• • • of the system"

([11],

p.

111).

Instead, it should be taken to mean something weaker such as
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"not compatible with some of the other propositions of the
system."

Discoveries in science are often incompatible with

some of the propositions previously accepted.

And further,

the new theory will probably not be strictly deducible from
anything contained in past assertions.
But coherence has additional value in that it tells
us why particular bits of data were picked out

(and why

others were ignored), and why they were connected in the ways
that they were.
on

virtually

Historical background has a powerful impact

all

research

since

there

is,

perhaps,

an

infinite number of possible connections that could be made
among the data of our environment.

The connection that is

chosen will have to demonstrate that it corresponds to the
world, but it is unlikely that it is the only connection that
could do that.

Correspondence cannot

tell

us why this

particular connection was chosen, but coherence may.

This is

part of the sense in which a theory of truth should apply to
the process of science and not merely to the product.
Pragmatism contributes to this
truth

both

fulfills

in

terms

of process

theory of scientific

and product.

A theory

its function when it makes a new connection among

the available data, and we know when that has happened when
new observaions occur as a result.

This functional quality

represents a pragmatic aspect of science, but not in the
"large and loose" sense that an assertion is called true if
it satisfies the purpose of the inquiry that brought it
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about.

This

sense

of

pragmatism

confuses

reasons

for

accepting something with the reasons for accepting it as true
( [ 11],

pp.

124-127).

The sense in which I

pragmatism is as a tool of correspondence.

wish to employ
To say that an

assertion is true when it corresponds to a fact is important
and there is no reason not to maintain that sense of truth in
connection with science.
we

But it remains an open question how

know when an assertion corresponds to a fact and it is

this aspect of truth that pragmatism fleshes out.

We know

that a theory corresponds to a fact when it makes possible a
new observation.

This is a more specifically empirical

interpretation of pragmatism than the more vague criterion of
"satisfying the purposes of the inquiry that brought it
about."

The point is the same, however, since the purpose of

scientific inquiry is to establsih a context within which a
problematic phenomenon no longer appears problematic.

TRADITIONAL EMPIRICIST PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

The problem that is common to Kuhn, Nagel and Thrane
is the failure to examine observation.
Kuhn and Nagel both retain the philosophical underpinning

of

an

observation was
the

earlier

age

theory-neutral.

when
If

it

was

assumed

that

theory-neutrality were

case then it would ·be reasonable to expect that the

content of observation reports would be uniform for all
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normal

observers.

theory-ladenness
Nagel

With

the

of observation

retreated

from

the

introduction

into

solid

the

of

debate,

foundation

the

Kuhn and

of

uniform

observation reports to "epochal stability" and ''relative
stability"

in

those

reports.

They

thought

that

these

interpretations of observational evidence were enough to
support rational characterizations of science.
these approaches
underpinning

is due to the fact

of

uniformity

theory-neutrality
without
among

losing it.

observation

perception,
theory.
it

of

that

in

that the philosophical

observation

observation--cannot
That

is,

reports

be

reports--the
watered

down

the assumption of uniformity

is

perception

The error of

based
can

be

on

a

philosophy

accomplished

of

without

Once that philosophy of perception is given up, as

must be with the acceptance of the

theory-ladenness of

observation, there is no longer any philosophical support for
the belief in the uniformity of observation reports.
belief

provided

the

implicit

characterization of science.

foundation

for

the

That

empirical

What is needed to re-establish

an empirical characterization of science is an examination of
observation, or a new philosophy of perception.
The structure of the rationality of science can then
be built on that analysis, but its shape cannot be predicted
prior to the analysis of observation.
to

retain the stucture of

Kuhn and Nagel tried

rationality of science that was

based on the justification of scientific knowledge, but they
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did so without the foundation on which the justificationist
approach was built.
Braithwaite takes a straightforward approach to this
problem, arguing that philosophy of perception is irrelevant
to philosophy of science, so long as all observers report the
same

things.

As

we

have

seen,

that

argument

has

contradictory assumptions.
Popper argues for much the same point with similar
conflicts.

The problem of epistemology, he says, lies in the

logical relations between statements,
the epistemologist"

([6],, pp.

43,

"which alone interest

99).

He admits that all

knowledge of the world comes from observation, but he insists
that this knowledge can justify other statements.
The conflict in Popper's position is obvious in the
sense that testability is his primary criterion for the
acceptability of scientific statements, as it must be for any
falsificationist.
contradictory

In

fact,

assumptions.

He

he

retains

believes,

Braithwaite' s

like

Braithwaite,

that observation reports should be the same for all normal
observers.

Any scientific statement,

he

says,

"can be

presented (by describing experimental arrangements, etc.) in
such

a

way

that

anyone

technique can test it"
approach avoids

who

([6],

p.

has

learned

99).

none of the problems

theory-ladenness of observation.

This

that

relevant

instrumentalist

introduced by the

The data achieved with the

aid of the instrument must be fitted into a context.

That
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context

is

theory and

if

the

theory

is

in

dispute

the

relevance of the data may be in dispute as well.
Popper's

position

misconstrued, I believe.

in

this

regard

can

be

easily

He takes great pains to argue that

which statements we employ as "basic" in science is a matter
of choice, giving the appearance of a conventionalist stance.
If

he

had

a

observation,

genuinely

he

contradiction.

could

conventional

not

be

accused

of

of

Braithwaite's

But the matter of choice for Popper is purely

the problem of where to stop
reasoning.

interpretation

He happily admits

in the deductive
that any

basic

chain of

statement at

which we choose to stop has the character of a "dogma," but
the admission of dogmatism is innocuous because we can at any
time test it further by deducing further consequences from it
([6], p. 105).

Popper must include observation in some form and he
does so with the criterion of "observability" (any basic
statement in science must be about an observable event).
need not define observability, however.

We

Instead, we should

treat it as a primitive concept, he says ([6], pp. 102-103).
Like

Braithwaite,

Popper

restricts

philosophy

science to the logical relations among sentences.

of

And like

Braithwaite he rules out any examination of observation.
This

appears

statements"

are

to

be

a

reasonable

unproblematic

as

to

ploy

because

"basic

their

content.

I.e.,

philosophy of perception is treated as irrelevant because of
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the

assumption

of uniform content

in observation

reports,

which is based on the assumption of the theory-neutrality of
observation, a philosophy of perception.
The importance of examining observation is demonstrated in another way in Israel Scheffler's Science and
Subjectivity.

Scheffler wants to include the notion of

theory-ladenness in his interpretation of observation, while
maintaining that science is objective.

That observation is

the source of that objectivity can be seen from the fact of
disharmony between what we expect and what we observe ([8],
p.

44).

This leads him to attempt an interpretation of

observation that, although theory-laden, nonetheless provides
the

basis

of agreement among scientists who may not agree

about theory.
off er

an

One of the ways in which he does this is to

extensional

observation terms
uniformity

of

interpretation

of

content for

is

never

observation
How this

observation

theory-ladenness

the

meaning

of

in order to establsih the possibility of

theoretical disputants.
meaning

of

terms

reports,

interpretation of the
is

entirely

even among

compatible

clear,

especially

with
since

theories cannot be given an extensional definition, referring
as he says they do to unobservables.
There

are

two

Sheffler's argument.

things

to

be

emphasized

about

First, it ends almost where it began,

with the dependence on the notion of disharmony between what
we

observe

and what

we

expect

([8],

pp.

118 ff.).

He
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provides no philosophical interpretation of this disharmony
and that brings up the second point of emphasis.

What he has

given does not constitute an analysis of observation because
he begins with the assumption that observation must provide
"independent

( [ 8],

control" over be lief

45).

p.

To begin

with such an assumption is to give the answer to the question
of philosophy of perception in advance.

The proper question

about observation is, how is it possible for observation to
achieve knowledge of the world?

To begin with the assumption

that it must be independent of belief is to beg the question.
This is exactly what is wrong with Thrane's approach.
His analysis of seeing begs the question.
defense

of

the

possibility

analysis of observation.

of

He substitutes a

theory-neutrality

an

He believes that the objectivity of

science depends on theory-neutrality.

Such an approach

appears with hindsight to be fainthearted.
interesting, however,

for

The outcome is

since it leads to the conclusion that

observation as theory-neutral is irrelevant to epistemology.
The
empirical
discovery

analysis

of

observation

characterization of
approach

observation as a
justificationist

leads

first

science.
us

The

the

it

to

any

because

the

analysis

of

superior to

the

It

through

step that

approach.

is

is

question

is

an

of

key

how

it

is

possible to obtain knowledge of the world through observation
must be answered before the question of rational structure of
science is raised.

The former has been avoided by Kuhn,
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Nagel and Thrane as well as by Scheffler and Popper, but only
by begging the question or making contradictory assumptions.
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CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

My point has been to argue that an adequate understanding of science must examine the problem of the discovery
The failure to do so, I have shown,

of scientific knowledge.

results in limited knowledge.
taken

as

an

argument

In general, my thesis can be

against

justification-discovery

distinction which is treated by Reichenbach ([3], p. 382) and
others as
science.

the outline for

the program of philosophy of

That is, philosophy of science concerns itself with

reasons for accepting an hypothesis after it is offered or
justification,

and

not

with

the

reasons

for

offering

that

hypothesis or its discovery.
The reason why the failure to examine discovery has
caused problems is because of inadequate and self-defeating
concepts of observation.
of

observation was

observation was

first

The inadequacy of the understanding
revealed

theory-laden.

I

by
have

the

recognition

that

examined works

from

recent writers in philosophy of science in order to see how
they

responded

to

the

challenge

ladenness of observation.
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brought

by

the

theory
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The first
the

problem of

of these writers was Kuhn.

the

theory-ladenness

surface of philosophy of science.

of

Kuhn brought

observation

to

the

His handling of it had a

great deal of impact on philosophers who followed him.
Kuhn's

concern with observation grew out of his

study of the history of science.

The evidence was over-

whelming, he believed, that the model of scientific growth by
steady accumulation was inaccurate.

It seemed to him that a

regular feature of science was the periodic rejection of much
that had been considered "scientific," including observation
reports.

The

conclusion

appeared

unavoidable

that

the

foundation of objective observation reports so long presupposed

by

foundation

empiricist

of

observation

philosophers
reports

was

appeared

faulty.
to

him to

The
have

more to do with consensus among the community of scientists
than with objectivity in the sense of giving a true account
of the world.
Kuhn did not explicitly conclude that science itself
was

irrational.

rationality

of

justification

Instead,
science

between

he continued to describe

in

theories

terms
and

of

the

observation

relation

the
of

statements.

The problem of philosophy of science, according to Kuhn, was
to

determine the sense in which that

relation still held,

given the loss of objectivity brought by the theory-ladenness
of observation.
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Science,

he

said,

could

continue

justifying

its

theories on the basis of observation reports so long as the
theories with which the observations were laden were not in
dispute.

When those theories were in dispute,

observation

reports

could no

longer

function

as

however,
evidence.

During such periods science was left with "persuasion" and
"conversion" as means of making decisions.

Revolutions, or

periods of major change, were treated as irrational by Kuhn.
Kuhn's work can be seen as an attempt to define the
limits of philosophy of science, given the theory-ladenness
of

observation and the loss

of objectivity

it entails.

Philosophy of science, he concluded, retained the capacity to
illuminate the

rationality

of science when theory

remained

stable, but it became mute when theory changed.
Kuhn accepted the theory-ladenness of observation and
concluded accurately that there was something wrong with the
traditional empiricist notion of the objectivity of observation.
not

Consensus on the content of observation reports did
seem to be supportable,

given the history

of science.

But instead of trying to find another interpretation of the
objectivity

of

observation,

he

concerned

himself

with

describing the implications of the loss of the traditional
sense of objectivity.

He rejected the problem of discovery

and thereby blocked at least one avenue that would have been
more fruitful.
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Nagel attempted to solve Kuhn's problem.
the

claim that observation was theory-laden,

He accepted

but he argued

that theory-ladenness did not relativize knowledge or lead to
circularity in testing in the ways that Kuhn thought.

He

held that even if there were no inherent differences between
observation and theory terms and statements, observation
terms and statements were nonetheless more stable.

This

relative stability provided all the foundation that was
required for the testing or justification relation to remain
a viable way of characterizing the rationality of science, he
said, with the single proviso that the observational evidence
chosen to

justify theory not be laden with that particular

theory.
In a
assertion

sense I

that

relatively

believe that Nagel is

observation

stable

in

terms

comparison

and
to

right in his

statements

theory

terms

are
and

statements, although in particular cases this may not be
true.

Unlike Nagel, however, I can place that assertion in

the context of the theory-observation distinction.

That is,

theory and observation are distinct because of levels of
generality and generality is sometimes related to stability
although not always.
Nagel's difficulties came from the same source as
Kuhn's.

He assumes that the objectivity of observation must

be based on consensus on the content of observation reports.
When forced to admit the theory-ladenness of observation he
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resorts to "common-sense" as a source of theory or prior
knowledge
provides

that

satisfies

"relative"

the

consensus

stability.

requirement

This gives him a

and

sense of

objectivity but only insofar as common sense is objective.
Should common sense change he would have no more insight into
that period of change than Kuhn did into revolutions in
science.

Nagel's solution to Kuhn's problem amounts to

shifting the basis of consensus from the scientific community
to the community at large.
This is not an attractive solution for two reasons.
First,

it does not tell

observation reports
achieve

any

is how specifically scientific

(that have no common sense corollaries)

reasonable

sense

of

objectivity.

With

theory-ladenness admitted, there would appear to be no basis
for

consensus

on the content of observation reports.

second reason for rejecting this solution is
himself implicitly rejects it.

The

that Nagel

He grants that circularity in

the testing relation is still possible, although avoidable.
Within science relative stability does not solve the problem
of the objectivity of observation.
objectivity
admission

is
of

the

content

of

theory-ladenness

As long as the basis of
observation

will

meaning-dependence and circularity.

raise

reports,
the

And as

issue

the
of

long as the

evidence of observation is even occasionally circular, it can
not

be

genuine

evidence

observation is in doubt.

because

the

obj ecti vi ty

of
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Nagel's treatment of science is interesting for one
more reason.

He raises the issue of the function of theory

in science but he can find no way to account for it within
the parameters of the problem of justification.

His

criterion fails

sometimes

because,

report observations.
the

problem

of

as he sees,

The problem of objectivity as well as

theories

results

objectivity in observation.
of

discovery

theories

"use"

the

from

the

isolation

of

If he had examined the problem

interrelations

between

theory

and

observation would have become the working context of his
philosophy of science.

Instead, the separation of theory and

observation

presupposition.

become

a

Consequently,

the

function of theory in reporting observations was as much a
problem as the objectivity of observation.
In short, Nagel tried to solve Kuhn's problems but he
retained the source of those problems in his assumptions
about observation.

And like Kuhn, he avoided the one route

that offered relief from the difficulties raised by theoryladenness.
This

attempt

to

solve

the

problems

raised

by

theory-ladenness failed, but others have concluded implicitly
that those problems are unsolvable.
supported this

conclusion.

Like

The article by Thrane
Kuhn,

Thrane say

that

theory-ladenness was incompatible with a consensus-on-content
interpretation of the basis

of objectivity

in observation.

But unlike Kuhn, he chose to develop a concept of vision that
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was

theory-free.

Without theory,

he thought,

consensus on

the content of observation would be achievable.

His article

is interesting because it establishes conditions that must be
met

for

theory-free

observation.

The

most

important

condition is that the object of observation must be something
of which we are not aware.

This is so because to be aware of

something is to-be aware of it as something determinate.
Since determinateness is the province of theory or knowledge,
indeterminateness

is

critical

to

theory-free

vision.

Thrane's argument for the possibility of perceiving something
without being aware of it fails, but he detects failure in an
even more important sense.

Even if it were

reasonable to

talk of an object of vision of which we are not aware,
would be useless for philosophy of science, he says.
Because an object of vision

that

is so radically

it

Why?

indeter-

minate cannot be specified as content in an observation
report.

In other words, his theory aims at a ground for

consensus on observation reports but the conditions required
for consensus are incompatible with content.
Thrane's article helps to point out that the problems
of philosophy of science discussed here were not created by
the theory-ladenness of observation, but were implicit in the
separation of theory from observation.

The principle that

consensus on the content of observation reports was the basis
of

objectivity

required

incompatible

presuppositions.

It

189
required indeterminateness for consensus and determinateness
for content.
I have described the independence of the evidence of
observation as a pseudo-problem.
for

two reasons.

First,

It arises, as we have seen

the concept of the objectivity of

observation reports and the theory-ladenness of observation
seemed to threaten that concept.
theory in its

And second, the concept of

relation to observation was left unexamined.

Theory was examined in philosophy of science to be sure, but
the

sense

in

which

it

might

be

observation was left unspecified.

said

to

contribute

to

I have offered discovery

as the approach to correct this situation because discovery
in

science~

the discovery of theories.

If we examine that

process we find both what theories contribute to observation
and how they make that contribution.

What they contribute is

the selection and connection of the data-energy from the
environment and not the data itself.

How the contribution is

made is through constant contact with the environment.
tells us both

~hat

This

theory is not a dilution-factor and that

it does not spring ex nihilo from the mind of the scientist.
It

is

empirical

both

in process

and

product

and

fully

compatible with an objective account of observation.
The

independence

of

observational

evidence

is

a

pseudo-problem based on faulty presuppositions about the
objectivity

of

observation and

discovery of theory.

the

failure

to

analyze

the

Nagel's work showed us how the latter
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results in the treatment of theory as the "free creation" of
the mind of the scientist and the concomitant inability to
integrate the function of theory into philosophy of science.
The meaning-dependence of observation terms on theory
was shown to be a pseudo-problem on similar grounds.

In a

common sense sort of way it is surprising that such a problem
should plague self-avowed empiricists.
meaning dependence

should arise

for

If a relation of

empiricists

it

should

have been the other way around, with the assumption that
theory

terms

were

meaning-dependent

on

observation

terms.

But it was to illuminate the reasons behind this construal of
the problem that

the demarcation criterion was

introduced.

The empiricists made presuppositions that were shielded from
examination.
metaphysics
evidence.
was

They assumed that science was different from
because

of

dependence

on

observational

Observation became their criterion of the real and

doubly

protected

philosophy of science.
exercise

its

in

Consequently,
science was

from

only

in

the

program

of

To examine it would appear to be an

metaphysics
the

inclusion

or

an

incursion

recognized

source

into
of

science.

meaning

in

theory and the arrow of meaning-dependence was

clearly established.
But,
examine

again,

to correct this problem we need only

the discovery of theories

to find

determination is the process of science itself.

that

meaning

"Theory" and

"observation" are logical distinctions which illuminate that
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process but they do not refer to separate or separable sets
of

terms.

It

is

only when

theory

and

observation are

artificially separated that dependence appears as a problem.
Falsification theory offered little that was new, as
the

problem

of

Non-rejection

the

was

non-rejection

a

problem

of

only

theories

because

of

showed.
related

assumptions about the basis of objectivity and the program of
philosophy

of

science.

Observation provided

the

bas is

of

objectivity because of its content and this in turn was the
foundation of the rationality of science.
the

theory-ladenness

of

observation

The admission of

forced

the

falsifica-

tionists toward a conventionalist position, but this appeared
(at least to Lakatos) the only alternative to irrationalism.
That
significant

is,

falsificationism

philosophical

unsupportable

content

advance

did
because

interpretation

objectivity in observation,

not
it

of

represent
retained

the

basis

a
the
of

and because it continued to

restrict the program of philosophy of science to the testing
relation and its

implications.

The sophisticated provisos

added by Lakatos, e.g., that a theory not be rejected until
another is found with "corroborated excess empirical content
over

its

predecessor,"

science, but 1 t

is

significant

for

understanding

has the flavor of an ad hoc addendum.

The

program of philosophy of science as justification provided no
context within which
general has

become

this
too

insight

fragmented,

fits.

Justification

resembling a

in

patchwork
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more than a program, as a result of the damage to the concept
of objectivity brought by theory-ladenness.
Discovery, on the other hand,

provides a context

within which the peaceful co-existence between theories and
anomalies constitutes no problem for the
science.

rationality of

The objectivity of observation, discovery revealed,

is not based on content.
This is why Hanson's philosophy of science represents
an

alternative

to

the

traditional

empiricist

program.

Instead of making assumptions about observation, he proposed
to examifle observation as the starting point of philosophy of
science.

The issue is discovery,

he said,

and the way to

enlighten discovery is by determining how theories are built
into our appreciation of observation,

facts

and data.

He

began with the assumption that theories and observation are
intimately related, and with the further assumption that the
way to understand the rationality of science was through the
investigation of that relation.
The fruit of Hanson's approach can be seen in his
contribution to the understanding of theories as the context
or background against which observational details make sense
alongside other data.
empirical part
analysis

He also characterized theory as an

of science.

But,

equally

important

in his

of observation which attempted to accommodate

complexity and depth.

its

He was able to bring these insights to

bear on particular issues in philosophy of science.

He was
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able to show, for instance, that the so-called "functionally
a priori" character of some of the laws of classical physics
is

a

psychological

issue

with

little

relevance

to

the

epistemology of science, giving new meaning to the charge of
"psychologism."
be

He also showed that many problems thought to

peculiar to quantum mechanics fit

the relations between

theory and observation that he developed in Patterns of
Discovery.
Hanson's philosophy of science mapped the discovery
direction that I have followed here.

He began by examining

the interrelations between theory and observation with the
result that he was able to specify the function of theory in
scientific observation as well as

its empirical character.

The theory-ladenness of observation appeared to be threatening from the justificationist's perspective in part because
that perspective offered no analysis of the relations between
theory and observation.
admitted in some cases

Theory input into observation was
(such as in the works of Nagel and

Kuhn treated here) without any specification of its actual
meaning or sense.

Whatever

its meaning it appeared to

conflict with objectivity based on the content of observation
reports.

By following Hanson's lead I have been able to show

that it is possible to develop a concept of observation that
is both objective and compatible with theory input.
function of theory,

I

have argued,

The

can be characterized as
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selective and connective which makes it both empirical and a
non-diluting factor in perception.
I have further attempted to develop a theory of truth
that

is

knowledge.

appropriate
That

theory

for

this

has

approach

elements

well as coherence and pragmatism.

of

to

scientific

correspondence as

One of the most attractive

parts of the theory is that it avoids too great a dependence
on coherence or conventionalism.

Lakatos described Popper as

courageous for his willingness to proceed on an essentially
conventional foundation, having found no reasonable sense of
correspondence.

The lack of a correspondence element was due

to the faulty and unsupportable assumption that obj ecti vi ty
was to be founded on observation reports.

To proceed as he

did seemed the only path open, given the dictates of the
justification program of philosophy of science,

but a more

prudent course would have been to seek another ground for or
interpretation of objectivity.
The coherence or conventional aspect of the theory of
truth developed here is not a
has a

retreat position but instead

functional role in the philosophy of discovery.

All

discoveries are contextual and understanding how a discovery
was made requires an appreciation of the history of the
problem that stimulated research in the first place.

Harold

Brown recommends the analysis of discovery in science based
on its historical context but he has explicitly given up any
sense of correspondence between scientific knowledge and the
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world.
of a

Instead he calls any proposition "true" that is part
body or scientific knowledge

( [l],

pp.

152-155).

He

overtly embraces historicism and relativism as that which is
possible for philosophy of science.
This is not a necessary course.

In a recent article

Theodore Kisiel attempts to formulate a
which

illuminates

the

rationality

logic of discovery

of

science

without

abandoning the belief that scientific knowledge somehow makes
objective contact with the world.
points

out,

begins

with

problems are not man-made.

the

The logic of discovery, he
problem to

be

solved,

and

They force themselves upon us and

this suggests a sense of objectivity that he calls "peculiar"
and more complex than the objectivity of atomically isolated
data

( [2],

p.

405).

This

is compatible with the sense of

objectivity to which I have attempted to give structure here.
I.e., observation is treated as objective because the input
from the world is both genuine and undiluted.
Kisiel further argues that the logic of discovery is
more

basic

than

traditional forms

of reasoning such as

deduction since these depend on discovery for their premises.
This more basic form or

rational! ty would be measured,

he

says, by the ability of the researcher to adapt to new and
challenging problems ([2], pp.

403-404).

This stands in

marked contrast to measuring a student's ability to learn and
apply rigid rules of inference.
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Kisiel,

like Brown,

takes what might be called a

contextual approach and for that reason could be on the same
path to conventionalism.

He avoids that course, however, by

placing his analysis of discovery in a wider, human context
with

discovery

presupposes

characterized

as

a

objectivity and precedes

"form

of

life"

verification

that

( [2],

p.

409).

His direction for philosophical investigation is

aimed,

in

my

discovery.

terms,
I

at

believe

fleshing
that

out

this

is

the

coherence

potentially a

of

very

fruitful direction to take.
An implied problem that deserves consideration is the
appropriateness
correspondence
consensus
then

of

available

is

for

primary

criterion

on observation reports

the basis

the most

the

metaphors

likely metaphor for

the

knowledge.
of

If

truth

and

of obj ecti vi ty,

relation between

knowledge and the world will be picturing or mirroring.
Hanson

has

pointed out

some

of

the

problems

with

this

metaphor, but in a broader sense it fails by being too rigid
and

specific.

genuine

It

contact

is possible for observation

with

the

foundation for consensus.
as

world
In fact,

without

to yield

generating

a

it can be characterized

objective without any specification of content and this

leaves open the possibility of a functional metaphor such as
"tool-using."
The shift from a content metaphor to a functional
metaphor may

have

other

interesting

implications

as

well.

197
Knowledge can be viewed as far more fluid and subject to
change (of any depth) on the tool interpretation without the
sense of threat that accompanied the content interpretation.
We

are

not

foreed

to

make

uncomfortable

concessions,

admitting for instance, that "knowledge" that once served us
effectively and was called "true" is now considered false.
Archaic knowledge was true because it manifested the three
elements of correspondence,

coherence and pragmatics.

The

fact that this was superseded represents no conflict for this
theory of knowledge simply because the basis of our concept
of objectivity is not content.
The emphasis on fluidity may also have implications
for fields such as learning theory and psychology.

Neurosis

might, for instance, be characterized and treated as, in
part, an epistemological illness--the inability to relinquish
certain non-functional approaches to the world.
A similar psychological problem may be responsible to
some

small

degree

for

obscuring the

laden observation to epistemology.

importance

of

theory-

While it is clear at a

common-sense level that our knowledge and attitudes influence
what

we are able to observe,

it is also common-sense that

many of those controlling factors are not empirically based
in any obvious way.
from our culture,

Attitudes and beliefs that are inherited
sub-culture and family may remain unchal-

lenged for a lifetime and yet constitute a dysfunctional
element

in our lives.

This would appear to call for a
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distinction

between

theory-laden

observation

(which

I

have

described as empirical in all its aspects) and ego-laden
observation.
The
more

tool-functional

practical

claims.

approach

to

metaphor may also
the

assessment

facilitate
of

a

knowledge

The process of determining the value of knowledge

claims need no longer be restricted to an up or down truth
determination.

The

discovery

itself, as Kisiel suggests,
life.

places

knowledge

in the broader context of human

The broader context allows for knowledge assessment

based on notions such as

"appropriateness."

metaphor, on the other hand,
to

approach

The picturing

restricts knowledge assessment

the corresponding relation between knowledge and its

purported objects.
The discovery approach,

however,

places no restric-

tions on the level of scrutiny in knowledge assessment.

The

only philosophical difference between theory and observation,
after all, is the level of generality.

Any level, including

the most basic observation is fair game.
It

is

my

belief

that

the

discovery

approach

to

scientific knowledge can give new life to philosophy of
science without sacrificing a basic commitment to empiricism.
It provides a context that is broader than justification, and
a viable interpretation of objectivity.
THE END
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